Greetings, everyone.
Things have been moving swiftly in Egypt and other areas of the Middle East. Were it not for Egypt, we would be seeing dramatic headlines from: Algeria (military administration being ended in favor of free elections), Tunisia (continuing uncertainty over who will become leader now that the dictator Ben Ali has fled), Yemen (anti-government demonstrations have picked up pace and spread throughout the country), Palestine and Israel (Palestine Papers leak show that Palestine leaders essentially were willing to give up everything to get a truncated form of freedom from Israeli occupation, and that showed how unwilling Israel is to accept anything like a two-state solution), Lebanon (with the resignation of the Hariri government intense negotiations among the various parties, including Hizballah with their new political allies the Druse, as it becomes clearer that the old National Pact structure of power-distributionwill no longer work), Turkey (which seems to have truly severed it remaining cooperative relationship with Israel), Iran (where the West seems to have accepted the analysis of Israeli and US intelligence that there is, indeed, no evidence that Iran has been pursuing nuclear weapons, and where the government seems to be shifting uneasily as they view the events in the Arab world), Iraq (where violence is escalating and the US strategy for Iraq is becoming less and less credible), Afghanistan (where "NATO coalition" i.e. US, forces have de facto abandoned huge swaths of the country while fighting hard in a few high-visibility areas), Pakistan (US policies and activities further destabilize the government and create support and cooperation for the "Pakistani Taliban") and.... Egypt, which dominates todays headlines and will do so until Mubarak leaves, and beyond depending on the nature of the interim government that will follow Mubarak's departure. Among today's developments in Egypt: 1. Mubarak, in my estimation, may well leave today (Friday/Saturday). This is by no-means a certainty, but has become the most likely scenario of many, with the growing estrangement of key figures in the new ministerial appointments that Mubarak made only a few days ago in an effort to save his position. If he does not leave very soon, we are likely to see demonstrators moving on the presidential Palace, only a few kilometers from Tahrir Square. 2. International support for Mubarak continues to evaporate, oddly but logically enough, leaving only Israel as having announced general support for him, and the Saudis who have limited themselves to offering a safe haven for Mubarak and his family. 3. Parliamentary (Shura as-Shab) elections are likely to be moved up and take place within a very few months. The same goes for the "upper" Shura, and it is likely that the Presidential election will be moved forward from its scheduled date in September. 4. The Muslim Brotherhood is unlikely to run a candidate for President, but will run candidates for the new parliament. Muhammad al-Baradei seems to be fading as a candidate to head the transitional government (which I thought was 'most likely' a few days ago), but this may be because he is saving his candidacy for the coming elections (it being likely that the head of the interim government will have to pledge not to run in the elections). 5. The post-Jumma demonstrations today are likely to be be massive, and even more widespread throughout Egypt than last-weeks. I expect that there will be some disagreement among the demonstrators as to whether they should march on the Presidential Palace or not. The army is 'highly likely' to act more decisively today in protecting the demonstrators from the attacks of thugs associated with the National Democratic Party -- the same thugs who repressed free elections in the last Shura elections. The government is dissociating itself from these attacks, which in effect destroyed Mubarak's efforts to raise public sentiment in his favor and might have allowed him to hold onto power through September. And lastly, following up on our earlier discussions on how communications could take place in the face of the Egyptian governments cut-off of access to the net and cell phones, see this for a fascinating description of one person's work-arounds: http://english.aljazeera.net/video/middleeast/2011/02/201122123021363973.html "Bypassing Egypt's web blackout" Cheers, lawry On Jan 30, 2011, at 10:06 AM, de Bivort Lawrence wrote: > Good morning/day/evening, Keith, > > I was thinking more of communications to the outside world, rather than > internal communications in Egypt, trying to reflect my immediate experience > of the information flows from within Egypt to the outside world. Normally, I > routinely have sent to me about a dozen Middle East sources a day, and when > something hot is happening or when specific clients have upped their requests > for analysis/recommendations, that can double. > > So i estimated that after the first 12-hour period from the Egyptian cut-off > of internet access and cell-phone internal nets (upon which much flow of info > to the outside is dependent) about 70% of the flow was restored, though not > necessarily through the normal channels. So, for example, embassies increased > their rate of info flow to compensate for the cut-offs. Some hotels (whose > access to the Net seems not to have been impaired) started reporting news, > too. Nile-TV got some important footage and reporting out. I don't know how > these last two did it, technically. > > Al-Jazeera and CNN came on-line quickly via dish satellite and with the > cooperation of at least one hotel that gave their reporters access to vantage > points. For example, both were transmitting footage (you probably saw the > video of demonstrators rocking a police personnel carrier and eventually > setting it on fire Friday night) from the Marriott Zamalek hotel. > > Internal communications in the end will be more determining of what happens. > So -- > > Egypt has about 10 million landline phones, and 55 million mobile phones. > Let's say that the cell-phones were/are effectively cut off (I placed several > calls to mobile numbers and could not get through over the last couple of > days, but this could be for several reasons). > > Let's say that 75% of the Egyptian land-lines are in Cairo. The population of > Cairo is around 20 million, comprising, say, 4 million households. So between > business, government and household landlines, one can readily posit that at a > minimum every other household has a land-line phone, or are neighbors of one > that does. > > Egyptians are a friendly, gregarious, social people, and every day spend a > substantial amount of time visiting each other, taking tea or coffee in the > innumerable cafés that dot every street and alley. > > So I imagine that Cairenes had little trouble finding out what was going on > and passing the news on rapidly to each other, even without the use of > cell-phones. the same would be true of the smaller cities: Suez, Mansoura, > Ismailliya, Alexandria. The upper Nile towns would probably be more isolated. > > These internal patterns and ease of communications would be true of all > communities, rich and poor, Muslim (90% of the population), Copts (9%), and > Jews (1%); educated, and less educated. > > And then, of course, among the demonstrators themselves, communications would > be rapid as they are all milling about together. > > The thing that impressed me was the coherence of the demonstrators. Some of > them formed a cordon around the Egyptian Museum (home to most the Pharaohonic > treasures) to protect against looting) and readily handed over that security > job to the army when it showed up. They occupied the TV-building (and > others), and then vacated it peacefully when the army showed up to secure it. > > I have been studying how insects (ants, bees, termites, schooling fish) > behave collectively, and how they can generate collective behaviors that > exceed the communications and decision-making capacities of its individuals, > and have become convinced that large groups of demonstrators (or other large > groups of randomly selected individuals not bound by top-down C&C structures) > show similar patterns of action and decision-making. > > Cheers, > Lawry > > > > > On Jan 29, 2011, at 1:35 PM, Keith Hudson wrote: > >> Hi Lawry, >> >> Fascinating. Are you saying that even though the protesters' cell-phones >> were cut off (and Internet access) that they then found a work-around? That >> is, so that they could resume full communication between themselves and also >> with the outside world? This, I think is what you have clearly said, but I >> just wanted to confirm it. The reason I'm asking is that the cell-phone has >> always been a potential catalyst and I often wonder just how much it will >> come into play in the West if times start to become rough -- particularly >> unemployment among the young (and particularly the graduate young) >> >> >> Bet wishes, >> >> Keith >> >> >> >> >> At 11:41 29/01/2011 -0700, you wrote: >>> Hi, Bob, >>> >>> Very interesting article. Thanks. here is another excellent technical one: >>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=egypt-internet-mubarak >>> >>> I have spent the last three days analyzing and consulting on events in >>> Egypt and the region and I am impressed by how rapidly information started >>> flowing out of Egypt after the Internet and cell-phone cut-off. There was a >>> 5-6 hour period in which news was severely truncated and spotty (maybe due >>> to the fact that the cut-off was made just after midnight and it took >>> people to wake up in the morning before they began to find work-arounds. >>> >>> By the12 hours after the cut-off I would say that the flow of information >>> was perhaps 70% as good as it would have been without the cut-off. >>> >>> I am referring here to publicly available info. Information flows from the >>> US and other embassies were essentially unaffected; there, the information >>> limitations were that embassy personnel could not reach their regular >>> sources and contacts in the Egyptian government for explanations. >>> >>> Interestingly, the major international news agencies seemed to have the >>> same satellite uplinks in Cairo that they had in Baghdad when the US >>> started bombing, and of course these were not subject to the cut-off. With >>> these news agencies the limitations on information flow seemed mostly to >>> reflect the fear that their correspondents had in going out into the >>> streets, fears legitimate in Baghdad but not in Cairo. >>> >>> Part of my work is to put out estimates on Mubarak's likelihood of staying >>> in power. As of 1100 hrs EST, this estimate was 92% that he will be >>> toppled, compared to 50% two a half days ago when we began tracking this. >>> Our next to last estimate was 85%, late last night. >>> >>> The continued strength of the demonstrations, the growingly common >>> fraternization between the demonstrators and the army forces that Mubarak >>> ordered in the major cities, and the withdrawal of the special internal >>> police forces to a cordon around the Presidential palace account for the >>> 85% to 92% movement in the estimate that Mubarak will go. >>> >>> We will be updating this as news continues to come in. >>> >>> Cheers, >>> Lawry >>> >>> >>> >>> On Jan 29, 2011, at 10:50 AM, Robert Stennett wrote: >>> >>>> http://gigaom.com/2011/01/28/how-egypt-switched-off-the-internet/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> How Egypt Switched Off the Internet >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> By Bobbie Johnson Jan. 28, 2011, 7:33am PST >>>> >>>> <2df17d6.jpg>Amid spreading protests, the Egyptian government has taken >>>> the incredible step of shutting down all communications late Thursday. >>>> Only a handful of web connections, including those to the nation’s stock >>>> exchange, remain up and running. >>>> >>>> It’s an astonishing move, and one that seems almost unimaginable for a >>>> nation that not only has a relatively strong Internet economy but also >>>> relies on its connections to the rest of the world. >>>> >>>> But how did the government actually do it? Is there a big kill switch >>>> inside Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s office? Do physical cables have >>>> to be destroyed? Can a lockdown like this work? >>>> >>>> Plenty of nations place limitations on communications, sometimes very >>>> severe ones. But there are only a few examples of regimes shutting down >>>> communications entirely — Burma’s military leaders notably cut >>>> connectivity during the protests of 2007, and Nepal did a similar thing >>>> after the king took control of the government in 2005 as part of his >>>> battle against insurgents. Local Chinese authorities have also conducted >>>> similar, short-lived blockades. >>>> >>>> The OpenNet Initiative has outlined two methods by which most nations >>>> could enact such shutdowns. Essentially, officials can either close down >>>> the routers which direct traffic over the border — hermetically sealing >>>> the country from outsiders — or go further down the chain and switch off >>>> routers at individual ISPs to prevent access for most users inside. >>>> >>>> In its report on the Burmese crackdown, ONI suggests the junta used the >>>> second option, something made easier because it owns the only two Internet >>>> service providers in the country. >>>> >>>> The Burmese Autonomous System (AS), which, like any other AS, is composed >>>> of several hierarchies of routers and provides the Internet infrastructure >>>> in-country. A switch off could therefore be conducted at the top by >>>> shutting off the border router(s), or a bottom up approach could be >>>> followed by first shutting down routers located a few hops deeper inside >>>> the AS. >>>> >>>> A high-level traffic analysis of the logs of NTP (Network Time Protocol) >>>> servers indicates that the border routers corresponding to the two ISPs >>>> were not turned off suddenly. Rather, our analysis indicates that this was >>>> a gradual process. >>>> >>>> While things aren’t clear yet, this doesn’t look like the pattern seen in >>>> Egypt, where the first indications of Internet censorship came earlier >>>> this week with the blockades against Twitter and Facebook, but when access >>>> disappeared, it disappeared fast, with 90 percent of connections dropping >>>> in an instant. >>>> >>>> Analysis by Renesys, an Internet monitoring body, indicates the shutdown >>>> across the nation’s major Internet service providers was at precisely the >>>> same time, 12:34 a.m. EET (22:34 UTC): >>>> >>>> Renesys observed the virtually simultaneous withdrawal of all routes to >>>> Egyptian networks in the Internet’s global routing table … The Egyptian >>>> government’s actions tonight have essentially wiped their country from the >>>> global map. >>>> >>>> Instead, the signs are that the Egyptian authorities have taken a very >>>> careful and well-planned method to screen off Internet addresses at every >>>> level, from users inside the country trying to get out and from the rest >>>> of the world trying to get in. >>>> >>>> “It looks like they’re taking action at two levels,” Rik Ferguson of Trend >>>> Micro told me. “First at the DNS level, so any attempt to resolve any >>>> address in .eg will fail — but also, in case you’re trying to get directly >>>> to an address, they are also using the Border Gateway Protocol, the system >>>> through which ISPs advertise their Internet protocol addresses to the >>>> network. Many ISPs have basically stopped advertising any internet >>>> addresses at all.” >>>> >>>> Essentially, we’re talking about a system that no longer knows where >>>> anything is. Outsiders can’t find Egyptian websites, and insiders can’t >>>> find anything at all. It’s as if the postal system suddenly erased every >>>> address inside America — and forgot that it was even called America in the >>>> first place. >>>> >>>> A complete border shutdown might have been easier, but Egypt has made sure >>>> that there should be no downstream impact, no loss of traffic in countries >>>> further down the cables. That will ease the diplomatic and economic >>>> pressure from other nations, and make it harder for protesters inside the >>>> country to get information in and out. >>>> >>>> Ferguson suggests that, if nothing else, the methods used by the Egyptian >>>> government prove how fragile digital communication really is. >>>> >>>> “What struck me most is that we’ve been extolling the virtues of the >>>> Internet for democracy and free speech, but an incident like this >>>> demonstrates how easy it is — particularly in a country where there’s a >>>> high level of governmental control — to just switch this access off.” >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> Futurework mailing list >>>> [email protected] >>>> https://lists.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Futurework mailing list >>> [email protected] >>> https://lists.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework >> Keith Hudson, Saltford, England http://allisstatus.wordpress.com/2011/01/ >> >> >
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