From: International Crisis Group [mailto:[email protected]] 
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Subject: Egypt Conflict Alert

 


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INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - CONFLICT ALERT


Egypt Conflict Alert


Brussels/Cairo | 4 Feb 2013

It is difficult to know which is most dangerous: the serious uptick in
street violence; President Morsi's and the Muslim Brotherhood's serial
inability to reach out to the rest of the political class inclusively; or
the opposition clinging to the hope of some extraneous event
(demonstrations, foreign pressure, judicial rulings or military
intervention) allowing it to gain power while bypassing arduous compromise
and politics. They are tied of course: the president's cavalier treatment of
the constitution-writing process and the judiciary and the opposition's
lethargic approach to politics and rejection of Islamist legitimacy alike
have eroded the authority of state institutions. This encourages in turn
unrest and contributes to the economic slide. Together, these heighten risks
of a complete breakdown of law and order. For two years, political factions
repeatedly have failed to reach consensus on basic rules of the game,
producing a transition persistently threatening to veer off the road. It is
past time for the president and opposition to reach an accommodation to
restore and preserve the state's integrity. 

Since President Mubarak's ouster, the level of violence has ebbed and
flowed, yet each new wave brings the country closer to tipping point.
Already, some police officers, beleaguered by attacks on their headquarters,
are considering removing their uniforms and going home; there is talk of
brewing discontent among Central Security Forces, the riot control police;
and criminal gangs along with looters profit from the chaos. There are new
shocking images of police brutality. Many young Egyptians increasingly
appear disillusioned with electoral politics, and some are drawn to
anarchical violence. 

The situation is made worse by deteriorating economic conditions. As foreign
currency reserves decline, the government finds it ever more difficult to
prop up the Egypt's pound or maintain fuel and food subsidies. One should
not be surprised to see larger segments of the population joining in
socio-economic riots. By current trends, Egypt could find itself in a
vicious cycle of economic under-performance and political instability, the
one fuelling the other. 

At first glance, the immediate trigger of the current crisis might appear to
be entirely local. The violence that claimed the lives of dozens in Port
Said began as reaction to death sentences for 21 soccer fans charged with
killing a rival team's fans. Yet, the events are symptomatic of a larger
trend erosion of respect for governing institutions. In the Suez Canal Zone
and the Nile Delta, protestors have violently targeted administrative
buildings, symbols of an authority viewed as removed, arbitrary and
impotent. The collapse of the police and increased porosity of borders with
Libya and Sudan, thus a marked increase in the illegal trafficking of light
arms, further enable street violence. 

Overshadowing this is a broader political context: a persistent, perilous
standoff between on one side the president and his Islamist backers for whom
elections appear to mean everything, and, on the other, opposition forces
for whom they seem to mean nothing; between those in power who deny
adversaries respect and those not in power who deny Islamists legitimacy.
The constitution-writing process was a sad microcosm: Islamist contempt in
forcing through what ought to have been a carefully constructed, consensual
document; opposition recklessness in seeking to exploit the moment to topple
the Brotherhood; one celebrating a narrow conception of majority rule, the
other holding to a counter-productive notion of street politics. 

In the absence of a shared view of the foundations of a future political
system, Islamists are pressing their vision, while their opponents play
spoilers. This has the makings of a self-fulfilling prophecy: the more the
opposition obstructs and calls for Morsi's ouster, the more it validates the
Islamists' conviction it will never recognise their right to govern; the
more the Brotherhood charges ahead, the more it confirms the others' belief
of its monopolistic designs over power. Even if leaders back away from the
brink, this could quickly get out of hand, as their ability to control the
rank and file - and, in the case of the opposition, ability to represent the
rank and file - dwindles. 

Reversing these dynamics requires efforts on two fronts. Politically, the
key is mutual acceptance of two realities: that the Brotherhood's electoral
victories give their rule legitimacy, but that a historic, complex
transition in a challenging security and economic context requires exercise
of power to be tempered by meaningful consensus-building. 

Several steps would help: an end to opposition calls for the president to
step down and agreement by Morsi that the constitution, whose adoption was
marred by boycotts and low voter turnout, ought to be revised to allay the
apprehensions of non-Islamists and notably the Coptic community. Likewise,
the process for designing the elections law - another topic of sharp
disagreement, especially on district boundaries and the representation of
women - should be revisited to reflect broader agreement among factions.
Finally, in the wake of approaching parliamentary elections, parties should
seek to form a national coalition, a result that would serve both the Muslim
Brotherhood (which would gain from the opposition becoming a responsible
stakeholder) and the opposition (which would be better positioned to impede
what it views as efforts to institute single party rule). 

The National Dialogue the president proposes is a possible forum. It should
build upon the 31 January Azhar memorandum in which all sides disavowed
violence and promised serious discussion; its agenda - to find a way to
amend the constitution and set the legal framework for legislative elections
- needs to be clearly defined in advance; participation should be expanded
to include representatives of youth activists and protesters. Parties should
commit that, for decisions requiring legislative action, their future
elected legislators would vote consistent with understandings reached in the
dialogue. 

The second set of challenges relates to the security environment. Security
sector reform broadly construed - including mechanisms to ensure
accountability and justice for victims of police brutality; training in
crowd control; but also measures to restore law and order - needs to be
tackled, and soon. 

The alternative could well be a downward spiral toward greater insecurity,
violence, social unrest and economic collapse. It also could be failure of a
transition to which all eyes are turned and whose fate would reverberate far
beyond its boundaries. 

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