Yes, I long for our great Golden Age as well. 

 

REH

 

From: futurework-boun...@lists.uwaterloo.ca
[mailto:futurework-boun...@lists.uwaterloo.ca] On Behalf Of Keith Hudson
Sent: Friday, August 02, 2013 8:47 PM
To: RE-DESIGNING WORK, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, EDUCATION
Subject: Re: [Futurework] FW: Is economic growth a continuous process that
will persist forever?

 

At 02:21 02/08/2013, you wrote:




Longing for Aristocracy again are you Keith.
 
REH


Naturally.

KSH




 
From: futurework-boun...@lists.uwaterloo.ca [
mailto:futurework-boun...@lists.uwaterloo.ca
<mailto:futurework-boun...@lists.uwaterloo.ca> ] On Behalf Of Keith Hudson
Sent: Thursday, August 01, 2013 11:51 AM
To: RE-DESIGNING WORK, INCOME DISTRIBUTION, EDUCATION; Arthur Cordell
Subject: Re: [Futurework] FW: Is economic growth a continuous process that
will persist forever?
 
At 01:56 01/08/2013, Arthur wrote:

  
Subject: FW: Is economic growth a continuous process that will persist
forever?

Hardly! In truth, economic growth as we know it, depended on a fluke. This
was due to the availability of limited liability banks in 18th century
England which hadn't occurred anywhere else in the whole of pre-history.
(Such banks, able to accumulate large amounts of cash was the only necessary
innovation needed for industrial take-off. It was no particular virtue of
Englishmen that the IR started here and not anywhere else.  More than 2,000
years previously, man was innovating other important elements -- the Greeks
could do precision engineering, the Indians practical mathematics, the
Romans steam-powered automata and the Chinese making steel.  If they had had
banks then any or all of these past civilization could have could have led
to IR.

All the above possibilities petered out very soon when some vital lynch pin
of their cultures gave way. In contrast, ours has been going on for much
longer. Something like 350 years. Until the mid-1980s. But also, since then,
the real median wage for what I call the 80-class of the population has been
reducing. Nominal wages have been going up.  Since then, and just as well
perhaps, there hasn't been any domestic good which has had the power of the
television or the car in the past, in causing people to work harder and
longer, or to save money. 

Keith 
     



 
ABSTRACT
 
This paper [written in August 2012 and 25 pages] raises basic questions
about the process of economic growth. It questions the assumption, nearly
universal since Solow's seminal contributions of the 1950s, that economic
growth is a continuous process that will persist forever. There was
virtually no growth before 1750, and thus there is no guarantee that growth
will continue indefinitely. Rather, the paper suggests that the rapid
progress made over the past 250 years could well turn out to be a unique
episode in human history. The paper is only about the United States and
views the future from 2007 while pretending that the financial crisis did
not happen. Its point of departure is growth in per-capita real GDP in the
frontier country since 1300, the U.K. until 1906 and the U.S. afterwards.
Growth in this frontier gradually accelerated after 1750, reached a peak in
the middle of the 20th century, and has been slowing down since. The paper
is about "how much further could the frontier growth rate decline?" 
 
The analysis links periods of slow and rapid growth to the timing of the
three industrial revolutions (IR's), that is, IR #1 (steam, railroads) from
1750 to 1830; IR #2 (electricity, internal combustion engine, running water,
indoor toilets, communications, entertainment, chemicals, petroleum) from
1870 to 1900; and IR #3 (computers, the web, mobile phones) from 1960 to
present. It provides evidence that IR #2 was more important than the others
and was largely responsible for 80 years of relatively rapid productivity
growth between 1890 and 1972. Once the spin-off inventions from IR #2
(airplanes, air conditioning, interstate highways) had run their course,
productivity growth during 1972-96 was much slower than before. In contrast,
IR #3 created only a short-lived growth revival between 1996 and 2004. Many
of the original and spin-off inventions of IR #2 could happen only once -
urbanization, transportation speed, the freedom of females from the drudgery
of carrying tons of water per year, and the role of central heating and air
conditioning in achieving a year-round constant temperature. 
 
Even if innovation were to continue into the future at the rate of the two
decades before 2007, the U.S. faces six headwinds that are in the process of
dragging long-term growth to half or less of the 1.9 percent annual rate
experienced between 1860 and 2007. These include demography, education,
inequality, globalization, energy/environment, and the overhang of consumer
and government debt. A provocative "exercise in subtraction" suggests that
future growth in consumption per capita for the bottom 99 percent of the
income distribution could fall below 0.5 percent per year for an extended
period of decades. 
 
Robert J. Gordon 
Department of Economics 
KateNorthwestern University Evanston, 
IL 60208-2600 
and NBER 
r...@northwestern.edu
 
 

_______________________________________________
Futurework mailing list
Futurework@lists.uwaterloo.ca
https://lists.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework
_______________________________________________
Futurework mailing list
Futurework@lists.uwaterloo.ca
https://lists.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework

_______________________________________________
Futurework mailing list
Futurework@lists.uwaterloo.ca
https://lists.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework

Reply via email to