Maybe it's not about dumbing down, but rather tuning out, or tuning in to a different message. > Admittedly a view from the right, but one worth considering. > > Arthur Cordell > > > TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2001 (A18) > > Prole Models ---- By Charles Murray > > The Wall Street Journal Op Ed > > That American life has coarsened over the past several decades is not much > argued, but the > nature of the beast is still in question. Gertrude Himmelfarb sees it as a > struggle between > competing elites, in which the left originated a counterculture that the > right failed to hold back. > Daniel Patrick Moynihan has given us the phrase "defining deviancy down," > to describe a > process in which we change the meaning of moral to fit what we are doing > anyway. I wish to > add a third voice to the mix, that of the late historian Arnold Toynbee, > who would find our > recent history no mystery at all: We are witnessing the proletarianization > of the dominant > minority. > > The language and thought are drawn from a chapter of "A Study of History," > entitled "Schism in > the Soul," in which Toynbee discusses the disintegration of civilizations. > He observes that one > of the consistent symptoms of disintegration is that the elites -- > Toynbee's "dominant minority" -- > begin to imitate those at the bottom of society. His argument goes like > this: > > The growth phase of a civilization is led by a creative minority with a > strong, self-confident > sense of style, virtue and purpose. The uncreative majority follows along > through mimesis, "a > mechanical and superficial imitation of the great and inspired originals." > In a disintegrating > civilization, the creative minority has degenerated into elites that are > no longer confident, no > longer setting the example. Among other reactions are a "lapse into > truancy" (a rejection, in > effect, of the obligations of citizenship), and a "surrender to a sense of > promiscuity" > (vulgarizations of manners, the arts, and language) that "are apt to > appear first in the ranks of the > proletariat and to spread from there to the ranks of the dominant > minority, which usually > succumbs to the sickness of `proletarianization.'" > > That sounds very much like what has been happening in the U.S. Truancy and > promiscuity, in > Toynbee's sense, are not new in America. But until a few decades ago they > were publicly > despised and largely confined to the bottom layer of Toynbee's proletariat > -- the group we used > to call "low-class" or "trash," and which we now call the underclass. > Today, those behaviors > have been transmuted into a code that the elites sometimes imitate, > sometimes placate, and fear > to challenge. Meanwhile, they no longer have a code of their own in which > they have > confidence. > > A small example will illustrate the broader phenomenon. In 1960, > four-letter words were still > unknown in public discourse. Among the elites, they were used sparingly > even in private. Free > use of vulgar language among adults was declasse. Now switch to the fall > of 2000 and a Sports > Illustrated article about the Oakland Raiders, in which the author conveys > the reason for the new > coach's success by quoting the apercu of one of Oakland's star players: > "He don't take no s -- , > and he knows his s -- ." > > One significant aspect of the editorial choice to publish the quote is > that the editors of Sports > Illustrated, a glossy, upscale magazine, had no reason to think they would > offend their > readership. Everyone does it -- as indeed everyone does. Another > significant aspect is that the > editors could leave the grammar untouched without worrying that they would > be accused of > condescension toward the player who was the identified source of the > quote. > > Most striking of all, the player's observation was quoted approvingly. The > writer sees the words > as pithy and stylish -- as they are, in their way. If pithiness and style > are the sole criteria for > selecting what to publish, the writer and editors were guilty of no lapse > of judgment. Technical > mastery of craft is not at issue here, just as it is not at issue for > "South Park" or the average MTV > video. At issue is the cultural significance of choosing to approve the > vulgar and the illiterate, > both of which used to be classic indicators of the underclass. > > Respectfulness toward, and imitation of, underclass behavior extend to the > other classic signals > that used to distinguish nice people from riff-raff. Appearance? The > hooker look in fashion, > tattoos, and body piercing is the obvious evidence, although Toynbee would > probably see as > much significance in wearing jeans to church. I find the intriguing > element here to be the > respectfulness extended toward underclass appearance. No one in the public > eye calls any kind > of dress "cheap" or "sleazy" any more. > > Sexual behavior? As late as 1960, sleeping with one's boyfriend was still > a lower-class thing to > do. Except in a few sophisticated circles, a woman of the elites did it > furtively, and usually with > the person she expected to marry. Behavior that is now considered > absolutely normal was > considered sluttish in 1960. > > Family? The divorce rate in 1960 was only a notch higher than it had been > in the first recorded > figures from 1920. It happened among members of the dominant minority, but > rarely and with > extreme reluctance. As for living together without being married and > having babies without > marrying the father, language alone conveys their change in status over > the years. People used to > shack up; now they cohabit. The woman used to have a bastard, then an > illegitimate child; now > she has a nonmarital birth. > > Language, appearance, sex, and family: Each of the signs by which we used > to recognize a > member of the underclass fails today. But the proletarianization of the > dominant minority has > broader implications than changes in social norms. What we are witnessing > is the aftermath of a > collapse of the code of the elites, creating a vacuum in which underclass > behavior takes on the > elements of a code. > > By code I mean your internal yardstick for tracking how you measure up to > a standard that is > accepted by those whose approval you seek. I will focus here on the code > of the gentleman as it > evolved in this country, where it had nothing to do with being rich or > wellborn. To be an > American gentleman meant that one was brave, loyal and true. When one was > in the wrong, one > owned up and took one's punishment like a man. One didn't take advantage > of women. One was > gracious in victory and a good sport in defeat. One's handshake was more > binding than any legal > document. When the ship went down, one put the women and children into the > lifeboats and > waved goodbye with a smile. > > They used to be rules. Now they are jokes. Some men still live by them -- > there is a lot of stealth > virtue going around -- but they are embarrassed to say what they are > doing. The code of the > gentleman has collapsed, just as the parallel code of the lady has > collapsed. > > The collapse of old codes leaves a vacuum that must be filled. Within the > elites, the replacement > has been tenets, broadly accepted by people across the political spectrum, > that tell us to treat > people equally regardless of gender, race, or sexual preference, to be > against poverty and war, > and to be for fairness and diversity. These are not bad things to be > against and for, respectively, > but the new code, which I will call ecumenical niceness, has a crucial > flaw. The code of the > elites is supposed to set the standard for the society, but ecumenical > niceness has a hold only on > those people whom the elites are willing to judge -- namely, one another. > One of the chief tenets > of ecumenical niceness is not to be judgmental about the underclass. > > Within the underclass, the vacuum has been filled by a distinctive, > separate code. Call it thug > code: Take what you want, respond violently to anyone who antagonizes you, > gloat when you > win, despise courtesy as weakness, treat women as receptacles, take pride > in cheating, > deceiving, or exploiting successfully. The world of hip-hop is where the > code is openly > embraced. But hip-hop is only an expression of the code, not its source. > It amounts to the > hitherto inarticulate values of underclass males from time immemorial, now > made articulate > with the collaboration of some of America's best creative and > merchandising talent. > > Thug code is actively espoused by a tiny minority of the population, and > probably not even by > many of the kids who love hip-hop. But it is vital, confidently celebrated > by its adherents, and > coherent. And there can be no counterweight from an elite that has lost > the confidence to say, > "We will not stand for this." If you doubt the impotence of ecumenical > niceness, consider the > recent reaction to the white rapper Eminem. His misogyny and homophobia > are a direct, > in-your-face challenge to the most central elements of ecumenical > niceness, thrown down within > an industry that passionately condemns any whiff of discrimination against > women or gays when > it is done by a peer. If the dominant minority still possessed a cultural > code with spine and elan, > Eminem would have no more chance of recording his lyrics than a > four-letter word had of > getting into Sports Illustrated in 1960. > > Toynbee entitled his discussion "Schism in the Soul" because the > disintegration of a civilization > is not a monolithic process. As elite culture begins to mimic proletarian > culture, remnants of the > elites become utopians, or ascetics, or try to reinvoke old norms (viz. > the words you are > reading). To recognize a disintegrating civilization, Toynbee says, look > for a riven culture -- > riven as our culture is today. > > For every example of violence and moral obtuseness coming out of > Hollywood, one can cite > films, often faithful renderings of classic novels, expressing an > exquisite moral sensibility. On > television, the worst-of-times, best-of-times paradox can be encompassed > within the same show > -- "The Sopranos," "Ally McBeal," and "The Simpsons" come to mind. In > social life, there are > signs that the family in the upper half of American society is beginning > to reknit itself, even as it > continues to disintegrate in the lower half. Religion seems to be taken > more seriously by today's > elites than it was 20 years ago. > > I used to think these contrasting trends foreshadowed a bimodal America, > with the elites doing > well and the underclass growing. Now I hear Toynbee murmuring "Remnants" > in my ear, and I > am not so sure. > > If he is right, bean-counting doesn't work in this case. Whether a culture > turns out bits and pieces > of the admirable is irrelevant to understanding where it stands on the > trajectory of history. If the > question is whether America's elites are being proletarianized, the answer > is found by > identifying the things that are no longer taken for granted. It may be a > positive sign that important > voices have again begun to talk about virtue, but the salient fact is that > they must start by > defending the proposition that virtue and vice are valid concepts. > Important voices are talking > about the coarsening of American life, but the salient fact is that they > can no longer appeal to a > common understanding of vulgarity and a common contempt for the vulgar. In > these senses, the > elites have already been proletarianized, and only remnants protest. > > Looking at history through a single prism, even Toynbee's, is bound to > lead one astray in some > respects -- no one is that good at understanding history yet. Still, the > bedrock validity of his > argument is persuasive, and not only for America. Elites throughout the > West are twisting in > apology for every failing they can concoct, disavowing what is best in > their cultures, and > imitating what is worst. But we in America have special reason to worry > about how far the > unraveling has gone. > > I have waited to make the obvious point until the end, lest I lose too > many of my readers before > now. But I urge that the following statement is not, at bottom, a partisan > one: Bill Clinton's > presidency, in both its conduct and in the reactions to that conduct, was > a paradigmatic example > of elites that have been infected by "the sickness of proletarianization." > The survival of our > culture requires that we somehow contrive to get well. > > --- > > Mr. Murray is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. > >
