At 10:35 AM 06/29/01 -0700, Franklin Wayne Poley wrote:
>What happens to the meritocracy if/when we find ourselves in an era of
>total automation and "the end of work" as Rifkin phrases it?
>FWP
As Michael Young pointed out somewhere, meritocracy was a mongrel neologism
combining Latin and Greek roots. I was musing over an even more awkward
neologism than meritocracy -- how about the "meritolottocracy" (my
dictionary gives the etymology of lottery, *loterij*, as Dutch).
For quite some time -- beginning perhaps with the hordes of college-educated
baby boomers -- it has not been sufficient to have demonstrated "merit". The
degree has become a pre-requisite for employment but not a ticket to
employment (which is not to argue that it *should* be a ticket). Meanwhile
the credential bar has been steadily raised. Credentials are used by
personnel departments as a convenient way of sifting the excessive
applicants out of the pile. In the process, the credentials themselves have
become both devalued and inflated.
It also strikes me that there is a fundamental confusion between the merit
system, as it pertains to appointment to office (or selection for a job),
and the outcomes expected from that system. The original idea was to replace
cronyism and corruption with competence. That makes sense. What doesn't make
sense (to me, anyway) is extending the reach from competence to some vaguely
conceived and subjectively-operationalized notion of "excellence". What I
see every day is "highly qualified" people developing, promoting and
enacting dubious policy decisions that those certified-excellent folks know
damned well to be dubious. The cynicism is pervasive.
Decisions are made not on *the merits of the case* but with respect to the
presumed merit of the persons affected by the decisions and/or entrusted
with making the decisions. In turn, that presumed merit is predicated on the
persons' inflated/devalued credentials and on their success in the lottery
in which those credentials have entered them. Instead of having to endure
plain old garden variety corruption and cronyism, we now have an equally
corrupt hybrid system of cronyism based on credentials and conceitedness.
The difference, for those who need it spelled out, is that assistant deputy
ministers don't take bribes. Instead they abide by the intricate protocols
of an interminable series of career-enhancing "acts of discretion". Their
merit consists above all in their fawning eagerness to do and defend
precisely that which any fool can see is the way for them to get ahead.
Case in point:
I have copied, below, a quotation on guaranteed income and labour market
activity forwarded by the Labour Welfare Party from Andrew Wharton,
Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Research Division, B.C. Ministry of
Social Development and Economic Security. This is a fascinating example of
the selective use of "evidence-based" policy justification. It is pure
sophistry.
Mr. Wharton refers to a point made in the federal discussion paper,
Improving Social Security in Canada. Several OTHER points were made in the
discussion paper were either totally down-graded in the implementation of
policy (the changing nature of employment relations) or that cynically
sought to justify policies that did get implemented on the basis of how they
would play in public perceptions (spin doctoring).
Research did not support penalizing repeat UI claimants. Public relations
did. Two of the leading economists in Canada (who by the way generally
admire Alice Nakamura who championed the so-called "experience rating of
claimants") privately described the stated rationale in the discussion paper
as "despicable".
The final decisions made by the federal government on the social security
reform were dictated not by discussion of the discussion paper -- however
skewed it may have been -- but by the federal Finance Minister's ambition to
quickly slash the federal budget deficit. To that end, billions of dollars
each year were diverted to general revenues from Unemployment Insurance
(re-named Employment Insurance in true Orwellian-style) premiums. To cite
ONE claim out of context from that federal discussion paper is disingenous.
I have approached SDES on research-based policy innovations and have been
told quite frankly -- too frankly, perhaps -- that the policy mold was cast
in the early 1990s as a result of a provincial policy review process. Here
is basically what my informant told me: the review process resulted in a
"balanced" range of recommendations some of which would have made life
distinctly easier for poor folks and others that were designed to appease
the seemingly insatiable demand that welfare policies not discourage
SUPPLY-SIDE labour market activity (regardless of demand-side conditions, of
course).
As this "balanced" set of changes ran the gauntlet from deliberation to
implementation many of the suspiciously kindhearted elements were toned-down
or edited out and what remained was the disciplinary ballast. Chalk another
one up for the sociology of policy-making and bureaucratic implementation
(but be sure to cite "research studies").
In short research supports what the Ministry does. It also supports what the
Ministry doesn't do. It also doesn't support what the Ministry does. And
let's not forget that the funding of research is itself biased by the uses
to which funders wish to put the results of the research. What are the
chances that the Policy and Research Division would fund critical
ethnographic research into the policy-making process?
What is lacking in the policy process is integrity with regard to the use,
non-use and abuse of research. Research has demonstrated that
decision-making in government ministries is heavily influenced by the class
attitudes and interests of the senior officials. I doubt Mr. Wharton would
be much interested in THOSE studies, though.
Somehow, the labour market activity of the lowly is an abiding concern for
the privileged. The labour market activity of the *privileged* is, however,
simply a "fact of life" -- the reward of merit, we might imagine -- that
belongs behind a veil of discretion.
Andrew Wharton, Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Research Division wrote:
"Research has demonstrated that these two different and conflicting
objectives cannot be reconciled by the same income guarantee scheme. In the
federal government discussion paper, Improving Social Security in Canada,
the point is made that converting Canada's income security programs into a
single GAI is not a practical idea.
"A GAI with an appropriate rate should reduce the cost and complexity of the
welfare system and increase labour market activity by current social
assistance recipients. However, this improvement would be more than offset
by reduced labour market activity by lower and middle income workers. The
net result would be a reduction in labour market activity. Results of
experiments conducted in Manitoba and the United States in the early 1970s
are consistent with this view*labour market participation declined."
Tom Walker
Bowen Island, BC
604 947 2213
