Hi Ed, I'm a little taken aback by the strength of your feelings concerning American culture.
With respect, I think you've got it backwards. I think it's precisely because most of the rest of the world want to live like the Americans that anti-Americanism is stirred up so powerfully. The stirring-up has two ingredients. In the case of Islam and the current riots that are now going on, one of the ingredients is the considerable number of young, jobless men who are so frustrated with lack of economic progress that they can easily be manipulated by demagogues. The other ingredient, the demagogues themselves, comprise the existing power structure that feels itself in danger -- in the case of Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey, Iran and several other Islamic countries, the mullahs -- who present the case as an American attack on their religion. Osama ben Laden, as a rich Saudi Arabian with previous close connections with the Saudi royal family, is an example of a member of the elite who could sense a loss of power if American culture continued to invade his country and overturn what is, in effect, a medieval kingdom where people can have their hands or feet cut off for petty crime or where women who've offended against their husband can be buried up to their armpits in sand and then stoned to death. Similar frustration has caused the troubles in Northern Ireland for the past 30 or 40 years. The Protestants had all the best jobs (and still comprise 95% of the police force), and the nationalist Catholics couldn't get a look in. It's presented (by the Protestants) as a religious issue. But that's just to disguise their fear that they sense that their power is now seeping away. Similar anti-Americanism has been occurring in France for some years by the elite 'enarques' whoi've been writing, speaking and legislating against too many Hollywood films being shown on TV and English being increasingly used as the official EEC language. Similarly snetiments are expressed in Germany. None of this is a simple 'My culture(or religion) versus your Culture (or religion)'. It is resistance by existing power structures who fear loss of control in a freer, less authoritarian society. Now you, Ed, might have an intellectual or philosophical case against American culture. And so might I -- there are many features of America that I don't like. But I don't think we should project such feelings into the minds of the majority of the poorer (or even fairly well-off) populations of the world who want nothing else but to live in the same style as modern Americans (or at least the ones mostly shown on TV). Tens of millions of poor people from central Europe, Asia and South America are migrating legally and illegally into America and Europe every year. So all this is why I believe that Fukuyama is not only on the right track, but also why the rest of the world will inevitably get to an American way of life -- or perish in the attempt. Keith At 11:01 11/10/01 -0400, you wrote: >Hi Keith, > >Thank you for posting the material on Fukuyama. I'll take another look at >it shortly and perhaps respond again. However, from one of my previous >postings, you probably recognized that I am not a fan of Fukuyama's, and I >think I should let you know why. > >When I read "The End of History" I felt there was an aura of smugness and >misplaced certainty about it. All of the Hegelian theses and anti-theses >had finally produced the ultimate state, the kind of liberal democracy >represented by the United States. That was the way everything that had >happened in the past had trended, and that was the ultimate solution to >human well-being and happiness. Given the large inequalities and growing >class disparities that continue to pervade modern democracies, and >especially the United States, I felt just a little nauseated at the thought >that this is how all of the struggles for human betterment should end. > >I also thought that it was a bit rash of Professor Fukuyama to dismiss what >people have seen as alternative ways of ending history throughout the ages. >Many believed and continue to believe that history will end with a >theocracy. Christians have believed, and in some cases still believe, that >history will end with the establishment of Christ's kingdom on Earth. And >as we know from recent events, Moslem fundamentalists see history ending >with the establishment of an Islamic state ruled by their narrow >interpretation of the Koran. As well, I felt that Fukuyama was very wrong >in equating the fall of the Soviet Union with the collapse of communism. >The fall of the Soviet Union represents the end of a massive experiment with >state capitalism - a capitalism of the most brutally exploitative kind - but >that is all it represents. Communism, as an ideal and as a potential >trajectory for human development, continues. It may well be that, a >thousand years from now, we will have matured to the level at which we are >able to live productively in an anarchic stateless and classless harmony. >Personally, I doubt this, but I cannot deny the possibility. > >But where I think Fukuyama is most in error is that he focuses on the state, >when everything we see and experience suggests that we must now look at >matters globally. While some nation states have achieved what Fukuyama sees >as "liberal democracy" or "modernity", the world as a whole is light-years >away from it. In terms of an increasingly interlinked global society and >economy, the West takes on the character of a dominant upper-class elite >while the rest of the world has become a growing subservient underclass. As >in any class system, the West looks after its own interests, dictates its >terms to the rest of the world, benevolently shares some of its benefits via >foreign aid, and, via arrangements such as NATO, operates a police force to >ensure that everything is maintained as it should be. To my mind, global >society is a class society of the old order, and hardly a liberal democracy. > >Moreover, global society is now fraught with several fault lines. Samuel >Huntington focused on those that lie between "civilizations" - between, say, >Islam and the Christian West. Others focus on those between rich and poor. >Still others focus on the spread of exploitative corporate power, or the >clash between modernity and ancient lifeways. The dangers that all such >fault lines pose is that they create enormous tensions and make people feel >they have their backs to the wall. As we saw on September 11th, such >tensions produce violent reactions. > >Fukuyama's "End of History" is about nation states which, by his definition, >had "made it" - states which consisted of about 15% of the world's people. >It implicitly assumed that, ultimately, all other peoples would make it too. >There seemed to be no question that what the US had was what everyone >wanted, and would strive to get. Recent events have proven him quite wrong. >History has not ended. It remains as transitional and uncertain as ever. > >Ed Weick ___________________________________________________________________ Keith Hudson, General Editor, Calus <http://www.calus.org> 6 Upper Camden Place, Bath BA1 5HX, England Tel: +44 1225 312622; Fax: +44 1225 447727; mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ________________________________________________________________________
