Keith, thanks for this. I can neither agree nor disagree because I no longer have Huntington's book. I had it, skimmed through some of it meaning to read it later, but then loaned it to someone who has not returned it. As you know from a previous posting, I rather like the idea of "fault lines". Like the fault lines in the earth's crust, they suggest tensions building up to the point at which something has to give. However, I'm not sure I would go along with the fualt-lines that Huntington appears to have identified. That's all I can say at the moment without the risk of going beyond my depth.
Best regards, Ed > Hi Ed, > > Here's my critique of Hartington's thesis. I've chiselled some time away > from notating a Bach's Cantata 150 today. > > First of all, he considers "culture" and "civilisation" as synonymous, and > defines the latter as: > > " . . . a cultural entity. . . . a civilisation is thus the highest > cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity > people have, short of that which distinguishes humans from other species." > > He maintains that civilisation identity will be increasingly important in > the future and that history will be shaped mainly by the interactions or > "fault-lines" between the major cultures. "These include Western, > Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and > 'possibly' African." > > I like his 'include' (surely he ought to be able to specify exactly what > these 'major' cultures are!) and I like his last reservation (the > 'possibly' African) because this exposes the basic fudge in all these > so-called identities. Most of them cannot be called monocultural entities > in any meaningful sense. He's drawn attention to African (with its mixture > of everything from Animist to Islamic), but there's also Islam.This is > divided between Sunni and Shi'ite factions which are as different from each > other -- if not more so -- than, say, Slavic-Orthodox is from Western. > > And also he's chosen cultures which happen to be geographically distinct > and have graphic resonances in our minds. This means that he's excluded > Buddhism from his list. This, by its very nature, happens to be a pacific > type of culture and also happens to be scattered in various countries > throughout Asia so it's unlikely to noticeable. But on any reasonable > assessment of world culture, Buddhism, as one of the largest religions, has > an important place (though I notice -- see below -- that he slips it in as > a minor player to support his argument). > > But let me put those quibbles on one side and consider his five basic reasons: > > 1. "Differences among civilisations are not only real, they are basic. . . > . differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition > and, most important, religion . . . over the centuries, differences among > civilisations have generated the most prolonged and violent conflict." > > This is all true -- but only in the past. In the past, when there were > empires rather than nation-states, and where the whole of an empire usually > consisted of a unified religion and a government with a unified set of > technologies and economic goals, then they acted in aggressive ways as > nation-states have done since, say, about the 1400/1500s. > > 2. "The world is becoming a smaller place. Increasing interactions between > peoples of different civilisations are increasing; and these increasing > interactions intensify civilisation-consciousness and awareness of > differences between civilisations and of commonalities within > civilisations. North African immigration to France generates hostility > among Frenchmen and at the same time increases receptivity to immigration > by 'good' European Catholic Poles." > > This is true, but trivial. Any group of people whose jobs are liable to be > taken over will become hostile to an immigrant group. You don;t need to > blams cultural differences for such hostility. A unionised labour force in > America or England sacked from a factory is very aggressive to scab labour > from its own neighbourhood with an identical culture. > > A much more powerful countervailing influence today is the unifying one > brought about by tourism. Over 1 billion people go on holiday every year to > other countries, and often to countries with totally different cultures, > and often to cultures with which their own cultures are officially strained > or even at odds. > > Yes, obviously, a tourist in Nepal or Turkey for example, as I have been, > is more aware of cultural differences during and after the holiday than > beforehand. But as someone who has ploughed a paddy field with a water > buffalo, or woven a carpet (partially and badly in both cases!) at the > cheerful invitation of a Nepali and a Turk respectively (the former fell > about laughing), can only feel that, despite immense cultural differences, > there is a deep well of human sociability between us that is far stronger > than cultural suspicions. > > 3. "The processes of economic modernisation and social change throughout > the world are separating people from long-standing local identities. They > also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world, > religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that > are labelled 'fundamentalism'. Such movements are found in western > Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam." > > The first sentence is true. The second sentence is nonsense (there is more > nationalism and more nation-states today than ever before). The third > sentence is extremely questionable. Islam, to choose the most obvious > example today, is no more fundamentalist in a religious sense than it has > always been despite the resurgence of anti-American protest in some, though > by no means all, Islamic countries. As for 'fundamentalist' Judaism, there > are far fewer Orthodox Jews than ever before in history. As for > Christianity, the recent rise of clap-happy denominations in America and > England hardly counts for much. As for Hindu fundamentalism, well, as > expressed in Sri Lanka and Kashmir, this is also no more fundamentalist in > a religious sense, and is mainly a political issue (nationalism, as it > happens!). As for fundamentalist Buddhism, the only example I can think of > at the moment is the Soka Gakkai sect in Japan, which went into politics > about 30 years ago and has a few dozen seats in the Japanese Parliament. > > 4. "The growth of civilisation-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role > of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same > time, however, and perhaps as a result, a return-to-the-roots phenomenon is > occurring among non-Western civilisations." > > Is Huntington saying here that the West is in some sort of conflict with > *all* the rest of the world's cultures? If he is, then he's right -- but in > doing so he undermines his main case that there are multiple "fault-lines" > between the major cultures. (As you know, my view is that the main conflict > between the power-holders of the other cultures and the West is because the > former are frightened of losing their grip as they sense that their people > are increasingly worshipping the standard-of-living-Gods of the West. But > this an aside as regards my criticism of Huntington.) > > 5. "Economic regionalism is increasing. The importance of economic blocs is > likely to continue to increase." > > He is obviously refering here to trading blocs such as NAFTA, EEC, OPEC, > APEC and the like, and it's true enough. But these don't have one-to-one > relationships with cultures. They often cut right across them. The above > are, simply, new forms of governmental-type organisations with a particular > objective in mind -- to increase trade. There are also many other types of > transnational, transcultural governmental-type organisations arising in the > modern world, such as control of river basins, pollution, fishing stocks, > etc. All these are coming into being to deal with single functions or > problems which have to do with environmental parameters and have nothing to > do with cultures. > > ------- > > Huntington has received much more acclaim more than his thesis deserves, > and the recent events in Afghanistan have raised his reputation to that of > a prescient world-guru. But it's only because the different cultures he > deals with have such distinctive bells and whistles that his thesis has a > grip on the imagination of many. I wouldn't want to equate Huntington with > the popular press but, like them, he's actually demonising events in a way > which gives no clue as to what is a constructive way forward. It's as bad > as saying that there's an asteroid heading for us and we can't do anything > about it. > > Keith > ___________________________________________________________________ > > Keith Hudson, General Editor, Calus <http://www.calus.org> > 6 Upper Camden Place, Bath BA1 5HX, England > Tel: +44 1225 312622; Fax: +44 1225 447727; > mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > ________________________________________________________________________
