An interesting contribution to a topic much discussed on this list recently.
 
Ed

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The Saudi Arabia dilemma
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George Bush Sr. fears a Saudi collapse in another war with Iraq. George Jr. doesn't and will go to war, says security analyst EDWARD LUTTWAK
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By EDWARD LUTTWAK

       

Friday, August 30, 2002 – Print Edition, Page A13, Globe and Mail

The current sharp quarrel between the two George Bushes over the wisdom of attacking Saddam Hussein is much more than just a disagreement over policy for the Middle East. It reflects radically divergent conceptions of strategy and energy economics. There is even a basic difference in cultural values -- most unusual between father and son. What complicates matters is that the subject of the debate is Iraq, but the disagreement is really about Saudi Arabia.

The elder Mr. Bush, his former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, former secretary of state James Baker, and others like them, not only consider the Saudi ruling family one of the most important allies of the United States, but actually have a Saudi-centred view of the Middle East. Therefore they vehemently oppose a war to remove Saddam Hussein because their sources, chiefly Prince Bandar bin Sultan, long-time Saudi ambassador to Washington, tell them that the de facto ruler, Crown Prince Abdullah, and other prudent members of the family are terrified of the Arab and Muslim reaction if bombs start falling on Baghdad.

The Saudis have a point. Having indoctrinated their population in the strictest variety of Islamic fundamentalism that prohibits any form of amity with Christians or Jews (pagans must convert or die), they are of course bitterly criticized for relying on the protection of the "Christian" United States, which supports Israel, a.k.a the Jews, and which just recently defeated the impeccably fundamentalist Taliban of Afghanistan.

Saddam Hussein was never religious and certainly is no fundamentalist, but in recent years he has stressed his Islamic identity more and more -- his speeches are now filled with invocations to Allah and quotes from the Koran. If the United States now attacks him -- almost certainly with the help of non-Arab Kurdish and Turkmen militias -- both Arab and Muslim fury will be aroused against the Americans, and therefore the American-protected Saudi family.

Of course, the foreign minister and other top princes keep saying that Saudi Arabia will not allow its territory and bases to be used for any American war against Mr. Hussein, but U.S. forces and logistical support remain in Saudi bases, there is no move to remove them, and it is just not credible that they would remain passive amidst the exigencies of war.

There is worse. Any U.S. war against Saddam Hussein would be fought under the banner of democracy. Both U.S. officials and Iraqi exile leaders have already declared that their aim is to replace Mr. Hussein's dictatorship with a democratic and federal parliamentary republic. That frightens the Saudis, who operate a family dictatorship without even the façade of a popular assembly, and makes the elder Mr. Bush and his men very uncomfortable. As Americans, they cannot speak out against democracy, but in the 1991 war in the Persian Gulf, at Saudi insistence, they refused to allow any mention of it in the propaganda beamed to Iraq, and are still convinced that democracy is a threat and not a promise in the Middle East because it would allow fundamentalists to come to power. "Better the princes we know," is their slogan.

Why is Saudi Arabia so valuable an ally in the eyes of the elder Mr. Bush and his men? For them, the answer is too obvious to be worth discussing: oil. More precisely, the unique ability of Saudi Arabia with its huge capacity to pump extra oil when the price rises too much, thus safeguarding the world economy from another round of inflation, and to cut back production to drive up prices when they fall too much and endanger the economic stability of all countries that rely primarily on oil exports, including Russia.

The younger Mr. Bush and his closest advisers, notably Vice-President Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defence, disagree on every point, even including energy of late. As they see it, the cheap oil of Arabia is the greatest disincentive to the development of alternative sources of energy, including new oil outside the Middle East, in Alaska for example. Instead of attaching great value to the Saudi policy of keeping oil below $30 per barrel, they see it as a frustrating obstacle to any rational energy policy -- and of course it reduces the earnings of Texan and other domestic oil producers.

Moreover, since Sept. 11, the younger Mr. Bush and his camp have received an entire education in how Saudi oil revenues are spent: in part for the profligate luxuries of more than 5,000 princes with their large families, and in part to operate Islamic centres and madrasah schools all over the world, which propagate the most extreme Salafist (Wahabi) fundamentalism -- the creed of Osama bin Laden.

The elder Mr. Bush, Mr. Scowcroft and their like are not much concerned with religion, and still think it perfectly natural for the Saudis to promote their creed, whatever it is. The younger Mr. Bush is a devoted Christian by all accounts, does pay attention to religious matters, and is therefore very conscious of the wide gap between the fanatical, hate-filled Salafism that the Saudis have been exporting, and the milder doctrines of traditional Islam that it is displacing with disastrous results.

Even the princely luxuries are far from harmless. While the invalid King Fahd flies around with more than 300 servants, his own cars, food and water, many lesser princes have immense villas with solid-gold doorknobs and such (one has his own fire brigade), and thousands enjoy high incomes without working. Saudi Arabia is becoming an increasingly poor country, with unemployment at over 20 per cent, and a growing problem of outright deprivation, even hunger. That is the greatest threat to the political equilibrium of the country, and of Arabia as a whole.

The camp of the elder Mr. Bush views the Saudi ruling family as the key to stability, but his son's followers increasingly disagree. They are not at all eager to see the Saudis overthrown, but now believe that their blind greed and overt profligacy is undermining their rule in any case, so U.S. policies should not be inhibited by Saudi needs.

Above all, there is a difference in strategic conceptions. The elder Mr. Bush and his followers compare the certain costs, high risks and uncertain benefits of a war against Saddam Hussein to conclude that it should not be fought, especially because one of the risks is a Saudi collapse.

By contrast, the younger Mr. Bush, Mr. Cheney and Mr. Rumsfeld are not planning a war against Saddam Hussein in the hope of achieving any positive gains, but rather to avoid the catastrophic losses of another Sept. 11. They are convinced that Saddam Hussein has refused to permit UN inspections, and paid the huge price of years of UN sanctions to accumulate biological, chemical and radiological weapons, because he actually wants to use them. Intelligence profiles show that Saddam Hussein's driving motivation is revenge, and while he has a long list of other enemies he would like to obliterate, the Americans must be at the top of that list -- on which, by the way, the Kuwaitis and Saudis easily outrank the Israelis.

Because the younger Mr. Bush is now persuaded that Mr. Hussein will attack one day unless he is attacked first, he sees only danger and no compelling advantage in waiting. Having presided impotently over the Sept. 11 catastrophe, he is determined to avoid a repetition -- at all costs.

Finally, there is the cultural factor. By all appearances, the elder Mr. Bush positively enjoys spending time with the graciously hospitable, if not too bright, Prince Bandar, as with other Saudi princes. Mr. Scowcroft is a devotee of high-altitude hiking in the costly elegance of Aspen, where Prince Bandar owns an immense parody of a Swiss chalet.

The younger Mr. Bush by contrast does not go to Aspen. He seems immune to its stylish attractions, preferring the plain comforts of his far from luxurious Crawford, Tex., ranch. To be sure, Prince Bandar has been there -- he was just there this week, but not as often as Israeli visitors.

In any case, as far as President Bush is concerned the debate is over. He has heard out his father and knows the views of his father's former officials. He has made his decision: Saddam Hussein must go -- even if the Saudis go down with him.


Edward Luttwak is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.


 

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