This week's Economist has a special survey on migration. The following is a
slightly shortened version of the first article—which serves as quite a
good introduction/summary of the whole survey.

Keith Hudson 

>>>>
THE LONGEST JOURNEY

by Frances Cairncross

Freeing migration could enrich humanity even more than freeing trade. But
only if the social and political costs are contained


“WITH two friends I started a journey to Greece, the most horrendous of all
journeys. It had all the details of a nightmare: barefoot walking in rough
roads, risking death in the dark, police dogs hunting us, drinking water
from the rain pools in the road and a rude awakening at gunpoint from the
police under a bridge. My parents were terrified and decided that it would
be better to pay someone to hide me in the back of a car.”

This 16-year-old Albanian high-school drop-out, desperate to leave his
impoverished country for the nirvana of clearing tables in an Athens
restaurant, might equally well have been a Mexican heading for Texas or an
Algerian youngster sneaking into France. He had the misfortune to be born
on the wrong side of a line that now divides the world: the line between
those whose passports allow them to move and settle reasonably freely
across the richer world's borders, and those who can do so only hidden in
the back of a truck, and with forged papers.

Tearing down that divide would be one of the fastest ways to boost global
economic growth. The gap between labour's rewards in the poor world and the
rich, even for something as menial as clearing tables, dwarfs the gap
between the prices of traded goods from different parts of the world. The
potential gains from liberalising migration therefore dwarf those from
removing barriers to world trade. But those gains can be made only at great
political cost. Countries rarely welcome strangers into their midst.
 
Everywhere, international migration has shot up the list of political
concerns. The horror of September 11th has toughened America's approach to
immigrants, especially students from Muslim countries, and blocked the
agreement being negotiated with Mexico. In Europe, the far right has
flourished in elections in Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands. In
Australia, the plight of the Tampa and its human cargo made asylum a top
issue last year. 

Although many more immigrants arrive legally than hidden in trucks or
boats, voters fret that governments have lost control of who enters their
country. The result has been a string of measures to try to tighten and
enforce immigration rules. But however much governments clamp down, both
immigration and immigrants are here to stay. Powerful economic forces are
at work. It is impossible to separate the globalisation of trade and
capital from the global movement of people. Borders will leak; companies
will want to be able to move staff; and liberal democracies will balk at
introducing the draconian measures required to make controls truly
watertight. If the European Union admits ten new members, it will
eventually need to accept not just their goods but their workers too. 

Technology also aids migration. The fall in transport costs has made it
cheaper to risk a trip, and cheap international telephone calls allow
Bulgarians in Spain to tip off their cousins back home that there are
fruit-picking jobs available. The United States shares a long border with a
developing country; Europe is a bus-ride from the former Soviet block and a
boat-ride across the Mediterranean from the world's poorest continent. The
rich economies create millions of jobs that the underemployed young in the
poor world willingly fill. So demand and supply will constantly conspire to
undermine even the most determined restrictions on immigration.

For would-be immigrants, the prize is huge. It may include a life free of
danger and an escape from ubiquitous corruption, or the hope of a chance
for their children. But mainly it comes in the form of an immense boost to
earnings potential. James Smith of Rand, a Californian think-tank, is
undertaking a longitudinal survey of recent immigrants to America. Those
who get the famous green card, allowing them to work and stay indefinitely,
are being asked what they earned before and after. “They gain on average
$20,000 a year, or $300,000 over a lifetime in net-present-value terms,” he
reports. “Not many things you do in your life have such an effect.”

Such a prize explains not only why the potential gains from liberalising
immigration are so great. It explains, too, why so many people try so hard
to come—and why immigration is so difficult to control. The rewards to the
successful immigrant are often so large, and the penalties for failure so
devastating, that they create a huge temptation to take risks, to bend the
rules and to lie. That, inevitably, adds to the hostility felt by many
rich-world voters.

This hostility is milder in the four countries—the United States, Canada,
Australia and New Zealand—that are built on immigration. On the whole,
their people accept that a well-managed flow of eager newcomers adds to
economic strength and cultural interest. When your ancestors arrived
penniless to better themselves, it is hard to object when others want to
follow. In Europe and Japan, immigration is new, or feels new, and
societies are older and less receptive to change. 

Even so, a growing number of European governments now accept that there is
an economic case for immigration. This striking change is apparent even in
Germany, which has recently been receiving more foreigners, relative to the
size of its population, than has America. Last year, a commission headed by
a leading politician, Rita Süssmuth, began its report with the
revolutionary words: “Germany needs immigrants.” Recent legislation based
on the report (and hotly attacked by the opposition) streamlines entry
procedures. 
 
But there is a gulf between merely accepting the economic case and
delighting in the social transformation that immigrants create. Immigrants
bring new customs, new foods, new ideas, new ways of doing things. Does
that make towns more interesting or more threatening? They enhance baseball
and football teams, give a new twang to popular music and open new
businesses. Some immigrants transform drifting institutions, as Mexicans
have done with American Catholicism, according to Gregory Rodriguez, a
Latino journalist in Los Angeles. And some commit disproportionate numbers
of crimes. 

They also profoundly test a country's sense of itself, forcing people to
define what they value. That is especially true in Europe, where many
incomers are Muslims. America's 1.2m-1.5m or so Muslim immigrants tend to
be better educated and wealthier than Americans in general. Many are
Iranians, who fled extremist Islam. By contrast, some of the children of
Germany's Turks, Britain's Pakistanis and France's North Africans seem more
attracted to fundamentalism than their parents are. If Muslims take their
austere religion seriously, is that deplorable or admirable? If Islam
constrains women and attacks homosexuality, what are the boundaries to
freedom of speech and religion? Even societies that feel at ease with
change will find such questions hard.

No but, maybe yes

Immigration poses two main challenges for the rich world's governments. One
is how to manage the inflow of migrants; the other, how to integrate those
who are already there. 

Whom, for example, to allow in? Already, many governments have realised
that the market for top talent is global and competitive. Led by Canada and
Australia, they are redesigning migration policies not just to admit, but
actively to attract highly skilled immigrants. Germany, for instance,
tentatively introduced a green card of its own two years ago for
information-technology staff—only to find that a mere 12,000 of the
available 20,000 visas were taken up. “Given the higher wages and warmer
welcome, no Indians in their right minds would rather go to Germany than to
the United States,” scoffs Susan Martin, an immigration expert at
Georgetown University in Washington, DC. 

Whereas the case for attracting the highly skilled is fast becoming
conventional wisdom, a thornier issue is what to do about the unskilled.
Because the difference in earnings is greatest in this sector, migration of
the unskilled delivers the largest global economic gains. Moreover,
wealthy, well-educated, ageing economies create lots of jobs for which
their own workers have little appetite. 

So immigrants tend to cluster at the upper and lower ends of the skill
spectrum. Immigrants either have university degrees or no high-school
education. Mr Smith's survey makes the point: among immigrants to America,
the proportion with a postgraduate education, at 21%, is almost three times
as high as in the native population; equally, the proportion with less than
nine years of schooling, at 20%, is more than three times as high as that
of the native-born (and probably higher still among illegal Mexican
immigrants). 

All this means that some immigrants do far better than others. The
unskilled are the problem. Research by George Borjas, a Harvard University
professor whose parents were unskilled Cuban immigrants, has drawn
attention to the fact that the unskilled account for a growing proportion
of America's foreign-born. (The same is probably true of Europe's.)
Newcomers without high-school education not only drag down the wages of the
poorest Americans (some of whom are themselves recent immigrants); their
children are also disproportionately likely to fail at school. 

These youngsters are there to stay. “The toothpaste is out of the tube,”
says Mark Krikorian, executive director of the Centre for Immigration
Studies, a think-tank in Washington, DC. And their numbers will grow.
Because the rich world's women spurn motherhood, immigrants give birth to
many of the rich world's babies. Foreign mothers account for one birth in
five in Switzerland and one in eight in Germany and Britain. If these
children grow up underprivileged and undereducated, they will create a new
underclass that may take many years to emerge from poverty.

For Europe, immigration creates particular problems. Europe needs it even
more than the United States because the continent is ageing faster than any
other region. Immigration is not a permanent cure (immigrants grow old
too), but it will buy time. And migration can “grease the wheels” of
Europe's sclerotic labour markets, argues Tito Boeri in a report for the
Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti, published in July. However, thanks to the
generosity of Europe's welfare states, migration is also a sort of tax on
immobile labour. And the more immobile Europeans are—the older, the less
educated—the more xenophobic they are too.

The barriers need to be dismantled with honesty and care. It is no accident
that they began to go up when universal suffrage was introduced. Poor
voters know that immigration threatens their living standards. And as long
as voters believe that immigration is out of control, they will oppose it.
Governments must persuade them that it is being managed in their interests.
This survey will suggest some ways in which that might be done.
>>>> 





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Keith Hudson,6 Upper Camden Place, Bath BA1 5HX, England
Tel:01225 312622/444881; Fax:01225 447727; E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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