Just a little sensitive I guess.  The last group in this pc world that one can badmouth without fear are white men.  Try it with, well, *any* other group. 
 
As to the article, it still seems like the same old stuff.  Even if its from the FT.
 
arthur
 
 
-----Original Message-----
From: Karen Watters Cole [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sunday, February 23, 2003 3:00 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Cordell, Arthur: ECOM; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: Stupid White Men

Arthur, I am not endorsing everything written in this article and posted it for debate – the title may be provocative, but that’s one reasons titles are chosen – to grab attention.

This article was written for and appeared in the Financial Times.  I hope that any FW feedback would tell me more about if the authors were eggheads with no clear purpose or whether the FWers who post to this subject thought the content had merit.  

I should have made my intent clear in my introduction. 

Cheers!

Karen

 

 

 

Beyond the offensive title of Stupid White Men, Michael Moore's racist title for his book, this seems to be the normal apologist remarks from the Economist.  Same old, same old.

 

Karen, the title seems at odds with your usual balanced reportage.

 

I sub to Michael Moore's list and also to his pro Nader stance, but with his title I think he is too quick to become a self hating white man.  Sad.

 

arthur

-----Original Message-----
From: Karen Watters Cole [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Sunday, February 23, 2003 12:33 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Cordell, Arthur: ECOM; Brad McCormick; Brian McAndrew; Harry Pollard; Keith Hudson; Ray Harrell
Subject: Stupid White Men

I just could NOT resist.  What did you think this would be about?  - Karen

Something for everyone:

Stupid White Men

By John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge

Published February 21 2003 21:18 in The Financial Times

How much do you trust companies nowadays? You are probably not as wary as this particular critic. He objects to the very idea of companies, claiming that they have “proved, universally, either burdensome or useless, and have either mismanaged or confined the trade”. The hired guns that run them will never be able to bring the same “anxious vigilance” to their companies’ interests as owner-managers. “Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail.”

The critic is not an anti-globalisation protester, an Enron pensioner, a Marconi shareholder, or even just another member of the French government. He is the father of free-market capitalism, Adam Smith.

Smith, like most 18th century liberals, thought joint-stock companies were by-words for greed, sleaze and corruption. In the 1720s, John Law’s Mississippi Company had managed to ruin the economy of the world’s most prosperous country, France.  In Britain, the South Sea Company wrought almost as much damage: the British government was forced to nationalise the company, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer and several South Sea directors were dispatched to the Tower of London, though they were eventually let out.

As for the more successful 18th century companies, they were hardly wholesome affairs. The Royal Africa Company, which incidentally counted that great prophet of liberty, John Locke, among its shareholders, was running His Majesty’s slave trade, branding humans with the initials RAC. Meanwhile, Smith’s particular bête noire, the East India Company, alternated between demanding government hand-outs and enriching the despoilers of India. Indeed, so great was the vulgarity of those who hauled back their treasure from the subcontinent that English society gave them a new name, “nabobs”, or nobs for short. Even in America, where organisations like the Virginia Company had helped to build the country, the company was held in low repute for most of the 18th century. “They are behind the times”, thundered a governor of Pennsylvania, “they belong to an age that is past.”

It is worth remembering this litany of abuse and complaint when you consider the current opprobrium being heaped on the company. The most vitriolic attacks come from a predictable source. For the anti-globalisation coalition, companies are the jagged fangs of le capitalisme sauvage, exploiting the poor world and subjecting us all to an era of Cocacolonisation and Disneyfication. Anti-globalisers cite the “statistic” that half the world’s largest 100 economies are now multinationals to maintain that a silent takeover is under way. Some even think that companies should have to apply for charters from the government, just as they did in Adam Smith’s day.

These doubts have even found an echo among many people who would not dream of opposing capitalism per se, let alone pillaging Starbucks. When the Harvard Business Review includes a confessional article entitled, “I was greedy too” and the New York Times runs a series on “dangerous” companies to work for, corporate capitalism is plainly in trouble.

Companies have become part of the furniture of our lives. Most of us work for them. They make almost everything we buy. Most of our savings are tied up in them. Yet now the furniture seems uncomfortable, broken or downright dangerous. Companies are cutting back jobs and slashing pensions. Far from proving a reliable source of future wealth, they seem to be picking the money out of our pockets. Any German foolish enough to bet her savings on their country’s brave new equity culture in March 2000 could have lost nearly 70 per cent of her money, thanks to the poor performance of companies. Since then, the London stock market and the Standard & Poors index have both fallen by almost half from their peaks in 2000 and 1999. In the 1990s, when the Dow floated above 10,000, bullish forecasters talked about “Dow 36,000”. On Monday, in the first of a Financial Times series on bear markets, Philip Coggan quoted one technical expert who expected the current downturn to end below “Dow 1,000”.

Last week, Reinhard Mohn, the patriarch of the family that owns Bertelsmann, echoed Smith by criticising the vanity and greed of the managers at the German media giant and saying they often made decisions against the company’s interests. Many of the erstwhile gods of corporate capitalism are now seen as villains – the sort of people who order $2,000 shower curtains with your money (as the head of Tyco did), or hide their companies’ liabilities (as Enron’s managers did).

Above all, many who have worked most of their lives in companies have suddenly discovered that they are curiously impersonal things. When companies such as Cable & Wireless or AOL Time Warner have crumbled, shareholders and workers have been able to take out some of their frustrations on the managers, but not the company itself.

What is going on? Seen from a broad historical perspective, two things stand out. The first is that the current wave of anger against companies is completely normal – even a healthy thing. The second is that the company’s gainsayers – particularly the anti-global crew – are wrong: the company has been an institution that has changed the world enormously for the better. Indeed, it has been the secret of the west’s success.

Looking back, corporate history has followed a set cycle of reckless and sometimes criminal expansion of corporate powers during bull markets, followed by reform during bear markets. No one should downplay corporate abuses. But what matters most of all are the sort of reforms that governments impose during the periods of recrimination.

The outstanding example of a bad response to corporate crisis was Britain’s Bubble Act of 1720. With new companies being created at pell-mell speed in the coffee shops around Exchange Alley, political allies of the South Sea Company, worried that these young rivals would suck away capital necessary for their patron, pushed through a stern law making incorporation a much trickier process. The Bubble Act did little to save the South Sea Company. But for a century it made it extremely difficult to set up joint-stock firms in Britain, something keenly felt by the pioneers of the industrial revolution.

More positively, the conception of the Companies Acts of the mid-19th century, which launched the modern joint-stock company, was intended as a reform. A small band of English politicians, including William Gladstone and Robert Lowe, pushed through laws making it possible for people to set up limited liability firms without having to go through the rigmarole of persuading parliament to give them permission. The effect was revolutionary, particularly once other countries copied Britain. These various “Ltds” “Incs” “SAs” “AGs” and so on drew in capital from around the globe, ushering in a stream of inventions that created the modern world. The “little Republics”, as Lowe dubbed them, soon acquired a life of their own, unsettling the state that had spawned them. It was not long before the new joint-stock companies began going bust in spectacular numbers – and another backlash began.

In America the link between bull-market abuse and bear-market reform was particularly pronounced. To begin with, companies such as Standard Oil were seen as American triumphs, bringing cheaper products to a continent-sized nation. But gradually their sins were revealed - which in John D. Rockefeller's case, according to the journalist, Ira Tarbell, included the Enronesque combination of "fraud, deceit, special privilege, gross illegality, bribery coercion, corruption, intimidation or outright terror". The howls against the robber barons led to antitrust laws, notably the Sherman Act.

Yet far from weakening American capitalism, antitrust laws strengthened it. They also paved the way for a quiet revolution in corporate life. From being the vehicles for individual robber barons, companies became the home of professional managers: Company Man was born.

 

When the roaring 20s came to their disastrous end, some of the blame was heaped on individual entrepreneurs such as the energy tycoon Samuel Insul, whose pyramid scheme of companies (at one point he held 65 chairmanships, 85 directorships and 11 presidencies) crashed to earth in 1929. But most of the fury of the 1930s Depression was directed at the faceless types who ran companies in the name of their shareholders and seemed answerable to no one. For the first time, the New York Stock Exchange demanded proper accounts for listed companies. Roosevelt created the Securities & Exchange Commission and other regulatory organisations to keep managers in check.

 

Now, once again, companies have over-reached themselves. Once again, the public is furious, not least because it has lost a lot of money. And once again, reforms are being put into place that will probably strengthen companies rather than weaken them. After all, there is nothing particularly "corporate" about executives selling their shares before the ship goes down or outside directors rubberstamping the chairman's grossly inflated pay packet.

 

For many opponents of the company, this is hardly reassuring. Why should these soulless organisations that run our lives be encouraged? The answer is because companies have proved themselves the most efficient creators of prosperity and progress yet known to humanity. Joint-stock companies allow investors to spread their risk by purchasing small and easily marketable shares in several enterprises, and they provide a way of imposing effective management structures on large organisations. Of course, companies can ossify and go bust, but the fact that investors can simply put their money elsewhere is a powerful rejuvenator.

 

Go back to the mid-19th century, and you can see how companies pushed power down to entrepreneurs and investors. Rather than being trapped in government monopolies, like the East India Company, or family partnerships, like Dickens's doomed Dombey & Son, capital began to search for the most efficient enterprises. These companies ushered in the first great age of globalisation, luring millions off the land, changing the way people ate, worked and played.

 

Naturally, this revolution was not without its drawbacks. The same organisations that provided farmers in the American mid-west with the first cheap ovens and soaps also despoiled the Belgian Congo and brutally suppressed trade unions. But consider the alternative. Civilisations that once outstripped the west yet failed to develop private-sector companies - notably China and the Islamic world - fell further and further behind. It cannot be just coincidence that Asia's most conspicuous economic success is also the country that most obviously embraced companies - Japan. Today, the number of private-sector companies that a country boasts - America has nearly 5.5m corporations, North Korea, as far as we call tell, none - is a better guide to its status than the number of battleships it can muster. It is also not a bad guide to its political freedom.

 

In one way, the virtue of the company stands on this basis alone. The great companies of their day have usually discovered the secret of bringing life-changing products to millions of people. Henry Ford may have been a dictatorial boss, but he made cars affordable for the great middle classes (and paid his workers $5 a day, far more than comparable employers at the time).

 

However, it is still worth demolishing two myths that are now widely propagated about companies: that they are more powerful than ever before, and that thanks to global competition, they are becoming less socially responsible.

 

The idea of all-powerful companies sits oddly with the fact that so many of them seem to be crashing to earth. For instance, companies may well account for 51 of the world's 100 biggest economies if you compare their sales with the GDP of countries, as the anti-globalisation crowd are wont to do. But GDP is a measure of value added, not sales. Using a measure for value added for companies, only 37 multinationals appeared in the 100 biggest economies in the world in 2000; and only two of them scraped into the top 50 (Wal-Mart in 44th place, and Exxon in 48th). Wal-Mart was barely a quarter of the size of a fairly small European country, such as Belgium, though it is bigger than Peru.

 

Far from gaining economic clout, the biggest multinationals have been losing it. Over the past 20 years, the world's biggest 50 firms have grown more slowly than the world economy as a whole. In most countries the average size of companies is going down not up. This should surprise nobody, because globalisation tends to help small companies rather than big ones, making it easier for small companies to reach their markets, purchase technology and raise capital.

 

And how reasonable is it to compare companies with states, when wealth is not the same as power? In 2000 Wal-Mart might have been richer than Peru, but set beside the government of even that often shambolic country, it looked pretty feeble. Wal-Mart had no powers of coercion: it could not tax, raise armies or imprison people. In each of the countries where it operated, it had to bow to local governments.

 

Hence a new complaint: this competition is bringing out companies' fiendish side. It is this that supposedly drives the Enron executive to cheat or the Nike purchase manager to seek out the cheapest factory.

 

There is something in this notion, but far less than critics of companies claim. If competition has increased dramatically, so has scrutiny. Companies are far more strictly policed now that they were in the past - both by the state and by NGOs. Companies have been at their most barbaric when they have been beyond prying eyes (take a look, for instance, at the Casement report into the abuses of Belgian concessionaire companies in the Congo 100 year ago ) or more often when they have been placed under the direct control of the state (think of IG Farben and the Nazis). Now most of the incentives for companies are for them to behave well. Multinationals pay higher wages in developing countries than local firms because they want to get the best people and avoid consumer boycotts.

 

To remain successful, companies have always had to retain some form of social franchise. In the days of Adam Smith, it meant returning to parliament to renew their charter. Just as companies have changed society, society has changed companies, forcing them to accept unions and decent working hours and laying down rules about the basic aspects of their business, including whom they can hire and fire.

 

Indeed, look back through the history of a company, and in general it is the story of an organisation that gets ever more worthy - and ever more boring. Modern businesspeople try to deny this by writing books that imply that their business has seldom been more macho (Only the Paranoid Survive and so on). But the first companies took risks with their lives as well as their fortunes. Send a fleet to the Spice Islands at the beginning of the 17th century, and you might be lucky if a third of the men came back alive. The East India Company was founded at a time when competitive advantage meant blowing your opponents out of the water, where marketing meant supplying an English rose for the Sultan's harem (a London merchant of "honorable parentage" selflessly offered his daughter) and when supply-chain management meant ensuring that your distributors did not put your head on a stick.

 

The company may have left those dashing days behind it. But in so doing it has also rid itself of many of the criticisms that Smith directed at it - and in general has made the world a considerably better place. In the end the company is a liberal creation: it provides choice and opportunity. Rather than being embarrassed about what J.B. Priestley dismissed as "the shoddy, greedy, profit-grabbing, joint-stock company industrial system", we should celebrate its manifold achievements. Look at the institutions that man has placed his trust in to build a better world - the monarchy, the church, the commune, political parties. Have any of them done as much good with as little praise as the joint-stock company?

 

John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, who work for The Economist, are the co-authors of The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, which will be published in March by The Modern Library in the US and in September by Weidenfeld & Nicolson in Britain.

 

http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStory&c=StoryFT&cid=1045511034607&p=1012571727092

 

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