In the Green Corn Rebellion in Oklahoma there were three elements. All three hopelessly poor and under the boot of the wealthy or they were Black, or Indian and under the boot of the White racists. It was believed by the Socialists in Oklahoma, said to be 17,000 strong, that an uprising would spread like wildfire since it promised to build on the farm coops that were being resisted by the status quo. So they started the Rebellion and nobody came except the authorities and the 17,000 Socialists who were either jailed or escaped to the area around San Antonio, Texas.
Why didn't the miserably poor, hopeless, ghettoed and battered respond by throwing off the yoke of the wealthy who either owned the land or had control of Indian land through crooked legal tricks? Well, my folks didn't talk about it all except to communicate the danger of authority and the need to always deal with it cannily and by paying attention. I learned about Greenwood in Tulsa, from a Black friend the Jazz Pianist George Denny and even today the Green Corn Rebellion is only spoken of indirectly. You will find almost nothing about it in the history books. The point of it is, that underneathe it all they considered themselves American and the American system, even though unfair to them, was their culture. They went to Europe to defend it. Why would we think that our Psy-Ops would convince people to turn their back, for economic and reasons of "freedom", on their culture and the history of their parents. I would argue that they don't have unlimited desires but that their desires are limited by their loyalty and sense of identity. Perhaps it is our lack of loyalty to community and family and our loss of identity that makes it OK for us to contemplate someone abandoning their life and embracing an alien conquering force. I can't imagine the CEOs of Enron, MCI or World Com making the same choice that those farmers, Blacks and Indians made in 1917 when they resisted the Socialists call to revolution and drove them instead into exile in Texas. REH ----- Original Message ----- From: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, March 26, 2003 12:59 PM Subject: [Futurework] wall st journal-- where things stand now > Slowing Momentum? U.S. Considers Options in Longer War --- A Prolonged > Campaign Would Add Tactical, Psychological Hurdles --- Plan to Make Lights > Flicker > 26 March 2003 > The Wall Street Journal > A1 > WASHINGTON -- Last weekend's hope that Saddam Hussein's government would > quickly crumble, bringing the war to a swift conclusion, has faded. It now > appears that the Iraqi leader is still in charge, that his military > commanders are able to communicate with troops in the field and that mass > defections of elite forces have yet to materialize. > The U.S. initially had hoped that the war would be a short, relatively > low-cost affair. Mr. Hussein was so hated by his own people that they would > rise up against him, the thinking in the government went. American > technology would overpower and paralyze the Iraqi forces. > It's too early in the fight to talk about drawn-out scenarios, of course, > and a quick series of U.S. victories in the coming days against the > Republican Guard divisions outside Baghdad could still bring down the > regime. But in a war plan that is based nearly as much on momentum as > military might, any slowing could change the psychology of the battle. If > the fighting drags on, Iraqi troops may be even less eager to defect, > leaving more troops for the U.S. to fight. American forces will have to > secure and defend longer supply lines in southern Iraq, where they continue > to be harassed by guerrilla fighters loyal to Mr. Hussein. And ultimately, a > longer war makes it more likely that the U.S. will be drawn into the kind of > urban warfare in Baghdad that Pentagon officials have long hoped to avoid. > In a sign that the U.S. is stepping up the pressure on Baghdad, last night > U.S. bombs turned off Iraqi television at least temporarily. > U.S. officials yesterday noted how far U.S. troops had advanced in a short > time. "It is a good plan, and it is a plan that in four-and-a-half or five > days has moved ground forces to within a short distance of Baghdad," Defense > Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said at a press conference. "And forces increase > in the country every minute and every hour of every day. And that will > continue to be the case." > Yesterday, British officers reported that Shiite residents of Basra, Iraq's > second-largest city, had begun rising up against Iraqi government forces. It > was the first sign of a popular revolt against Mr. Hussein triggered by the > invasion. Still, resistance elsewhere in the south has slowed the advance of > U.S. troops. And with U.S. forces poised to engage Iraq's top Republican > Guard divisions guarding Baghdad, fierce sandstorms slowed their progress. > Meanwhile, the U.S. is moving along on its war plan even as more soldiers > and equipment arrive in the region. The first of three additional heavy Army > divisions with tanks, artillery cannons and armored troop carriers is > expected to join the fight in Iraq in about two weeks. > Here are some problems and choices that military leaders will have to > contend with in coming days if the action drags on: > Psychological Momentum > Given their experience in the Gulf War, many Iraqis were expecting a > devastating knock-out blow against their government or at least more > disruption than they've witnessed so far. Mr. Hussein appears to have > survived the first cruise-missile barrages. His government ministers still > are holding regular press conferences, and a few U.S. casualties and > prisoners were paraded on Baghdad television. > All of that creates a burden for U.S. strategists who had been hoping that > an early display of American power would persuade Iraqi military commanders > that the end of their careers was imminent and that their only hope was to > switch sides. That would have made the job of getting rid of Mr. Hussein and > taking and keeping control of Baghdad easier, especially if Iraqis had taken > on the brunt of the job themselves, sparing U.S. troops the task. > Now the U.S. may have to give Iraqis a little more shock and awe to shift > the psychological momentum. The U.S. could do that in coming days if it > manages to shatter one of two important Republican Guard units waiting to > defend the southern entrances to Baghdad. Many Iraqis never have had much > confidence in their regular army, but the sight of more-elite troops dead on > the battlefield or taken prisoner could persuade other guard units to give > up their arms and shift the psychological balance against the regime. > In addition, if U.S. and British forces manage to squelch militia troops in > Basra, and bring badly needed food and water to residents there, the > psychological impact would also be strong. > The U.S. also may have to rethink its bombing strategy currently designed to > minimize the suffering of Iraqi civilians. So far it has tried not to knock > out the lights and many other basic services of residents in Baghdad, even > as it pounds away nightly at military and government compounds. "I think the > Iraqis are losing but they don't know it. We may need to be a little less > careful: make their lights flicker or interrupt the soap operas," said one > official earlier in the day. > Confronting the Guard > Increasingly, it looks like the U.S. will have to take on Iraq's best > fighters in the elite Republican Guard divisions and risk civilian > casualties. U.S. officials say that the Medina division near Karbala -- the > first Republican Guard unit the U.S. is likely to take on -- already has > dispersed its troops and tanks into populated areas and positioned some > close to schools, hospitals and religious shrines. The U.S. has been trying > to minimize so-called collateral damage by using precision weaponry and > lower-flying helicopters and tank killers. > But if the Republican Guard holds out for long, or the U.S. loses more > pilots and helicopters, it may have to bring in firepower that could shatter > the division but risk alienating Iraqi citizens and provoking world opinion. > > U.S. planners say there's no question they can destroy Iraq's military > equipment with enough time and if rules of engagement are made less > restrictive. But they also worry that the Iraqi troops will fall back to > Baghdad, where they might reinforce militia units and the Special Republican > Guard in an urban fight for control of the city. > If the Medina division isn't destroyed, other Republican Guard units may be > less likely to fold. The U.S. First Marine division is moving into position > to take on a second unit, the Baghdad division, near al Kut in coming days. > There are another three divisions stationed closer to Baghdad, all in > heavily populated areas, and one more to the north near Mr. Hussein's > hometown of Tikrit. > U.S. officials say that they've picked up intelligence that the al Kut and > perhaps other Republican Guard units have been given chemical weapons stocks > and orders to use them as U.S. troops close in on Baghdad. U.S. planners say > that American troops are trained and equipped to survive such an attack and > that Iraqi troops and civilians are more likely to suffer. But such an > attack would confront President Bush with even more difficult choices about > how hard to hit back and against what targets. > If the fight against the Republican Guard drags on, the U.S. may have to > call in fresh troops. The first of those, the Army's Fourth Infantry > Division, won't be ready to provide backup for at least two more weeks. > Troubles in the South > In time, the U.S. military may find that it needs to venture into many of > the cities in southern Iraq that it has bypassed on its way to Baghdad in > order to head off a humanitarian crisis and to break the will of guerrilla > groups, such as the Saddam Fedayeen, that are scoring propaganda points by > inflicting casualties on U.S. and British troops. > Some Army officials have referred to the first days of the conflict as the > "Autobahn War" because U.S. forces stuck to the highways in their race to > the capital. A few days into the campaign, U.S. military officials were > saying the cities in the south were militarily insignificant. > Yesterday, their attitude seemed to be changing. British officials referred > to Basra as a target of "enormous political and military importance." > British forces stepped up their efforts to flush out and kill the Fedayeen, > though they admit it's been a slow slog. "We can't attack them directly > because of fear of collateral damage, so we get them when they poke out," > British Capt. Alan Massey told Reuters. > The problem is that guerrilla forces fiercely loyal to Mr. Hussein remain > strong in key southern cities such as Basra and Nasiriyah. Their attacks > haven't severely disrupted the movement of U.S. supplies to the front lines, > at least so far. But they have prevented the U.S. from getting much-needed > food and water into the cities in the south, where suffering could sharpen > international criticism of the war. Earlier this week U.N. Secretary General > Kofi Annan warned of a coming humanitarian crisis in Basra and pointedly > warned that "it is the occupying power that has the responsibility for the > welfare of the people." > The Battle for Baghdad > The U.S. war strategy has been crafted to bring down the Iraqi regime before > U.S. troops have to set foot in Baghdad. > But if the U.S. smashes through Baghdad's ring of defenses while Mr. Hussein > and large numbers of his forces still control the city, the Pentagon will > have to decide between two difficult options: lay siege to the capital or > take on Iraqi troops in an urban battle. > U.S. forces could try to seal off the city and wait until it collapses. And > there are ways to calibrate that pressure, starting with turning off the > power and smashing more political and economic sites important to Mr. > Hussein and his inner circle. The U.S. also could carve off sections of the > city as safe havens and invite civilians to flee to them, before it mounts > an even-larger bombing campaign or begins to send in its troops for a street > battle. > Mr. Hussein could complicate these plans by either blocking civilians from > leaving, using them as human shields by placing them at sensitive sites, or, > conversely, by driving hundreds of thousands of needy people into the arms > of U.S. forces. > Dealing with such a humane siege would require many more troops than the > U.S. currently has available to feed, protect and screen the outpouring of > civilians and to block supplies going in to the remnants of the regime. > More likely, U.S. forces will mount a full-blown offensive on the city with > attack planes, helicopter gunships and ground troops. Such a fight likely > would result in high Iraqi casualties and more U.S. casualties than even a > post-Sept. 11 American public appears prepared for. > In the end there is little question that the U.S. will win, but such a > devastating victory could make the occupation and reconstruction of a > postwar Iraq far more costly and dangerous. > --- > > _______________________________________________ > Futurework mailing list > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > http://scribe.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework _______________________________________________ Futurework mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://scribe.uwaterloo.ca/mailman/listinfo/futurework
