Posted on Wed, Feb. 12, 2003

HISTORY: '1919' turns dry story into verdant splendor
BY FRITZ LANHAM
Houston Chronicle

• Title: "Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World"

Mention of the Treaty of Versailles tends to inspire glazed looks and
hazy memories of 11th-grade history class.

What does one recall? That the treaty ended World War I. That Woodrow
Wilson, the idealistic American president, tried to do the Right Thing
at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference where it was drafted but saw his
efforts thwarted by his French, English and Italian counterparts, a trio
of oily Machiavellians. That the confreres so botched the job as to make
the rise of Hitler and World War II virtually inevitable.

That's about it. All in all, dry and confusing stuff best left to the
specialists.

Thus it is that Margaret MacMillan's splendid "Paris 1919" comes as
something of a surprise. Here is history as it should be done —
soundly researched, detailed, enlivened with shrewd, sharply drawn
portraits of principal players and walk-ons. Winner of the Samuel
Johnson Prize when published in England, "Paris 1919" was named one of
the seven best books of 2002 by the New York Times Book Review.

Make no mistake. The Paris Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles
deserve our attention. Between January and June 1919, the leaders of the
victorious Allies in World War I made decisions that changed the world.
Those decisions haunt us still. Iraq, for example, was one of the
countries carved out of the debris of the Ottoman Empire in horse
trading between France's Georges Clemenceau and Britain's David Lloyd
George.

When the Czech Republic and Slovakia divorced in 1993, they undid a
country created in 1919. To understand why Turkey and Greece are so
hostile to each other and why Syria virtually absorbed Lebanon after the
latter collapsed into civil war in the 1970s, look back to decisions
made in Paris more than 80 years ago.

What is unappreciated, MacMillan argues, is the sheer scale and
complexity of the task that confronted the leaders of the United States,
Britain, France, Italy and Japan as they gathered with armies of
advisers to make the peace after the bloodiest war ever to afflict
Europe to that point.

Two old and enormous multiethnic empires — the Austro-Hungarian and
the Ottoman — had allied themselves with Germany and collapsed into
rubble after the Central Powers went down in defeat. Virtually the
entire map of Eastern Europe and the Middle East would have to be
redrawn.

Then there was the matter of Germany's African colonies and German
concessions in China — what to do about those? — and the boundaries
of Germany itself, a country full of people who never accepted the fact
that they'd lost the war.

What rendered the assignment nearly impossible, MacMillan says, was the
flame of ethnic nationalism, a flame Wilson fanned in language both
stirring and maddeningly vague. Every nationality deserved to have its
own state. That was to be one of the great organizing principles of the
new postwar world. But the nationalities were hopelessly intertwined on
the ground.

That being true, the author, a professor of history and provost at the
University of Toronto, is inclined to cut the peacemakers considerable
slack. "If they could have done better, they certainly could have done
much worse," she writes.

MacMillan doesn't accept the caricature of the treaty and peace
conference described at the beginning of this review. The motives of all
the principals — Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Italy's Vittorio
Orlando — were complex and mixed. Nor can the treaty, with its
reparations payments imposed on Germany, be held responsible for the
rise of Hitler, she argues.

MacMillan details how the peacemakers addressed the conflicting demands
of each group — the Poles, the Czechs, the Slavs, the Jews, the Arabs.
But what makes "Paris 1919" so compelling is her skill at precise, often
amusing, character portraits.

Dozens of minor characters make brief appearances, but MacMillan devotes
most of her attention to the leaders of the Big Four (later reduced to
the Big Three when Italy, in a huff, walked out of the conference).
Early on, Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando decided they
could proceed most expeditiously by meeting informally, unencumbered by
troops of aides and representatives of the minor allies. So these four
men, sitting for days behind closed doors, decided the fate of the
world.

In evaluating the four, MacMillan is notably evenhanded: "Both Wilson
and Clemenceau were liberals with a conservative skepticism of rapid
change," she writes. "What divided them was temperament and their own
experience. Wilson believed that human nature was fundamentally good.
Clemenceau had his doubts. He, and Europe, had been through too much."

As it happens, MacMillan is the great-granddaughter of Lloyd George. But
she doesn't hesitate to criticize the wily Welshman: "With different
leadership in the Western democracies, with stronger democracy in Weimar
Germany, without the damage done by the Depression, the story might have
turned out differently," she writes. "And without Hitler to mobilize the
resentments of ordinary Germans and to play on the guilty consciences of
so many in the democracies, Europe might not have had another war so
soon after the first. The Treaty of Versailles is not to blame."

"Paris 1919" is an exhilarating and eye-opening treatment of decisions
that made much of the world as we know it.


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