At 07:59 05/06/2003 -0700, you wrote:
<<<<
From the Atlantic Monthly March 2003: Read this as follow-up to all
those posting we've shared about the influence of religion on
contemporary geopolitics and the sociology it represents. . . .
>>>>
I much enjoyed reading David Brooks' article, "Kicking the
Secularist Habit". I agree with Brooks that many of us have accepted
the notion that as the world becomes richer and better educated, it
becomes less religious. But that's only because we (that is, the sort of
people who read the Atlantic Monthly) are richer, better educated and
less religious than we used to be.
It is interesting that the main examples of religious revivalism Brooks
cites -- in Africa and in the Moslem countries -- not to mention two
large blocs he doesn't cite -- South America (Brazil particularly) and
India (among the Hindus particularly) -- are plainly affected by being
"mere conduits for thwarted economic impulses", to use his
words, even though he doesn't agree with this as a reason for religious
revival.
Well, all I can say is that this seems to me to be a very adequate reason
for the revival of religion in the above regions of the world. What's
more, this also accounts for the fairly large numbers of lower
middle-class whites in America, England, and very likely (though I don't
know for sure) in western Europe who, fearing that they are not going to
be as secure or prosperous as they thought (in the 1960s, 70s and 80s)
they were going to be, are now turning to pentecostal and fundamentalist
sects. (The evangelical wing of the Anglican church is growing healthily
in England, while the more austere, intellectual, liberal main body is
losing ground fast.) We can also point to the vigorous revival of the
Orthodox Church in Russia to which millions have turned after being let
down by the economic promises of communism.
Even in the one remaining large region of the world, China -- hitherto, a
fairly atheistic country -- religious ferment is growing. This is
obviously seen as a great danger to the primacy of the Communist Party
and the authorities are cracking down brutally on religious groups which
are 'unauthorised', such as underground Protestant and Catholic groups
and the Falun Gong which appear to have the potential of growing fast and
subverting loyaties on a large scale. From what few documentaries I've
seen on TV, the membership of these movements strikes me as being similar
to the non-conformist sects of 18th and 19th century England. Their
working class members are definitely becoming more prosperous but not at
the same rate as the middle class professionals in the large cities --
not so much a thwarting of economic impulse as economic envy, as it was
in England two centuries ago. (The Chinese authorities, however, would do
well to bear in mind, that the growth of the non-conformist sects, such
as Methodism, in England with their own self-imposed moral disciplines,
was probably the reason why we did not experience the violent revolutions
which shook France and other European countries in that era.)
Keith Hudson
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KICKING THE SECULARIST HABIT
A six-step program
by David Brooks
.....
Like a lot of people these days, I'm a recovering secularist. Until
September 11 I accepted the notion that as the world becomes richer and
better educated, it becomes less religious. Extrapolating from a tiny and
unrepresentative sample of humanity (in Western Europe and parts of North
America), this theory holds that as history moves forward, science
displaces dogma and reason replaces unthinking obedience. A region that
has not yet had a reformation and an enlightenment, such as the Arab
world, sooner or later will.
It's now clear that the secularization theory is untrue. The human race
does not necessarily get less religious as it grows richer and better
educated. We are living through one of the great periods of scientific
progress and the creation of wealth. At the same time, we are in the
midst of a religious boom.
Islam is surging. Orthodox Judaism is growing among young people, and
Israel has gotten more religious as it has become more affluent. The
growth of Christianity surpasses that of all other faiths. In 1942 this
magazine published an essay called
<http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/42oct/bell.htm>"Will
the Christian Church Survive?" Sixty years later there are two
billion Christians in the world; by 2050, according to some estimates,
there will be three billion. As Philip Jenkins, a Distinguished Professor
of History and Religious Studies at Pennsylvania State University, has
observed, perhaps the most successful social movement of our age is
Pentecostalism (see
<http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/10/jenkins.htm>"The
Next Christianity," October Atlantic). Having gotten its start in
Los Angeles about a century ago, it now embraces 400 million peoplea
number that, according to Jenkins, could reach a billion or more by the
half-century mark.
Moreover, it is the denominations that refuse to adapt to secularism that
are growing the fastest, while those that try to be "modern"
and "relevant" are withering. Ecstatic forms of Christianity
and "anti-modern" Islam are thriving. The Christian population
in Africa, which was about 10 million in 1900 and is currently about 360
million, is expected to grow to 633 million by 2025, with conservative,
evangelical, and syncretistic groups dominating. In Africa churches are
becoming more influential than many nations, with both good and bad
effects.
Secularism is not the future; it is yesterday's incorrect vision of the
future. This realization sends us recovering secularists to the bookstore
or the library in a desperate attempt to figure out what is going on in
the world. I suspect I am not the only one who since September 11 has
found himself reading a paperback edition of the Koran that was bought a
few years ago in a fit of high-mindedness but was never actually opened.
I'm probably not the only one boning up on the teachings of Ahmad ibn
Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb, and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.
There are six steps in the recovery process. First you have to accept the
fact that you are not the norm. Western foundations and universities send
out squads of researchers to study and explain religious movements. But
as the sociologist Peter Berger has pointed out, the phenomenon that
really needs explaining is the habits of the American professoriat:
religious groups should be sending out researchers to try to understand
why there are pockets of people in the world who do not feel the constant
presence of God in their lives, who do not fill their days with rituals
and prayers and garments that bring them into contact with the divine,
and who do not believe that God's will should shape their public
lives.
Once you accept thiswhich is like understanding that the earth revolves
around the sun, not vice-versayou can begin to see things in a new
way.
The second step toward recovery involves confronting fear. For a few
years it seemed that we were all heading toward a benign end of history,
one in which our biggest worry would be boredom. Liberal democracy had
won the day. Yes, we had to contend with globalization and inequality,
but these were material and measurable concepts. Now we are looking at
fundamental clashes of belief and a truly scary situationat least in the
Southern Hemispherethat brings to mind the Middle Ages, with weak
governments, missionary armies, and rampant religious conflict.
The third step is getting angry. I now get extremely annoyed by the
secular fundamentalists who are content to remain smugly ignorant of
enormous shifts occurring all around them. They haven't learned anything
about religion, at home or abroad. They don't know who Tim LaHaye and
Jerry B. Jenkins are, even though those co-authors have sold 42 million
copies of their books. They still don't know what makes a Pentecostal a
Pentecostal (you could walk through an American newsroom and ask that
question, and the only people who might be able to answer would be the
secretaries and the janitorial staff). They still don't know about Michel
Aflaq, the mystical Arab nationalist who served as a guru to Saddam
Hussein. A great Niagara of religious fervor is cascading down around
them while they stand obtuse and dry in the little cave of their own
parochialismand many of them are journalists and policy analysts, who are
paid to keep up with these things.
The fourth step toward recovery is to resist the impulse to find a
materialistic explanation for everything. During the centuries when
secularism seemed the wave of the future, Western intellectuals developed
social-science models of extraordinary persuasiveness. Marx explained
history through class struggle, other economists explained it through
profit maximization. Professors of international affairs used
conflict-of-interest doctrines and game theory to predict the dynamics
between nation-states.
All these models are seductive and partly true. This country has built
powerful institutions, such as the State Department and the CIA, that use
them to try to develop sound policies. But none of the models can
adequately account for religious ideas, impulses, and actions, because
religious fervor can't be quantified and standardized. Religious
motivations can't be explained by cost-benefit analysis.
Over the past twenty years domestic-policy analysts have thought hard
about the roles that religion and character play in public life. Our
foreign-policy elites are at least two decades behind. They go for months
ignoring the force of religion; then, when confronted with something
inescapably religious, such as the Iranian revolution or the Taliban,
they begin talking of religious zealotry and fanaticism, which suddenly
explains everything. After a few days of shaking their heads over the
fanatics, they revert to their usual secular analyses. We do not yet
have, and sorely need, a mode of analysis that attempts to merge the
spiritual and the material.
The recovering secularist has to resist the temptation to treat religion
as a mere conduit for thwarted economic impulses. For example, we often
say that young Arab men who have no decent prospects turn to radical
Islam. There's obviously some truth to this observation. But it's not the
whole story: neither Mohammed Atta nor Osama bin Laden, for example, was
poor or oppressed. And although it's possible to construct theories that
explain their radicalism as the result of alienation or some other
secular factor, it makes more sense to acknowledge that faith is its own
force, independent of and perhaps greater than economic
resentment.
Human beings yearn for righteous rule, for a just world or a world that
reflects God's willin many cases at least as strongly as they yearn for
money or success. Thinking about that yearning means moving away from
scientific analysis and into the realm of moral judgment. The crucial
question is not What incentives does this yearning respond to? but Do
individuals pursue a moral vision of righteous rule? And do they do so in
virtuous ways, or are they, like Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, evil
in their vision and methods?
Fifth, the recovering secularist must acknowledge that he has been too
easy on religion. Because he assumed that it was playing a diminishing
role in public affairs, he patronized it. He condescendingly decided not
to judge other creeds. They are all valid ways of approaching God, he
told himself, and ultimately they fuse into one. After all, why stir up
trouble by judging another's beliefs? It's not polite. The better option,
when confronted by some nasty practice performed in the name of religion,
is simply to avert one's eyes. Is Wahhabism a vicious sect that perverts
Islam? Don't talk about it.
But in a world in which religion plays an ever larger role, this approach
is no longer acceptable. One has to try to separate right from wrong. The
problem is that once we start doing that, it's hard to say where we will
end up. Consider Pim Fortuyn, a left-leaning Dutch politician and
gay-rights advocate who criticized Muslim immigrants for their attitudes
toward women and gays. When he was assassinated, last year, the press
described him, on the basis of those criticisms, as a rightist in the
manner of Jean-Marie Le Pen, which was far from the truth. In the
post-secular world today's categories of left and right will become inapt
and obsolete.
The sixth and final step for recovering secularists is to understand that
this country was never very secular anyway. We Americans long for
righteous rule as fervently as anybody else. We are inculcated with the
notion that, in Abraham Lincoln's words, we represent the "last,
best hope of earth." Many Americans have always sensed that we have
a transcendent mission, although, fortunately, it is not a theological
one. We instinctively feel, in ways that people from other places do not,
that history is unfulfilled as long as there are nations in which people
are not free. It is this instinctive belief that has led George W. Bush
to respond so ambitiously to the events of September 11, and that has led
most Americans to support him.
Americans are as active as anyone else in the clash of eschatologies.
Saddam Hussein sees history as ending with a united Arab nation globally
dominant and with himself revered as the creator of a just world order.
Osama bin Laden sees history as ending with the global imposition of
sharia. Many Europeans see history as ending with the establishment of
secular global institutions under which nationalism and religious
passions will be quieted and nation-states will give way to international
law and multilateral cooperation. Many Americans see history as ending in
the triumph of freedom and constitutionalism, with religion not abandoned
or suppressed but enriching democratic life.
We are inescapably caught in a world of conflicting visions of historical
destiny. This is not the same as saying that we are caught in a world of
conflicting religions. But understanding this world means beating the
secularist prejudices out of our minds every day.
The Atlantic Monthly | March 2003
Keith Hudson, 6 Upper Camden Place, Bath, England
- [Futurework] yin and yang of the religious mind Karen Watters Cole
- Re: [Futurework] yin and yang of the religious min... Ray Evans Harrell
- RE: [Futurework] yin and yang of the religious... Karen Watters Cole
- Re: [Futurework] yin and yang of the religious min... Stephen Straker
- Re: [Futurework] yin and yang of the religious min... Keith Hudson
- Re: [Futurework] yin and yang of the religious min... pete
- [Futurework] Two "not evers" (was: y... Keith Hudson
- Re: [Futurework] yin and yang of the religious... Ed Weick
- RE: [Futurework] yin and yang of the religious... Karen Watters Cole
