[Futurework] Equals? in the middle east

[Darryl and Natalia]

I was wondering if anyone else considered Abbas an Israeli puppet, Bush the world Emperor and Israel run by a Junta.     Darryl       ************** "Hic Road Map. Quo Vadis?" Printed on Wednesday, June 18, 2003 @ 00:05:16 CDT http://www.yellowtimes.org/article.php?sid=1427  By Gabriel Ash YellowTimes.org Columnist (United States) (YellowTimes.org) - Three leaders, an Israeli, a Palestinian, and an American meet in a seaside town. It sounds like the beginning of one of those slightly risqu� ethnic jokes. And to some extent, not to say that the summit in Aqaba was totally without importance, it was a particularly tasteless one. It began with the speeches. Bush's was platitudinous; no surprises there. Sharon's sounded like he was reading a sales contract for the Brooklyn Bridge. Abbas, the Palestinian prime minister, surprised everyone with a speech that was a disaster. But who authored the speech? It wasn't surprising that Abbas pledged to end the violent intifada. That pledge was the core of the Road Map and Abbas was expected to make it. But Abbas went further than that. Abbas completely adopted the Israeli perspective of the intifada as a pointless and criminal endeavor. He stood before the cameras, a unique moment, to his side the emperor of the world as well as the world's most successful war criminal, and did not have a single word of recognition to the thousands of young men, women and children who have kept the idea of liberty alive in the heart of the occupation's darkness. Abbas has a right to be a harsh critic of the tactics employed by the armed factions, especially the suicide missions inside Israel. Such internal criticism is not only legitimate but necessary. Yet it wasn't Abbas the intellectual who stood side by side with Bush. It was Abbas the official representative. As such, his speech was an exercise in self-disrespect. It reminded Palestinians that Abbas wasn't elected to represent them. He was appointed, essentially by Israel. Likewise, Abbas may be excused for not mentioning the right of return. His arm was twisted securely behind his back to ensure that he didn't (although Sharon was allowed to insert a signal of his opposition to the right of return in his own speech). But did he have to pass in silence over the suffering of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians still living in the refugee camps of Lebanon? It was not wrong for him to acknowledge the historical suffering of the Jewish people, but he should have also spent a sentence on the suffering of those he claimed to represent. To top it all, Abbas endorsed a classical, colonial view of Palestinians as a supposedly immature nation that must prove itself before it is accepted by the U.S. and Israel. He accepted the premise that Palestinians need tutelage because they are not yet ready for independence. As if what stood between Palestinians and self-determination was the lack of transparency in the Palestinian accounting office, rather than Israeli tanks, helicopters and torture chambers. Abbas emerged from Aqaba as a Palestinian puppet king. The result was a predictable damage control operation by the armed factions. The speech and its aftermath put on display the futility of Israel's quest for new Palestinian leadership. Israel can either manufacture a Palestinian leader who will accept its terms of surrender, or it can find a Palestinian leader who will deliver peace on equitable terms, but it can neither find nor manufacture a Palestinian leader who can do both. The damage control took the form of a joint attack on the Erez checkpoint by the three factions, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Al-aqsa Martyrs Brigade. The operation, clever and successful, was designed to send a complex message. It showcased the tactical ability of the factions to deliver a sophisticated military blow on demand. In doing that, it called attention to the vacuity of IDF promises to quash the resistance. It also sent a message of unity to Abbas, reminding him that he has no authority to surrender to Israel. But the attack also sent a message of moderation. The target was a hated military installation, Erez, a potent symbol of the everyday humiliation of Palestinians. Israeli civilians were neither targeted nor hurt. In choosing that target, the factions signalled their readiness to go along with Abbas and agree to a cease-fire, provided that Abbas agreed to include them in the process and respect their demands. Unfortunately, this gesture of de-escalation by Hamas and the other factions missed its target completely because it assumed that Israeli politicians really mean what they say. In public, Israel says that Palestinian attacks on civilians are the worst of the worst, proving the impossibility of compromise. But in reality, the Israeli generals are much more frightened by attacks on soldiers. Attacks on civilians play into their hands, helping to justify the continuing occupation and relieving the pressure to negotiate for peace. In contrast, attacks on soldiers, of the form the Lebanese Hizbullah perfected in Lebanon, weaken the image of the IDF and undermine the logic of the occupation. The Israeli Junta justifiably worries that were Hamas able to limit its attacks to soldiers, the army would soon be forced to leave the Occupied Territories the way it was forced -- by the Israeli public -- to leave Lebanon. Hence, what Hamas intended as an act of modest de-escalation was perceived by the Junta in Israel as an increased threat. This pattern, too, is old, and it is a pity that Hamas seems unable to grasp it. The first large-scale Israeli attack on a Palestinian refugee camp during the second intifada, the attack on Balata in March 2002, was not in response to suicide attacks on civilians, but in response to a series of successful ambushes against Israeli tanks and checkpoints (as well as to the Saudi Peace initiative). The Israeli Junta responded with escalation -- an assassination attempt on Hamas spokesman Rantisi. The missiles missed Rantisi, killing three other civilians instead. Hamas responded like a clock, blowing up a bus in Jerusalem in which 17 Israeli civilians were killed, and considerably heating up its rhetoric. Israel vowed for the umpteenth time to root out terrorists. More Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians poured, with a total death toll of 28, including children, while Israelis paid with 24 casualties so far, mostly civilian. Rantisi, whose only weapon is his fiery tongue, wasn't hiding. An Israeli death squad could have made an appointment with him anytime during the last year. Even American journalists could figure that something didn't add up in Israel's action. Why now? Why a clearly civilian target? Why an unambiguous escalation just as the U.S. was pushing for restraint? Why a missile into a traffic jam? Who gave the order? As if to prove the obvious, it turned out that the momentous decision to murder Rantisi was not taken by the Israeli cabinet, but by a group composed of two former generals (Mofaz and Sharon) and three current generals. Did someone say Junta? What was the goal of the Junta? Not necessarily to derail the Road Map itself, but to make sure that the Road Map proceeds the way the Junta wants it, as a slow Palestinian surrender. Bush wants a fast deal. The Junta wants more time to advance the Apartheid Wall and the settlements. The U.S. would settle for a deal that included Hamas as a silent partner. But such a deal would require real Israeli compromises. The Junta needs justifications for continuing the war alongside, not instead of, the Road Map. For the Junta, that would be the best of all worlds, both a "peace process" to please the moderates, and freedom to continue the war on Palestinians. Some critics have concluded that the attack on Rantisi backfired. It was noted that Bush issued a (relatively) stern rebuke to Israel. Israeli papers have woken up to contemplate Sharon's determination to blow up the Road Map. A brave U.S. journalist even dared to point out -- finally, one might add -- that Sharon had a record of escalating attacks just when a cease-fire looked imminent (for more about the method in that madness, see "A glitch in the matrix" and "The other roadmap"). Bush was beginning to show impatience toward Sharon and Mofaz. Some commentators hoped that this impatience might grow. In fact, the Junta succeeded. No sooner had Bush issued his rebuke than Washington legislators began competing on who could best wash the blood off Israel's hands. The administration, too, backtracked, and refused further to condemn Israel's attacks on civilian targets. Of course, the suicide bomb in Jerusalem made life easier for Bush. But it did just that, no more. The reason the U.S. lined up behind Israel is neither the cruelty of Hamas nor the strength of the Jewish lobby. The truth is that the U.S. has no choice. Bush is the World Emperor.(???) And Empire has consequences. Hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers are spread around the globe, enforcing U.S. imperial power from Iraq to the Philippines, against the will of restive, indigenous populations. Bush cannot possibly acknowledge the right of national resistance to oppression. It would be tantamount to acknowledging that U.S. soldiers all around the world are potentially legitimate targets. The Empire recognizes a single mode of relation between soldiers and population -- masters and subjects. The Empire recognizes the language of mercy, but not the language of rights. Rights imply reciprocity. But in the imperial mindset, to insist on reciprocity is an act of insolence, Lese Majeste against the Emperor. How can there be reciprocity between the one holding the gun and the one staring into its barrel? Hamas's demand for reciprocity in the cease-fire is incomprehensible to Bush. The Israeli Junta understands that. That is why it is not afraid of crossing Bush. Israel holds the U.S. by its imperial balls, and is thus certain that Bush's heart and mind will follow. After the Jerusalem bus bombing, Bush said, with a stammer so genuine that it made me think he studied method acting with Marlon Brando, that "violence leads...nowhere." It comes to mind that Bush's budget reserves half a trillion dollars to fund the greatest instrument of violence the earth has ever seen -- the U.S. war machine. It comes to mind that Bush could easily find in his own behavior the means to understand Hamas. Hamas uses violence, mostly against civilians, to keep its popularity among its public. Sharon does the same in Israel and Bush does the same in the U.S. Except it doesn't come to mind because Empire means we are not allowed to recognize the similarities between us and the other. We can no longer afford intelligence, not even military intelligence. The imbalance of power inherent in the American Empire cannot bring peace, neither in the Middle East nor anywhere else. It can only bring more and more inhuman violence of all sides, as it leads both rulers and ruled, and the rulers always faster than the ruled, to bid farewell to the ethics of our common humanity. Only equals can live in peace. Only equals can recognize each other's humanity. Bush is right. Violence leads nowhere. After fifty years of robbery and vandalism, Israel is almost there. Our violence also leads nowhere. And that is exactly where we're heading, armed to the teeth with the worst that money can buy. [Gabriel Ash was born in Romania and grew up in Israel. He is an unabashed "opssimist." He writes his columns because the pen is sometimes mightier than the sword - and sometimes not. He lives in the United States.] Gabriel Ash encourages your comments: [EMAIL PROTECTED] YellowTimes.org is an international news and opinion publication. YellowTimes.org encourages its material to be reproduced, reprinted, or broadcast provided that any such reproduction identifies the original source, http://www.YellowTimes.org. Internet web links to http://www.YellowTimes.org are appreciated. DJB