THE STRATFOR WEEKLY: 7 July 2003
by Dr. George Friedman
U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategies in
Iraq
Summary: The appointment of Gen. John
Abizaid as head of U.S. Central Command opens a new phase in both
the Iraq campaign and the war on al Qaeda. In order to wage
follow-on operations against al Qaeda, an effective
counterinsurgency operation must be launched against the Iraqi guerrillas.
This is a politico-military imperative. Politically, the
United States must demonstrate its effectiveness against the full
spectrum of opponents. Militarily, the United States must show it
can project forces from Iraq while the base of operations remains
insecure. Directly suppressing an insurrection without indigenous
support historically has been difficult, but Iraq has a
built-in opposition to the guerrillas: the Shiites in the south. But
their desire to dominate an Iraqi government -- and their ties to
Iran -- runs counter to U.S. policy. This means Washington
will have to make some difficult choices in Iraq, and in the end
will give away some things it does not want to give away.
Analysis: U.S. Army Gen. John Abizaid will officially
take over as head of Central Command during the week of July 7. His mission will
be not only to stabilize the situation in Iraq, but also to
command the main U.S. offensive against al Qaeda. The summer
offensive that Stratfor has written about has begun, and Abizaid's
mission will be to wage war, integrate the various operations into
a coherent whole and achieve the goal of the offensive: to
further undermine al Qaeda's ability to strike at the U.S.
homeland.
In war, no plan unfolds as
expected. This war began in a completely unexpected fashion on
Sept. 11, 2001. As is inevitable, the course of the war has taken unexpected
turns. The most recent and significant turn of this war has been the emergence of a
guerrilla war in Iraq. To be more precise, it appears to us that in Iraq, as in
Afghanistan, the fighters on the ground understood that they
could not win a conventional war. Rather than engage in the sort of conflict at which the
United States excels, they put up token conventional resistance,
all the while planning to engage the United States in
unconventional warfare over an extended period.
In other words, the Iraqi forces understood that
they could not defeat the United States in conventional war. Instead, the
Iraqi war plan consisted of declining conventional engagement and subsequently
engaging U.S. forces in operations in which their advantages were
minimized and their weaknesses were exposed.
This has left the United States with the following battle problem: It
must wage the broader summer offensive while simultaneously containing,
engaging and defeating the Iraqi guerrillas. This is not an easy
task, not only because it spreads U.S. forces thinner than planned,
but also because the challenge posed by the guerrillas has trans-military
implications, politically and psychologically. Abizaid must not ignore
these considerations and must integrate them into his war plan.
This is neither easy nor optional.
It is useful to begin by recalling the overarching strategic purpose of all
of these operations: the disruption of al Qaeda and potential follow-on groups to
prevent further major attacks on the United States. The Iraq
campaign was an element in this broader strategy, designed to
achieve these three goals, in increasing importance:
1. The elimination of a regime that potentially could support al Qaeda
operations.
2. The transformation of the
psychological architecture of the Islamic world. The perception in
the Islamic world, developed since the U.S. withdrawal from
Beirut in 1983 and reaffirmed by events since then, was that the
United States was incapable of resolute action. The United
States was seen as powerful militarily, but as lacking the
political will to use that power. U.S. forces withdrew after taking minimal casualties in
Beirut and Somalia. In Afghanistan, the United States halted
operations after seizing major cities, apparently because it was
unwilling to engage in more extended conflict. The U.S. invasion of
Iraq was designed to change the Islamic world's perception -- accepting anger
at the United States in exchange for greater fear.
3. The creation of a base of operations that would allow the United States
to bring political and military pressure to bear on a cluster of
nations the U.S. administration sees as directly or indirectly
sustaining al Qaeda operations -- in particular Saudi Arabia, Syria
and Iran. Riyadh began shifting its position prior to the Iraq
invasion. Immediately after the end of the campaign, the United
States turned its attention to follow-on operations against Syria
and Iran. These operations have been primarily political since the end of the
Iraq campaign, but the constant threat exists that they could
move to a military phase at any point.
The guerrilla war in Iraq strikes directly at the second objective of
the Iraqi campaign. It is what Stratfor has called a
trans-military goal: It is rooted in a military operation but ultimately
arrives at an issue that transcends the purely military -- namely the
psychological perception of the United States and the credibility of U.S.
military threats. As a secondary matter, it also
complicates the logistics of follow-on operations after Iraq. At the
moment, that is not the primary issue -- although it should be
emphatically noted that an evolution in the conditions in
Iraq very well could undermine the U.S. ability to use Iraq as a
base of operations.
The
problems that have arisen in Afghanistan and Iraq are rooted in U.S. strategy. The United
States invaded both countries as a means toward other ends, rather
than as ends in themselves. The invasion of Afghanistan was
intended to disrupt al Qaeda's main operational base. The invasion of
Iraq was intended to bring U.S. power to bear against al Qaeda's
enablers in the region. In neither case did the United
States have an intrinsic interest in either country -- including
control of Iraq's oil. (end of excerpts.
Attached in full)
THE STRATFOR WEEKLY 070703.doc