"Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some
have greatness thrust upon 'em." (Twelfth Night)
The three most powerful people in the world, George W. Bush, Hu Jintao
and Vladimir Putin are, respectively, perfect examples of Shakespeare's
epithet.
Despite the fact that the governances of America, China and Russia are
hugely different in structure -- as also the way they are elected or
selected -- the eons-old alpha male emerges just as strongly in these
three modern societies as in hunter-gatherer times. It is true, of
course, that each of the presidents concerned has to pay attention to
their closest advisors but, to a very considerable extent, all of them
have the most tremendous decision-making power that can affect the whole
world. Each of them sits upon a nuclear arsenal that can deliver missiles
to any point on the earth's surface and obliterate it.
Two of the current presidents are mysterious and few people in the west
know much, if anything, about them. Even George W. Bush is ambiguous if
we are to believe all the different opinions about him. We know a great
deal about his earlier life, particularly of his business history,
largely unsuccessful. Some (including the writer), believe that he is
just a front man for a small group of powerful people behind him who are
manipulating him -- including his father George Herbert Bush, the former
president twice removed, vice-president Richard Cheney and two or three
other figures with strong views and interests.
In due course, there'll be a sufficient number of biographies written
about Bush but, for the time being, it is difficult to reach a considered
view. Most of us are inevitably prejudiced one way or the other due to
his decision to invade Iraq and, at least for some years to come, opinion
is likely to become even more polarised. Perhaps the most objective
opinion of Bush so far qua president has come from Fred I.
Greenstein, who leads Princeton's Leadership Studies Program and has
written a paper, The Leadership Style of George W. Bush, given at
a conference earlier this year.
Greenstein has developed a six-fold job-requirement assessment for
leadership in big business and governance and the following is a brief
summary of his findings by John W. Dean.
"Greenstein gives Bush high grades on emotional intelligence, given
the fact that Bush could be (based on his years of alcohol abuse) an
'emotional tinderbox'. Yet as Texas governor, presidential candidate and
now as president, Greenstein finds him in good control of his emotions.
Bush does not score particularly well on his 'cognitive style'. While he
does not find Bush lacking in intelligence, Greenstein also finds him
'not particularly well equipped to reason clearly about the complex
trade-offs presidents typically have to make.'
"Our first MBA president gets high marks for his
organisational abilities, but Greenstein says his lack of tolerance for
staff disputes during meetings results in 'Bush's deliberative
processing' leaves 'something to be desired'. Bush's 'congenitally
gregarious nature', Greenstein believes, puts him in a league of
political masters like Lyndon Johnson. Nevertheless, Greenstein suggests
that Bush has not lived up to his potential as president because
'there has been a hard edge to his administration's partisanship in
Washington that was not evident in Texas.' "
Well, that takes care of Shakespeare's first category because, whatever
else may be said about Bush, he was certainly born to leadership. As a
young man he helped in his father's own presidential campaigns and
acquired a great deal of experience which few others could ever have had.
Furthermore, Bush's father rescued him from business disasters more than
once, and almost certainly was able to precisely position his son in the
Republican hierarchy as a strong presidential candidate.
Shakespeare's second category is filled by Hu Jintao. Yes, he'd been
previously tapped as a possible future leader by Deng Xiaoping but, as is
the case of all the members of the poliburo from which he was selected,
he'd already had vast administrative experience for several decades
previously. We know very little about his personality -- much less than
we know about Bush or Putin. When we see a photograph of him he looks
much the same as all the Chinese poliburo look-alikes -- with the same
suits and hairstyles, the same spectacles and the same sort of
inscrutable faces.
Hu Jintao's immediate predecessor Jiang Jemin was also considered to be
one of these bland, uncharismatic types. But appearances are deceptive.
Anthony Lake, president Clinton's senior advisor and negoiator on Chinese
matters suddenly discovered him to be very quirky, brilliantly
intelligent and widely read. One day when they were about to start
negotiations, president Jiang suddenly realised that Lake's name was
similar to his own (meaning "river"), and then started
expatiating on names and their origins delving deeply into Chinese
history, and then into poetry and philosophy and then relating it all to
modern technology in a bewildleringly fascinating way that caused Lake to
throw away his formal discussion agenda and simply enjoy a fascinating
conversation with a man of obviously great.scholarship. They postponed
negoitations until the next days.
The present president, Hu Jintao, is more than likely to be as gifted and
versatile as Jiang Jemin. As a young man Mr Hu qualified as an engineer
at Qinghua University in Beijing, the most prestigious university in
China, for which millions of young Chinese sit examinations every year
for one of 3,000 places. John Thornton, the ex-CEO of Goldman Sachs and
who made it into the top investment bank in Europe, teaches there now.
This is what he thinks of Qinghua (or Tsinghua) University: "If you
were to put Harvard, Stanford, Yale, Chicago, etc, all together you still
wouldn't have the concentration of future leaders you do at
Tsinghua." So Hu Jintao is no intellectual slouch! The BBC
News item below gives a few more details about him. But since this item,
president Hu has already released a raft of radical reforms in almost
every aspect of Chinese life -- more freedom for the media, stricter
banking regulations and control of corruption, and the further
institution of democratic voting procedures in the countryside among many
others.
Finally, we come to Shakepseare's third category of greatness -- that
which comes out of the blue. As the communist system in the Soviet Union
was collapsing, Putin, one of hundreds of officers of his rank (major) in
the KGB thought that he would have to become a taxi-driver in order to
survive. Then he was selected by an old friend, the Mayor of St
Petersburg to be his Mr Fix-it and then soon afterwards, even more
astonishingly, chosen by Yeltsin as the next president of Russia! This
was a man of modest rank in the secret service with absolutely no
political or administrative experience becoming the president of a
country with the greatest land mass in the world and many of its greatest
resources!
I think there's a slight clue in an article written from Der Spiegel
by Christian Neef. Although everything we have seen and read about
Putin so far -- his oppression of the independent TV channels, his arrest
of Khordokovsky, etc -- suggests that he is heading towards being a
dictator, ably assisgted by an revivified secret service, there is a clue
in the following article as to why Yeltsin chose him. In bringing about
the privatisation of Russia as fast as possible in order to prevent any
possibility of communism returning, Yeltsin had cut many corners and,
strictly speaking, was criminally guity of many acts which, after his
retirement, he could have been arrested for. Yeltsin thus needed a
successor who would give him absolution and who would not go back on his
word. Putin was such a person. There seems to be considerable rigidity in
his personality and while this will probably augur badly for Russia as a
whole and over the longer term, there are a couple of unexpected
instances mentioned which are praiseworthy.
So, to summarise, what is the future of Shakespeare's dramatic
personae? Indeed, what is our future in their hands? Both Hu and the
newly re-elected Putin have years of power ahead of them, Bush, we don;t
know about yet. He faces presidential re-election next November and, at
the time of writing, the American political situation is exquisitely
poised between the 'super-Patriot' Bush and his attempt to carry a
sufficiently large jingoistic electorate with him in the coming months,
and the newly rising star, Howard Dean, who has been the only Democratic
candidate who has constantly opposed the invasion of Iraq. We will see.
Whoever wins will join Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin in possessing awesome
power over the rest of us.
Except for one fact of life. Powerful leaders are commensurately afraid
of their own people. And they are particularly fearful of new ideas or
cultural shifts within their own people which can be their undoing. Hu
Jintao, like the rest of his politburo, deeply fears unrest by hundreds
of millions of Chinese, particularly those in the countryside, unless he
can keep on delivering consumer prosperity. Vladimir Putin, with his
secret service backing him up, doesn't fear any sort of uprising, but he
has a population which is literally dying on him, due to alcoholism, drug
addiction, Aids, fast-declining fertility and sheer despair about the
future. And George W.Bush, or Howard Dean, will have to cope with an
American electorate, and particularly an intelligentsia, which is
becoming more and more deeply cynical of politics and government as a
whole -- and thus of the very basis of presidential validity.
Keith Hudson
<<<<
HU JUNTAO
Even close followers of Chinese politics can say little for sure about Hu
Jintao, the man who has taken over as China's Communist Party leader and
is its new president.
It is 10 years since Deng Xiaoping promoted Mr Hu to the party's ruling
Politburo, thereby earmarking him to succeed Jiang Zemin as the
"core" of the Communist Party's fourth generation of leaders.
But in all that time he has given little clue as to what sort of leader
he will be. "He has played the role of heir apparent
brilliantly," says one analyst."He hasn't mistimed a single
move -- largely because he hasn't made one."
Hu Jintao, aged 60, is the first leader whose party career began after
the Communist takeover in 1949. Official biographies say he was born in
eastern Anhui province, and joined the party at the height of the
Cultural Revolution in 1964 when he was studying hydroelectric
engineering at Beijing's prestigious Qinghua University.
One entry -- excised after he took over as Party chief -- mentioned his
liking for table tennis and ballroom dancing. He is also said to have a
photographic memory. After graduating, he worked his way up through the
ranks in the Ministry of Water Conservancy and Power. This background --
which he shares with outgoing hardline premier Li Peng -- suggests he is
likely to be a champion of such major projects as the Three Gorges Dam,
despite opposition from environmentalists and others.
Mr Hu's party career began to take off after Deng's rise to power in the
late 1970s. He was one of several young administrators promoted rapidly
because of their performance or patrons.
Secret reformer?
Hu Jintao has served in key posts in some of China's poorest and most
remote provinces. He headed the Communist Youth League in Gansu and
became party chief in Tibet and Guizhou.In Tibet, he demonstrated his
toughness when he responded to separatist protests by declaring martial
law. It paved the way for similarly harsh measures to be used to end the
Tiananmen Square demonstrations in Beijing.
Many Tibetans even believe Mr Hu had a hand in the unexpected death of
the Panchen Lama, their second highest spiritual leader. They also
criticised him for spending little time in Tibet -- the apparent reason
being that he suffered from altitude sickness.
When Mr Hu returned to Beijing as a member of the Politburo's seven-man
Standing Committee in 1992, he took over key tasks such as handling
personnel matters and supervising the ideological training of top
officials.The courses he introduced on market economics and good
governance have led some to speculate that he is at heart a reformer. But
he has always been a faithful follower of the party line.
One of his few ventures into international affairs was in 1999 when, as
vice-president, he authorised anti-US demonstrations after the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade was mistakenly hit in a US bombing raid. One of Mr
Hu's few recorded sayings is that success in life "requires resolve,
attention to concrete matters and courage in making decisions".
BBC News -- 3 May 2003
>>>>
<<<<
A COMPLETE CONFORMIST
Christian Neef
Until now, it was unclear what exactly Vladimir Putin did as a KGB
officer in Dresden. Now his former offlcemate is talking about their
shared days of espionage. In a new book, he presents a character analysis
of his former colleague, who since then has managed to become the Russian
president.
[KH: I've deleted some descriptions of the work of the KGB in Dresden,
East Germany at about the time that Putin was transferred there in 1985.
Christian Neef now largely takes up the story of Vladimir Ussolzev, who
sat in the same office as Putin and got to know him well and is now
writing Putin's biography.]
"Soslushivez" is what Ussolzev, now 56, calls his manuscript
about his erstwhile fellow spy, and it is scheduled to be published as a
book in Russia soon. Loosely translated, the word means
"professional colleague" or "comrade," and it
suggests closeness. In fact, Ussolzev was something like Putin's
counterpart for an extended period of time. The man from Leningrad,
nicknamed "little Volodya" in Dresden, sat across from Ussolzev
in a two-man office at Angelikastrasse 4. Ussolzev had the opportunity to
observe Putin day after day, from one desk to another.
With his book, he intends to shed light on some of the fabricated and
romanticized notions Putin biographers have expressed in recent years.
One of these, according to Ussolzev, is the theory, put forth by German
author Alexander Rahr, that Putin's dizzying career was not really that
surprising, because it had been planned for a long time. In fact, there
are two questions that have yet to be completely resolved: Who is the
real Vladimir Putin, this man whose persona is as charming as it is
difficult to fathom, and what did the current president really do in
Dresden? Insider Ussolzev provides answers to these questions by
illuminating the small world of those six officers who manned the KGB
office in the East German district of Dresden, just 100 meters away from
the local headquarters of the Stasi, the former East German secret
police.
It was an isolated life, like the life of an astronaut on an extended
mission. A microcosm in which graduates of the secret service school
rubbed shoulders with embittered former Chekists. A world filled with
pointless filing work, party lectures and human intrigues.
Dresden was no dream job. Those assigned to Dresden had been passed over
for the well-paid positions at the KGB residences in Bonn and Hamburg.
They had to make do with a salary of 1800 East German marks (plus a
little extra paid into a Russian ruble account back home), the
merchandise in the military store of the First Guard Tank Division (where
bananas could be had, among other things), and the chance to flip through
the pages of Otto, Neckermann and Quelle mail-order catalogues circulated
clandestinely among the KGB offices. As Ussolzev recalls, Putin was able
to get most of the catalogues through his contacts. Later on, the agents
were paid the princely bonus of about a hundred dollars in cash, to be
spent in the diplomats' store in Berlin-Marzahn.
For Moscow, even the most remote East German province represented an
important front in terms of class struggle, and NATO was its primary
target, even in Dresden. Moscow was especially interested in the Green
Berets, the special forces of the US Army stationed in the Bavarian town
of Bad Tolz, as well as the military training areas in Wildflecken and
Minister. The representatives of the third division ("Illegal
Reconnaissance") were the ones responsible for these target areas,
and Vladimir Putin was their man in Dresden.
Ussolzev claims that the East German KGB was unable to station truly
productive agents near these bases. The Stasi passed on to the KGB all
applications filed by citizens of Dresden to obtain official approval for
visits by relatives from the West. According to Ussolzev, Putin combed
through tens of thousands of these documents in an effort to find
contacts who lived near the US bases of interest. The KGB was more
successful in recruiting East German citizens willing to emigrate.
Although they opposed Honecker, Ussolzev writes that they were not
necessarily against Gorbachev. After all, it was the era of Perestroika.
According to Ussolzev, "the argument we used to tempt them was that
if the Americans were to leave West Germany, the Russians would also
withdraw from the eastern portion." The new West German citizens
reported important US troop movements to their contacts in the east,
claims Ussolzev.
How many agents did the East German division of the KGB have in West
Germany at the time? "Hardly more than 20," says the former
secret agent. "We paid them miserably, sometimes as little as 50
marks." Sometimes they were discarded Stasi informers, hand-me-down
people who had no idea that suddenly they were working for the KGB.
Ussolzev is certain that "many of them were also on the payroll of
the BND (the German federal intelligence service) or the
Verfassungsschutz (the German federal agency responsible for defending
the constitution)," and goes on to say that "we were under
tremendous pressure to succeed, and any new recruitment increased our
chances of getting a promotion."
Putin's real job was discovering potential KGB agents among the foreign
students at the Technical University. He looked for people whose families
were part of the political elite at home, and who could become valuable
informants after returning to their native countries. Two of the four KGB
agents in Dresden were responsible for establishing contact and
supervising the informants. On paper they were employees of the criminal
investigation division of the East German police, but in reality they
worked exclusively for the Soviets. They met with Putin in cars and in
remote rural areas near Dresden.
One of them, Rainer M., with whom Putin had an "almost family-like
relationship," was arrested and charged with espionage after the
fall of the German Democratic Republic, or GDR. M.'s primary
responsibility had been to recruit Latin American students, who
apparently then provided the Dresden KGB office with "extremely
useful" information from people in Fidel Castro's
environment.
Was Putin also involved in the secret "Lutsch" (the Beam)
operation, in which the KGB observed its own friends, i.e., the East
German leadership? Yes, says Ussolzev. However, he also says that
"Lutsch" was not an "elite group of spies," as Putin
biographer Rahr has claimed, nor was its objective the replacement of
Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the SED (Socialist Unity Party of
Germany, the state party of the GDR). Everyone, claims Ussolzev, had to
work for "Lutsch," because Moscow routinely requested
information on the domestic political situation in the GDR, so that it
could remove dissatisfied party functionaries, critical employees of the
Stasi district administration, and church members.
The operation gained in importance when Honecker began to distance
himself from Moscow. The Kremlin was clearly irritated when, in February
1985, Honecker invited former American and British pilots, men who had
bombed Dresden 40 years earlier, to the official opening of the Semper
Opera House, which had been destroyed in World War II. From Moscow's
perspective, Honecker's move had the appearance of unwanted
reconciliation and enhanced the status of the former Anglo-American war
allies. In response, the KGB posted its men, equipped with microphones,
on Dresden's Theaterplatz and immediately transmitted Honecker's speech
to the Kremlin. "It was really a ridiculous game," says
Ussolzev today.
The germ of mistrust also began to spread within the Stasi administration
in Dresden, headed by General Horst Bohm, an especially zealous friend of
Honecker. The "great hypocrite" (in Ussolzev's words)
prohibited the KGB's people from entering the Stasi complex on Bautzner
Strasse, a place to which they had had unrestricted access in the past.
"Even in our minds, the MfS (East German Ministry for State
Security) seemed like a product of an Orwellian fantasy world, a leftover
from the Stalin era," says Putin's former colleague, adding that the
Stasi employed more people in the Dresden district alone than did the KGB
in all of White Russia.
Much of the work done at the Angelikastrasse office was routine and often
represented additional work for Putin's Department 3: obtaining cover
addresses for agents in other countries, forging passports with the
assistance of contacts at the Dresden registration offices, but also
extensive "scientific theft." West German dissertations mailed
to GDR scientists were confiscated by the customs office and, instead of
being forwarded to the correct addressees, were passed on to the Stasi
and the KGB. Ussolzev says that "anything relating to computer or
laser technology was copied for Moscow, and then forwarded by the KGB to
Soviet scientists for further analysis. In many cases, the Soviet
scientists simply incorporated the data into their own
dissertations."
What were some ofUssolzev's personal impressions of his colleague Putin?
"He was a pragmatist," says the former KGB officer,
"someone who thinks one thing and says something else." Someone
who was a "complete conformist" and did not believe in any
changes in his native country, who played the role of the committed
Communist to keep up appearances, and who called his colleague an
"idiot" because of his "provincial openness."
According to Ussolzev, Putin told him to restrain his criticism of
conditions in the Soviet Union and think about his family.
But then there were the office conversations between two men and the
regular Friday sauna evenings in the basement of the KGB mansion.
"In small groups," says Ussolzev, "Putin surprised us with
his political views." On the one hand, Ussolzev claims, Putin
refused to believe that under Stalin the KGB indiscriminately shot people
for the sole purpose of fulfilling a plan dictated by Moscow. On the
other hand, he says that Putin, a lawyer, was visibly upset about the
abuse of justice in the Soviet Union and sympathized with the Kremlin's
most important critics, such as dissident Andrej Sacharov, whom he
respected for his consistency.
Even more surprising was the diminutive KGB major's tolerance for Jews in
an organization that was deeply anti-Semitic, that saw a Jewish role in
everything it considered anti-Soviet, and had Soviet Jews watched in the
belief that they represented security risks. According to Ussolzev, Putin
never agreed with this stance, and told Ussolzev that he believed Jews
were "completely normal people." In fact, Putin grew up among
Jews in the Leningrad athletic clubs, where many of the trainers and top
athletes were Jewish. Ussolzev also debunks a few myths: that Putin spoke
perfect German, for example, and was even in command of several dialects
("he spoke fluently, but not easily"), and that it had already
been evident then that he was destined for great things ("his
intellectual abilities were good, but not outstanding; he was no great
speaker").
But he was persistent, a "nachalnik" type (which means chief or
boss in Russian), and even tried to pursue activities after it had become
apparent that they had become pointless. One of his early successes,
according to Ussolzev, was the rescue of the dossier that contained all
KGB contacts. A copy of the dossier was on file at the Stasi
administration in Dresden. Putin was able to remove the dossier at the
last minute, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November
1989.
According to Ussolzev, Putin concealed his energy behind a studied air of
politeness and courtesy. When interacting with his superiors, he gave the
impression of being extremely obedient, even dependent. This, says
Ussolzev, made him the constant favorite of his superiors, in Dresden, at
headquarters in Karlshorst, and probably later on with his political
mentor Boris Yeltsin.
But did he have the makings of a statesman? This would never have
occurred to any of his Dresden colleagues, says Ussolzev. Toward the end,
Putin also seemed to have distanced himself from the KGB. By 1990, during
the swan song of the Soviet Union, he had already resigned himself to
working as a taxi driver in Leningrad. But then he suddenly reappeared as
the right-hand man of Leningrad's mayor. Today, Ussolzev is convinced
that Putin served under the mayor as an officer on special assignment.
And now, as president? Now, like none of his predecessors, he has placed
a large share of the Kremlin's power onto the shoulders of the secret
services, at least according to Ussolzev. "To me," says
Ussolzev, "that is the biggest mystery. That is his
tragedy."
Translated by Christopher Sultan
Der Spiegel -- 20 October 2003
>>>>
Keith Hudson, Bath, England,
<www.evolutionary-economics.org>
- Re: [Futurework] Shakespeare's three great leaders -- Bu... Keith Hudson
- Re: [Futurework] Shakespeare's three great leaders ... Ray Evans Harrell