Because, of course, the horror of the terrorist attack on the Trade Center on 11 September 2001, was so great that almost any other reason could be implanted in the minds of the credulous public. This was so, even though Bush and Blair have had to change their story several times. Firstly, the invasion was to get at the heart of terrorism (ignoring the fact that the terrorists were mainly Saudi Arabians), then that Saddam was creating weapons of mass destruction (and that we Brits were in danger of being attacked at 45 minutes' notice!), and then that Saddam was a nasty man and that it was about time that Iraq was democratised (ignoring the fact that there are several other dictators around the world who are just as mad or bad).
The real reason was that 9/11 meant that Saudi Arabia was fermenting great problems domestically and producing fanatical extremists -- and who knows what they may do next. It was in the national interests of both America and the UK that further rich sources of oil supplies must be found fairly soon just in case Saudi Arabia become snarled up in an insurrection.
We "oilists" have been on the defensive because Bush and Blair have been very clever in never mentioning oil. Almost never, anyway. I think I have heard each of them mention the word once. And when they do, it is as an aside -- a throwaway comment said with a dismissive smile. It is as though the oil resources of Iraq were on a par with the growing of olives or camel races or the Sumerian archeological remains -- just one of those minor characteristics of the country which is of no consequence compared with the grave matters of state with which statesmen occupy themselves.
It is very likely that oil-as-a-reason will recede even further in the public's consciousness as attempts are made in Iraq to form a government in the coming months and years. Sooner or later, America's increasing dependence on Middle East oil will become obvious. Sooner or later, if western Europe doesn't wake up and throw itself into enthusiastic support of American policies in tghe Middle East, then it is likely that we will only be able to survive on the natural gas pipeline from Russia -- assuming, of course, that Russia will not want more of what remains in the decades to come.
Keith Hudson
<<<< SLEEPWALKING INTO GREATER OIL DEPENDENCE
David Buchan and Carola Hoyos
America has almost all the natural resources it needs to conduct its foreign policy. It can grow more than enough food to feed its people; and it has most of the minerals and metals it needs for manufacturing.
The one big exception to the country's self-sufficiency is in oil and gas: the US appears to be sleepwalking into ever-greater reliance on some unstable suppliers around the world.
In 30 years its own domestic oil output has fallen by 40 per cent, while consumption has increased by 40 per cent. And over that same period the share of imports in US consumption has risen from 36 to 56 per cent. In less than 20 years, the US could also be importing as much as a quarter of its natural gas, compared with 2 per cent today.
But what is so special about US dependence? The general answer is that such foreign reliance on a commodity vital to America's economy limits any notion of US omnipotence. Specifically, it underlines the contradiction between the US's dependence on, and its policies towards, the Middle East.
First, take the issue of dependence. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec) is likely to regain its market power. Despite intensive efforts by western oil companies in the past 30 years to develop non-Opec sources of supply -- from west Africa to the Caspian and even in the tar sands of Canada -- the Middle East remains the primary supplier.
Indeed, Opec countries in the Middle East will account for two-thirds of the increase in global oil production from now until 2030, according to the International Energy Agency. This will increase the ability of predominantly Arab Opec to set prices -- a development of economic consequence to the US.
Second, turn to US policies towards the Middle East. These have been largely determined by US support for Israel, which led the Arabs in 1973 to try to cut off oil to the US. Since then, Arab-US relations have improved, largely because Saudi Arabia, Opec's chief petro-power, has modulated output to try to smooth oil price fluctuations. In doing so, it earned US gratitude. The emergence of the fact that the terrorists behind the attacks of September 11 2001 were mostly Saudis, however, caused deep distrust in the US. Today President George W. Bush is campaigning to democratise Arab regimes. And if that policy proceeds smoothly it could put US relations with Arab oil states on a sounder political footing. But if it tips Arab oil states into revolution, it could be devastating for the world's oil imports.
The US has made sporadic, largely futile, attempts to reduce its oil vulnerability in the past:
1. Stockpiling oil in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, started by President Gerald Ford in 1975. This has recently been topped up by the Bush administration but could only ever be a stop gap measure.
2. Increasing domestic production. President'Richard Nixon's Project Independence in 1973 was billed as making the US self-sufficient in oil but its only result was to get plans for the trans-Alaska oil pipeline through Congress. In response to the second oil shock in 1978-79, President Jimmy Carter launched a "synfuels" programme to make oil out of coal and oil shale in the Rocky Mountains, a scheme abandoned when oil prices dropped. And the second Bush administration tried in vain to persuade Congress to open the Alaskan wildlife refuge to drilling.
3. Conservation. With the first oil shock of 1973, US energy efficiency began to improve. But Congress has refused to raise federal petrol taxes beyond the minimum needed to fund highway-building. The only successful conservation measure has been the Corporate Automobile Fuel Efficiency standards, introduced in 1975 but never tightened since.
US dependence on foreign oil may be inevitable but there is perhaps a silver lining. For instance, if the US were ever drastically to reduce its imports its ability to ignore Arab opinion might reduce its incentive to find a balanced Israeli-Palestinian solution.
It may be of comfort to the world's many other oil-importing countries to know the US is in the same position. The reason relates to the US's having built up a navy during the cold war. One rationale for maintaining it is to thwart any attempt to block oil routes through the Bosporus, the Suez and Panama canals or the Hormuz straits in the Gulf and the Malacca straits in south-east Asia. The US is the only power capable of policing or protecting this world oil market from disruption. Import dependence gives it the incentive to do so.
Financial Times -- 18 December 2003 >>>>
Keith Hudson, Bath, England, <www.evolutionary-economics.org>
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