On 2012-02-01, at 1:33 PM, Dannon Baker wrote:
> With Galaxy's toolbox at hand you could generate invalid HTML from plain text
> components. A simple example, but consider the following:
> Upload one plain text file with the content:
> Change the type of this dataset to html and there's your attack. If you
> tried to upload this, we'd interpret it as malicious HTML and discard it. As
> separate datasets, it's impossible to tell. Given Galaxy's powerful text
> manipulation tools you could write just about whatever you wanted using
> Galaxy itself and get it in the system as a (seemingly) valid tool-generated
> dataset. Now, with the outbound sanitation on any dataset served as
> "text/html" it doesn't matter and it gets handled prior to serving.
Okay, I follow you there. That's a good example, thank you!
> Another option we discussed would be to trust all tool generated HTML,
> disallow changing the datatype of anything *to* html, and so on, but that
> approach comes with its own problems.
In the case of the tool we're working on, this option is probably what would
have worked best.
>> If anything, would it be possible to make this sort of sanitization
>> controllable via a configuration file option?
> I'm rather hesitant to put in a disable option for a security feature, though
> you're more than welcome to pop those two lines out of your instance. I
> think the best path forward is probably relaxing the filter a bit, the
> initial pass was somewhat draconian. Would relaxing the filter to allow
> style content to pass through work for your needs?
Yes, we've already commented it out for the time being. :) Relaxing the filter
would be a good improvement so far as we're concerned. I'd be happy to keep in
contact with you during the process so that we can find the happy middle ground
between security and usability.
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