> > The socket credential check is at best a double check and a poor one > > at that in particular on systems with different access control > > systems. Moreover, the information provided by LOCAL_CRED violates > > the principle of least information (i.e. it exposes information that > > neither the client nor the server require to sufficiently implement > > their security policy). > > I disagree with this.
That's fine. We clearly have different ideas about how security mechanisms are supposed to work and how a security policy is supposed to be implemented. > > We think that programs never require the information that > > LOCAL_CRED supplies to implement their security policy as such we > > don't implement it. > > Your choice, I take patches for mach specific authentication > but only if they don't modify the current behaviour on other platforms. I tried to make my patch as conservative as possible: it fixes the case where LOCAL_CRED is not supported by the underlying OS. > > Again, my patch only allows gamin to run on systems > > which don't support LOCAL_CRED. > > Your patch sounds acceptable to me but I'm not on one of the affected > platforms, so I asked for a public check. Linux and, I think, the various BSDs all support LOCAL_CRED. Which other platforms did you have in mind? Thanks, Neal _______________________________________________ Gamin-list mailing list [email protected] http://mail.gnome.org/mailman/listinfo/gamin-list
