http://smartfootball.com/gameplanning/breaking-down-boise-how-the-broncos-use-leverage-numbers-and-grass-to-gash-the-opposition

Breaking down Boise: How the Broncos use leverage, numbers and grass to gash 
the opposition

337Share
[Ed. Note: The following article was written by my friend Mike Kuchar, who, 
when not writing incredibly informative articles, is the defensive coordinator 
at North Brunswick Township High School in New Jersey.]

It’s no secret that Boise State knows how to move the football — its 42 points 
per game last season led the nation — but it’s exactly how Boise moves the ball 
that makes them unique.  I became privy to this information when I spent a week 
with the Virginia Tech coaching staff back in early April as they prepared for 
their opener against the Broncos, a September 6 bout at Fed Ex field pitting 
two top ten teams against each other.  Indeed, the mere fact that Va Tech’s 
staff was breaking film down more than five months before gameday tells you 
something profound about how much respect Boise head coach Chris Petersen’s 
offense commands. I sat with Virginia Tech defensive backs coach Torrian Gray 
and defensive graduate assistant Steve Canter (who has since become Norfolk 
State’s QB coach) as they scouted Boise State’s games against Tulsa, Nevada, 
Fresno State and finally TCU last season.  Canter was given the important but 
not-so-glamorous task of charting every snap that Boise took on offense last 
year.  And after just a few minutes of watching tape with them my head began to 
spin, but Canter couldn’t spare to take his eyes off the screen.

To me, every play seemed like an entirely different scenario — a tiny but 
perfect little strategic masterpieces carved out by Petersen and his offensive 
staff for that situation alone.  While I struggled just to follow the ball 
(apparently the filmer in the press box had the same problem, as the camera 
often got faked out along with the defensive end or safety Petersen targeted) 
Canter diligently worked his craft, jotting each down and distance, all the 
personnel used, every formation, any motion and play. It’s a process he’s 
engrossed himself in as a former head coach himself: he mentored Vikings 
receiver Percy Harvin at nearby Landsdown High School (Virginia) and won a 
state championship in 2004. He’s earned the respect of defensive coordinator 
Bud Foster, one of the best defensive minds in the game. “[Boise] tr[ies] to do 
a ton of different things, but there has to be a reason for what they are 
doing,” said Canter.

Five months and a dozen scratch pads later, I’m not sure that the Hokies have 
Boise all figured out yet, but knowing Foster, they’ve certainly gotten some 
insight on them.  I took all the information from that visit and — mainly out 
of curiosity for my own purposes as a coach to see how a great offense works 
and how a great defense might prepare — to thoroughly study what Boise State 
does on the offensive side of the ball.  Once the studying was complete, I 
compiled a detailed and definitive report on what makes Boise, well…Boise. And 
more importantly, what the Hokies must do to win.



Personnel

“Maximizing personnel,” one of those football buzzwords that sounds like it was 
invented by Peter Drucker, is nevertheless essential to making an offense 
dynamic — and arguably nobody in the college game knows how to do it better 
than Petersen.  He learned it from his days working as the offensive 
coordinator under previous head coach Dan Hawkins where his direction thrust 
little known talents RB Ian Johnson and QB Jared Zabransky onto the college 
football landscape in 2006. [Ed. Note: Petersen also credits former Southern 
Cal head coach and longtime NFL offensive coordinator Paul Hackett for his 
football development, along with the time he spent under Mike Bellotti at 
Oregon where he worked alongside Dirk Koetter and Jeff Tedford.] Boise doesn’t 
always have the Tarzan’s on film — they don’t bang heads with the Oklahomas and 
Floridas in the recruiting wars — but they don’t need to.  Petersen is schooled 
in the art of allocation: he wants to best utilize the talent he has.  For 
example, five-foot-nine senior running back James Avery, rushed for 1,151 yards 
last season for the Broncos.  He’s not the fastest, but he’s elusive with an 
explosive burst. “He’s not the fastest guy in the world, you rarely see him get 
long runs” said Virginia Tech’s Gray.  “But like most Boise backs he has 
terrific start and stop skills; he can change direction quickly and he knows 
how to read blocks.”


Chris Petersen: smart guy, smart slacks

Avery is a patient, zone style back who looks for creases in defensive fronts. 
His skills are modeled after guys like Ian Johnson who had a stellar career 
running the same zone type runs.  Of course, it helps when those blocks are 
created by an offensive line that only surrendered five sacks last season.  And 
that success against the pass rush must be attributed to their knowing their 
protection assignments when picking up various blitz packages that teams throw 
at them at a weekly basis. In the Fiesta Bowl last season, TCU appeared to be 
in dial-a-blitz mode for most of the first half but still couldn’t get to Boise 
quarterback Kellen Moore, before largely giving up that approach as Moore never 
got flustered.  He knew where the weakness in his protection were and found a 
way to escape at the right times to avoid losses.

Moore is another anomaly: not scary on paper, frightening on film. Despite 
being barely six-feet tall, he has tremendous presence in the pocket.  He knows 
exactly where to escape when the pocket collapses and often finds receivers 
downfield simply because the defensive backs got tired of covering.  He’s quick 
and decisive with the ball — he threw only three interceptions in 431 attempts 
last season. His career completion percentage has been in the mid 60%s, he 
finished seventh in Heisman voting and was the WAC offensive player of the 
year.  His main target, senior Austin Pettis, had 63 catches from virtually 
every spot on the field: flanker, slot, split end and even out of the 
backfield; Petersen loves moving his chess pieces around.  Referring to Pettis, 
Virginia Tech’s Gray said: “He’s their tallest guy at 6-3 and they move him 
around a ton,” adding, “In the red zone, he’s lethal.”  Indeed, Pettis had 14 
touchdowns last season, mainly on bootleg schemes — a Boise favorite in that 
part of the field.

Schemes

Boise State’s linebacker coach, Jeff Choate, once told me at coaching clinic 
two years back, “We run plays, we don’t have an offense.  It makes it difficult 
to defend.”  At that time he was working with the running backs.  Before this 
project, I wondered how an offense can’t be a system.  Coordinators pride 
themselves on establishing identities: “It’s what we do” is a common mantra 
among the coaching profession.  Urban Meyer at Florida has his spread option, 
Chip Kelly at Oregon has his QB run game, Steve Sarkasian at Washington has his 
pro-style offense that he developed at USC. Well, apparently Boise was the 
Seinfeld of college football — their lack of identity is their identity.  
Although I may not have understood it then, the method behind this apparent 
lack of cohesion became much clearer to me after hours of study.

Boise specializes in getting defenses out of position to make plays by 
utilizing the three major essentials in offensive football:  numbers, leverage 
and grass.  “Numbers” means outnumbering the defense at the point of attack — 
i.e. more blockers than defenders on the edge, more receivers than zone 
defenders, etc.  “Leverage” refers to out-flanking a defense at the point of 
attack — i.e. you may not have numbers but the angles are on your side.  
“Grass” harkens to Willie Keeler’s baseball adage, “hit ‘em where they ain’t.”  
Run the ball where there are the fewest defenders.  As it turned out, Choate 
was right: Boise spends more time on distracting you then developing 
themselves.  But don’t get confused: the point is that although the Broncos 
have the talent to be one of the best teams in the country and could simply 
overrun certain opponents, their modus operandi is to be patient and to take 
what the defense gives them — a true reflection of Petersen, their coach.  The 
quintessential underdog philosophy, they wear you down by picking at four and 
five yard gains until they pop a big one.   Watching them on film, it’s never 
surprising they score, but to a football junkie, the methodology of how they 
score is a work of art.  Basically, Boise uses three distinct ways to score: 
(1) pre-snap leverage by the use of formation, (2) post-snap misdirection and 
(3) calling the unexpected — the dagger after lulling you to sleep.

1. Pre-Snap Leverage

Boise moves before almost every snap.  In the four games I broke down there 
were only seven plays (out of 162) that someone didn’t motion, trade or shift 
their alignment.  It’s not surprising that of those seven plays, their net 
yardage was a mere twenty-four.  They are comfortable moving.  Choate calls it 
“a show game to the defense,” meaning that there may be no distinct reasoning 
behind their shifting at all. [Ed. Note: I'm reminded of the old coaching saw, 
"Motion causes emotion."] But after studying each play that corresponds with 
it, its apparent there is a method.  The Broncos are naturally a 12 personnel 
team, which means they play with one tailback (Avery) and two monstrously large 
tight-ends who are monstrous — Tommy Gallarda at 6-5 and Kyle Efaw at 6-4.  
Having two tight ends in the game at the same time, especially with that kind 
of size, provides for excellent blocking surfaces.   Even Boise’s fullback, Dan 
Paul 6-0 and 240 lbs. will line up at the tight end spot from time to time.  
One of their favorite schemes is to line up in a pro wing formation on one side 
of the formation (Diagram 1) and quickly shift to the opposite side of the 
formation (Diagram  2).  Efaw will start in the fullback spot and move to a 
wing alignment as Paul moves from a wing alignment to the fullback spot, his 
natural position.   While it may seem elementary to the normal football 
watcher, what Petersen is doing is intricately planned.  He is overloading one 
side of the formation with a tight end plus wing set, thus creating an extra 
gap to the strong side of the formation that the defense must worry about.  
With the addition of a fullback who can be moved anywhere in the front, another 
gap is created and has to be defended, often too quickly for the defense to 
adjust to adjust to it.  By the time the ball is snapped, Petersen has created 
a defensive dilemma, too many gaps to cover in too little time, and he is able 
to run his base run schemes, like the Power O (Diagram 3) by gaining a numbers 
advantage in the tackle box.



A couple plays later, as he did against Nevada last season, Petersen will line 
up Gallarda in a traditional I formation set with two tight-ends, and, as Moore 
gets under center, as shown in Diagram 6.  While most opponents may expect 
another strong side run scheme and rotate their coverage and bump their front 
to the strong side, Petersen will run his inside zone scheme and watch Avery 
cut it back weak where there are voided lanes in the defense (Diagram 6). [Ed 
Note: For space constraints there are no diagrams 4 or 5.]



It’s a scheme Boise expects because of how defenses adjust to their motion.  
It’s a called scheme, not a spontaneous cut by Avery.  Avery knows he’s going 
there pre-snap.  Petersen and offensive coordinator Bryan Harsin make their 
adjustments from the sideline after seeing how a defense reacts to their 
movement.  “The way their offense is designed, there are plenty of schemes to 
cut the ball back,” said Gray.  “When you have a back that is patient, and can 
change directions quickly, it works.”

A cornerstone staple of the Broncos offense is to overload formations: they 
will line up in a traditionally 3×1 trips set (Diagram 7) which already puts a 
tremendous amount of horizontal stress on defenses.   But Petersen will take it 
one step further, often motioning out Avery (Diagram 8 ) to get into a 4×1 
formation which gives him two options.   If the defense overloads the coverage 
by cheating one of the safeties to the four side set, Moore will often bang the 
slant (throw it right away) or comeback route to the split end (Diagram 9) — 
against Tulsa last year he hit two of them.

Then when teams start to stay in a two deep rotation as Nevada did three weeks 
later, it frees the middle of the field up for a potential seam route by one of 
the strong side receivers (Diagram 10).



Instead of motioning to empty, Boise will also start in empty and motion Avery 
back into the backfield (Diagram 11).  The main idea here is for Petersen to 
see what defenses empty adjustment is. Most teams have only one, and usually it 
is man coverage.

 If he gets what he wants, he’ll run the jailbreak screen to Avery (Diagram 
12).  If everyone handles their blocking assignment, it’s usually Avery in a 
one on one situation with the defender assigned to cover him.  It’s a win/win 
situation.  “Jailbreak is such a scary play,” said Gray.  “Once you realize it, 
the linemen get on you and they hit that thing in the alley and you have 
problems.”



2. Post-Snap Misdirection

If all of the shifting, motioning and trading doesn’t get a defense where they 
want it, Petersen and his staff will wait to the snap of the ball to undress 
them.  Like most offenses, Boise packages their plays, which means they may 
have two particular options on any given play.   Case in point is Boise’s tight 
trips formation (Diagram 13) where they will overload the field with three 
receivers while keeping Gallarda, the tight end, away.  Since most defenses 
declare their strength to the tight side, they may have some players playing 
out of position on the trips side.  The “stressed” defensive player in this set 
is the trips side alley player, usually an outside linebacker.   If Petersen 
sees that that innermost receiver to the trips has a leverage advantage on him, 
Moore will just take the snap out of gun and throw a bubble screen to him 
(Diagram 14).    However, if that alley player starts to cheat his alignment to 
the trips side, it means that the offense has a number’s advantage to the tight 
side in which case Harsin may call some sort of speed option (usually to the 
boundary as it did against Nevada) picking up six yards a clip (Diagram 15) 
while the slot still gives the illusion of a bubble screen forcing the backer 
outside and away from the play.  Either way, the Broncos have the advantage.



Over the four games I watched, I also a lot of unbalanced formations where the 
tight end and flanker were both on the line of scrimmage while the X receiver, 
usually junior Titus Young, off it.  They’ll run some form of fast flow jet 
sweep to Young (Diagram 16).  

Young isn’t your prototypical running back, but he doesn’t need to be. Petersen 
just wants to set up the defense. Regardless of the yardage gained on the play, 
all he looks for is how the defense reacts.  Once the defense rolls its 
coverage to the side of the jet sweep, as TCU did in the Fiesta Bowl, Petersen 
will run the jet sweep pass off of that action.  Kellen Moore fakes the handoff 
to Young, and throws a post/wheel combination with the Z and the fullback 
(Diagram 17).  He hit it for 19 yards against the Horned Frogs to set up 
Boise’s initial score.



3. Bold, Calculated Risks

Sure, offensive coordinators give lip service about taking shots, but most play 
it close to the vest during crunch time.  Not Petersen and the Bronco staff. 
They’ll pull the trigger with any play at any time and are willing to live with 
the consequences — though most have been quite positive. We all remember the 
stunts he pulled against Oklahoma to win the Fiesta Bowl in 2008. Yet Petersen 
managed to do it again against TCU when his punter Kyle Brotzman tossed a 29 
yard completion on fourth down. Besides his already non-conformist approach to 
offense — like lining up in unbalanced sets and running to the short side of 
the field — Petersen takes specific risks at various stages in the games.  
Their first possession of the TCU game reflected this. Insider their own twenty 
yard-line, where most teams don’t like to take chances, Boise State threw three 
pass plays in a row.  The Horned Frogs were playing quarters coverage, a scheme 
deficient against double post routes.  So, Petersen and his staff wasted no 
time in trying to expose them by lining up in tight spread sets and trying to 
get over the top.  Because of their athleticism on defense, TCU kept up, but 
Boise managed to convert a few of those double posts later on in the game.

Even when facing a third and seven and beating Nevada in third quarter by six 
and in scoring position inside the forty yard line, Petersen easily could’ve 
tried to convert a quick slant to move the chains.  Instead, he opted for an 
outside zone play — into the boundary side of the field.  Petersen saw that 
Nevada’s defense was playing a soft cover two zone anticipating the throw (who 
wouldn’t be) and he took what they gave him.  The play only yielded six yards.  
Didn’t matter.  They picked up the first down on a QB sneak the very next play. 
It’s that free-spirited, offensive creativity that makes the Boise offense 
amazing to watch — and so difficult to defend.  “It’s truly a beautiful 
offense.  You watch every game in awe,” said Gray.  “They throw screens, they 
throw underneath high percentage passes, they throw hot (right away) to outside 
pressure and they max protect when they need to.  Seeing what you are in 
defensively, you’re up against the clock on defense.”

How to Stop Them

Gray and the rest of the Hokies staff are done with preparations for their 
nationally televised game against the Broncos on September 6th. Now the game 
must be played. Boise has won fourteen straight games and have their best 
ranking in their history. Moreover, essentially the entire offense, including 
Kellen Moore, returns, and there is even talk of a National Title. If Virginia 
Tech wants to thwart that dream in week one — or to have any shot themselves 
(the Hokies are ranked in the top ten as well) — they will need to do some very 
specific things:

Pressure Moore: TCU was the only team to do all season last year.  Although 
they couldn’t get to him, they pressured him into plenty of incompletions- his 
58 percent completion percentage in the Fiesta Bowl was ten percentage points 
lower than his average.  Moore is lethal when he’s in his comfort zone, so the 
Hokies need to change up their blitz packages.  Va Tech has the athletes to 
cover, so on third downs expect them to lock up in man situations and bring six 
defenders at Moore.
Come up with simple adjustments to their motion package: No matter how you 
slice it, Boise will come out with one of four types of formations, each based 
on eligible receivers:  2×2 (four wides, three wides and a tight-end, two wides 
and two tightends, etc), 3×1 (trips), 3×2 (no backs), and unbalanced sets.  
After studying Boise’s film, I noticed that only their fullbacks and tight ends 
shift and motion on each play, which limits the teaching (for the offense) to 
just focusing on those players. But it also helps the defense in their 
preparation. Virginia Tech must have an answer for each of those formations and 
rep against them continually in practice.  Petersen must continually shift and 
motion until he gets you in what he wants.  The Hokies must communicate their 
adjustments and get set before the ball is snapped.
Die Slowly: It sounds pessimistic, but is essentially what the Hokies must go 
by to succeed against BSU:  let Boise work for their yards; don’t give up the 
big play; and don’t get caught up in all the misdirection post-snap.  Va Tech 
needs to be disciplined, read their keys and not get caught up in the “show 
game” that Boise State presents.  Make them earn it. (And hope Tyrod Taylor has 
a big day!)
Related Posts:

Dick LeBeau, Dom Capers and the evolution of defense
Smart Notes – Norm Parker; inverted veer – 10/12/2010
Smart Notes 1/18/2010
Smart Notes 9/17/2009
Anatomy of a Beatdown: The key concepts Dana Holgorsen’s West Virginia 
Mountaineers used to crush Clemson 70-33 in the Orange Bowl



Woody (via iPhone)

-- 
GATORS: ONE VOICE ON SATURDAY - NO VOICE ON SUNDAY!
1996 National Football Champions   |   2006 National Basketball Champions
2006 National Football Champions   |   2007 National Basketball Champions
2008 National Football Champions   |   
Three Heisman Trophy winners: Steve Spurrier (1966), Danny Wuerffel (1996),
Tim Tebow (2007) - Visit our website at www.gatornet.us

Reply via email to