The "exploitable vulnerability" may lead to a misunderstanding that
missed hardening issues are considered vulnerabilities, just that
they're not exploitable. This is not true, since while hardening bugs
may be security-relevant, the absence of hardening does not make a
program any more vulnerable to exploits than without.
Drop the "exploitable" word to make it clear that missed hardening is
not considered a vulnerability.
diff --git a/SECURITY.txt b/SECURITY.txt
index b3e2bbfda90..126603d4c22 100644
--- a/SECURITY.txt
+++ b/SECURITY.txt
@@ -155,10 +155,10 @@ Security features implemented in GCC
GCC implements a number of security features that reduce the impact
of security issues in applications, such as -fstack-protector,
-fstack-clash-protection, _FORTIFY_SOURCE and so on. A failure of
- these features to function perfectly in all situations is not an
- exploitable vulnerability in itself since it does not affect the
- correctness of programs. Further, they're dependent on heuristics
- and may not always have full coverage for protection.
+ these features to function perfectly in all situations is not a
+ vulnerability in itself since it does not affect the correctness of
+ programs. Further, they're dependent on heuristics and may not
+ always have full coverage for protection.
Similarly, GCC may transform code in a way that the correctness of
the expressed algorithm is preserved, but supplementary properties
