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http://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/12/world/cia-tie-asserted-in-indonesia-purge.html?pagewanted=al
      
<http://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/12/world/cia-tie-asserted-in-indonesia-purge.html?pagewanted=all>

C.I.A. Tie Asserted in Indonesia Purge By MICHAEL WINES, Special to The New
York Times Published: July 12, 1990


*WASHINGTON, July 11— *A dispute has developed over a report that 25 years
ago, United States officials supplied up to 5,000 names of Indonesian
Communists to the Indonesian Army, which was then engaged in a campaign to
wipe out the Communist Party in that country.

The House Intelligence Committee plans to investigate the report, which
said that State Department and Central Intelligence Agency officials who
served in Jakarta ''described in lengthy interviews how they aided
Indonesian Army leader Suharto'' in his attack on the Indonesian Communist
Party.

Gen. Suharto, now Indonesia's President, took control of the Government in
October 1965, days after Communist insurgents launched an unsuccessful coup
and killed six senior military officials. His army later encouraged and
joined in a nationwide massacre of known and suspected Communists, which
the C.I.A. has said claimed 250,000 lives before it ended in early 1966.

The article, distributed by the Washington-based States News Service on May
17, first appeared in The Spartanburg (S.C.) Herald-Journal on May 19, and
has been published by other papers, including The Washington Post, in
somewhat abridged form.

The author of the article, Kathy Kadane, quoted Robert J. Martens, who from
1963 to 1966 was a political officer at the United States Embassy in
Jakarta, as saying that he had headed an embassy group of State Department
and Central Intelligence Agency officers who for two years compiled lists
of as many as 5,000 Communist Party members and sympathizers.

He was quoted as saying that the lists were turned over to an aide to the
Indonesian Foreign Minister, who was known as an anti-Communist, once the
massacre of Communists and others had begun.

The article also said that approval for the release of the names came from
the top officials at the Embassy, including Ambassador Marshall Green.

Release of a List: Who Approved It? There is no question that a list of
names was provided to the Indonesians. The dispute has focused on whether
the decision to turn over the names was that of an individual American
Embassy officer, or was coordinated with the Central Intelligence Agency
and approved by senior embassy officers.

Also, there is some disagreement over the significance of the action
-whether the turning over of several thousand names was important
information for the Indonesian Army.

Mr. Martens, who is retired from the Foreign Service and now lives in
Maryland, acknowledged in an interview that he had passed the lists of
names to the Indonesians. But he contended in a letter to the editor of The
Washington Post that ''I and I alone decided to pass those 'lists' to the
non-Communist forces.''

''I neither sought nor was given permission to do so by Ambassador Marshall
Green or any other embassy official,'' he said in the letter.

''I also categorically deny that C.I.A. or any other classified material
was turned over by me. Furthermore, I categorically deny that I 'headed an
embassy group that spent two years compiling the lists.' No one, absolutely
no one, helped me compile the lists in question.''

He said in the letter that the lists were gathered entirely from the
Indonesian Communist press and were available to everyone.

Mr. Green, who later became Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, called the Kadane account ''garbage.''

''There are instances in the history of our country, and specifically in
the Far East, where our hands are not as clean, and where we have been
involved,'' he said in Washington, where he lives in retirement. ''But in
this case we certainly were not.''

Ms. Kadane said tape-recorded interviews support ''every point of the story
that was published,'' and the editor of States News Service, Leland
Schwartz, said: ''The news service stands behind the story and we feel that
there is no question that what we said took place, took place. This comes
from principals at the time.''

Responding to a New York Times reporter's request, States News Service,
which provides articles on Federal Government activities to local and
regional newspapers, furnished transcripts of several key interviews used
to prepare the article. They appear ambiguous on the central accusation:
that Mr. Green and others approved releasing to the Indonesians a list of
Communist Party members.

What Was U.S. Role In Frenzied Killing? The Indonesian coup attempt and the
massacre occurred against a backdrop of political intrigue and virulent
anti-Americanism in Jakarta, where the Government was then controlled by a
charismatic pro-Communist dictator, President Sukarno. Mr. Sukarno had
actively supported the three million-member Indonesian Communist Party,
also known as the P.K.I., as a counterweight to General Suharto's growing
influence as head of the military.

In October 1965, one day after a coup attempt by Communist forces was
beaten back by General Suharto, Communist forces killed six senior military
officers. In response, army units marched into Communist strongholds and,
joined by anti-Communist civilians, began a frenzied round of killing. Mr.
Sukarno retained titular control for another six months before being ousted
by General Suharto.

In an interview, Mr. Martens said he told Ms. Kadane that he acted without
approval because he wanted to avoid embassy red tape at what he believed
was a critical time.

''I felt it necessary and useful to provide people standing up to this
Communist takeover the means to understand what was happening,'' Mr.
Martens said. ''If we had any purpose in the world except to be
bureaucrats, that was the sort of thing I felt we ought to be doing.''

Ms. Kadane agrees that Mr. Martens told her that he acted alone, but
contends that Mr. Green and two other officials then at the United States
Embassy - the deputy chief of mission, Jack Lydman, and the political
section chief, Edward Masters - acknowledged in interviews that they
approved Mr. Martens's action in advance.

In interviews with The New York Times, Mr. Lydman, Mr. Masters and the two
senior C.I.A. officials in Jakarta at the time of the coup denied any
involvement in Mr. Martens's action.

According to the transcripts of Ms. Kadane's tape-recorded interviews, Mr.
Green said he had no recollection that Mr. Martens had compiled lists of
Communist Party members. Asked whether he had approved the transfer of such
a list to the Indonesians, he replied, ''I have no recollection of such a
thing.''

When Ms. Kadane said that others had confirmed it, he replied, ''Well, I
wouldn't gainsay it,'' and added, ''I told you I couldn't remember it.''

Role of 'Top People': One Memory Fails But the transcripts do not show
conclusively that others confirmed Mr. Green's involvement. Indeed, they
suggest that some embassy officials did not see the lists as sensitive or
of great value to the Indonesians.

Mr. Masters at first replied, ''Oh, sure,'' when asked if Mr. Martens told
him about passing the list, the transcripts show, and he later added, ''We
knew where the names were going.'' But when asked several times if
Ambassador Green or C.I.A. officials also knew or approved, he replied:
''I'm not sure anyone could remember at this late date. Let's face it, an
awful lot of things were going on out there. This was not No. 1.''

Mr. Masters, now head of the Washington-based National Planning
Association, later told Ms. Kadane that the Indonesian military was not a
group of ''village idiots'' and that he believed they knew how to find
Communist leaders without American help.

In a final conversation with Ms. Kadane, when he became aware of what would
later appear in print, Mr. Masters said: ''I certainly would not disagree
with the fact that we had these lists, that we were using them to check
off, O.K., what was happening to the party. But the thing that is giving me
trouble, and that is absolutely not correct, is that we gave these lists to
the Indonesians and that they went out and picked up and killed them.''

''I don't believe it,'' he said. ''And I was in a position to know.''

The transcript of an interview with Mr. Lydman includes an assertion by Ms.
Kadane that ''top people'' in the embassy coordinated the release of the
list. Mr. Lydman replied, ''Oh, yes, absolutely.''

But in an interview last week in Washington, where he is retired, Mr.
Lydman said his response was ''absolutely not what I intended.''

''I certainly wasn't focusing on the impact of what she was saying,'' Mr.
Lydman said. He said many issues were coordinated at daily staff meetings
at the embassy, but that he had no knowledge of any approval for the
release of the lists.

C.I.A. Involvement: Ex-Officers Speak When interviewed for her article, the
deputy C.I.A. station chief in Jakarta at the time, Joseph Lazarsky, told
Ms. Kadane that the Jakarta C.I.A. station ''contributed quite a bit'' to
Mr. Martens's lists, contradicting Mr. Martens's assertion that the lists
were assembled only from press clippings.

But the C.I.A. station chief in Jakarta at the time, B. Hugh Tovar, denied
that his office gave any classified information on Indonesian Communist
officials to Mr. Martens.

The article also said that William Colby, a former Director of Central
Intelligence who headed the C.I.A.'s Far East division in 1965, ''compared
the embassy's campaign to identify the P.K.I. leadership to the C.I.A.'s
controversial Phoenix Program in Vietnam.'' Phoenix was a C.I.A.-sponsored
effort to identify Communist agents within the South Vietnamese civilian
population, some of whom were later killed by South Vietnamese Army units.

Mr. Colby said in a telephone interview that his remarks were
''misappropriated.'' He noted that he had repeatedly stated publicly that
the C.I.A. had no covert involvement in the Indonesian coup or its
aftermath.

One observer removed from the controversy is John Hughes, a former editor
of the Christian Science Monitor who won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting
on the Indonesian coup and later wrote a book on the subject.

Reached in Maine, where he now edits The Camden Reporter and The Free Press
in nearby Rockland, Mr. Hughes said the notion that the United States
Embassy would have assisted the army in locating Communists seemed ''pretty
far out'' to him.

''I don't think the Indonesian Army needed any help in going after
Communists in Indonesia at that time,'' he said. ''It sort of boggles the
mind that the embassy would need to be giving out lists. There wasn't any
problem about killing people. There was an abundance of names and targets.
Everybody knew who was a P.K.I. cadre.''

Photo: President Suharto of Indonesia, who may have been aided by American
officials in a campaign to massacre Indonesian Communists 25 years ago.
(Bob Nicklesburg/Gamma-Liaison)



































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