Baru pangkalan militer di Djibouti yang secara resmi diakui Tkk. Tapi 
sebetulnya Tkk terus secara agresif memperbanyak pangkalan militernya di banyak 
negeri, hanya ditutupi dengan segala dalih dan alasan. Misalnya di Argentina, 
Tkk juga punya pangkalan, tapi dibilang hanya untuk hal-hal yang berkaitan 
dengan ruang angkasa. Padahal sudah diketahui Tentara Tiongkok ada di belakang 
kegiatan ruang angkasa itu. Ada tulisan tentang pangkalan di Argentina itu, 
tapi sayang dalam bahasa Spanyol. Di bawah ini saya sertakan  artikel "China 
eyes 18 overseas naval bases" (Tkk mengincar 18 pangkalan angkatan laut di luar 
negeri). Strategi jalan sutra sebetulnya berhubungan erat dengan usaha 
pembangunan pangkalan militer dan merebut daerah pengaruh. Di artikel ini 
disinggung juga bagaimana Tiongkok menggunakan utang untuk mendapatkan 
fasilitas yang memang sudah diincarnya. Persis seperti tulisan yang pernah saya 
postingkan juga.  semua ini memperlihatkan terus meningkatnya kontradiksi antar 
imperialis. Sebagai kekuatan imperialis yang "datang belakangan" ,  jelas 
terlihat Tkk sedang berusaha untuk "membagi kembali dunia" dan menuntut 
bagiannya.

|  China eyes 18 overseas naval bases

  |


 

|  These developments are in sync with China’s much pronounced Maritime Silk 
Route strategy.

  |


 

|  |
|  |  With the recent challenging of the notion of the Indian Ocean Region 
(IOR) being India's "strategic backyard", China is gradually upping the ante in 
the maritime realm around India — a traditional strategic nerve centre for New 
Delhi. Beijing is sending a tacit signal, wherein it "recognises India's 
special role in stabilising the strategic Indian Ocean Region, but the 
perception that it is India's 'backyard' may result in clashes...."

 The caution thrown in by China needs to be read in conjunction with the 
cumulative maritime activity of the PLA Navy (PLAN) and its mounting forays 
into the Indian Ocean — the third largest water body in the world. The 
expanding strategic naval footprint in the Indian Ocean by means of acquiring 
more maritime bases and berthing facilities is a core pillar of China's ports 
Policy. The PLAN's presence and deployment in the IOR have been on the rise 
since 2014, when a Song-class conventional submarine docked in the Colombo 
harbour along with a Ming-class diesel-electric nuclear submarine.. Striking, 
was the fact, that the submarine docked at Colombo's South Container Terminal 
that is built, run, and controlled by China Merchants Holdings — thereby 
raising queries as to why did it not choose to dock at the Sri Lanka port 
Authority in Colombo, which is mandated to accommodate foreign military 
vessels? The emphasis to dock at a minuscule "Chinese facility" well within a 
Sri Lankan administered harbour, merits careful analysis.

 Given its strategic placement, Sri Lanka is fast becoming the pivot of rising 
Chinese naval presence in the IOR, in that, China also has a substantial 
controlling stake in the Hambantota port, with Colombo agreeing to grant 
Chinese state-owned companies operating rights to as many as four berths in 
exchange for an easing of loan conditions. Besides, there are unconfirmed 
reports of construction of a Chinese-run aircraft maintenance facility near 
Hambantota in order to service PLAAF assets based in Sri Lanka. In neighbouring 
Pakistan, the docking of a Chinese submarine in Karachi, following the handing 
over of the port's operational control to China Overseas port Holdings is 
another step towards consolidating Chinese permanent naval presence in South 
Asia.

 These developments, significantly, are in sync with China's much pronounced 
Maritime Silk Route strategy — a prominent feature of the upcoming 13th 
Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). The maritime route is a proposed sea network of 
ports, coastal infrastructure projects beginning in Quanzhou in the Fujian 
province and culminating in the northern Mediterranean Sea. By virtue of this 
fresh strategy, Beijing seeks to gain greater access to the strategic pathways 
of the Indian Ocean, alleviated access to the Gulf oil — which consequently 
shall reduce its dependence on the passage through the Straits of Malacca — a 
key potential vulnerability for China in the event of a future conflict.

 China recognises fully well that in order to boost its naval power projection 
capability, it will have to gain greater access to ports and berthing 
facilities. This is being increasingly reflected with China's covert strategy 
of granting huge loans to smaller coastal island nations that are in dire need 
for developmental funds to improve infrastructure. The pattern that China is 
following, almost unvaryingly for handing out these loans, is that there are 
"no conditions and/or transparency measures" while issuing the loan. As soon as 
the island nation in question reaches the stage where it is unable to repay the 
loan on time, China thereafter "offers" to "waive off/relax" loan conditions in 
exchange for a "few berths" for that particular naval facility. The Maldivian 
project is a case in point, in which China is developing the iHavan Integrated 
Development Project in the northernmost main sea line of communication joining 
Southeast Asia and China to West Asia and Europe. The iHavan project is riding 
on huge concessional loans/aid financing from China and it is being forecast 
that Maldives shall almost certainly default on payments, thereby allowing 
China to seize a few berthing facilities there.

 This pattern could well be adopted in the future with many other countries, 
especially since official Chinese publications including Xinhua have advocated 
and "advised" the PLA Navy to build as many as 18 overseas naval military bases 
in the greater Indian Ocean area, possibly including: Chongjin port (North 
Korea), Moresby port (Papua New Guinea), Sihanoukville port (Cambodia), Koh 
Lanta port (Thailand), Sittwe port (Myanmar), Dhaka port (Bangladesh), Gwadar 
port (Pakistan), Hambantota port (Sri Lanka), Maldives, Seychelles, Djibouti 
port (Djibouti), Lagos port (Nigeria), Mombasa port (Kenya), Dar-es-Salaam port 
(Tanzania), Luanda port (Angola) and the Walvis Bay port (Namibia).

 The long shadow of China's ports policy in the Indian Ocean being currently 
driven and characterised by both, state- and private-sponsored "infrastructure 
investment", foretells strategic ramifications militarily as these facilities 
shall end up becoming communication and surveillance facilities, in addition to 
being repair and replenishment centres for the Chinese Navy — underscoring the 
intransigent course of Beijing's influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.

  |

 

    On Tuesday, February 13, 2018 10:15 PM, Sie Tik Tan <sietik....@yahoo.com> 
wrote:
 

 Numpang tanya......di Djibouti,ditanduk Afrika, ada 3 pangkalan militer asing, 
milik Prancis, USA dan RRT, lha kalo Prancis dan  USA keberadaannya untuk 
menduduki Djubouti atau menodong negeri2 sekitaranya.....lalu keberadaan 
pangkalan RRT buat melawan USA, lha....rame dong disana bertempur 
melulu.......kemana rakyat Djibouti ngungsi menghindari perang? Lha wong  
Djibouti cuma 23 ribu km2?

Verstuurd vanaf mijn iPad
Op 11 feb. 2018 om 15:06 heeft Chan CT <sa...@netvigator.com> het volgende 
geschreven:


Lalu, ... bagaimana pemikiran nenek yg satu ini menghadapi dan melawan 
imperialisme AS, yg bukan saja memiliki puluhan armada kapal induk, begitu 
banyak sudah terbangun basis-mi9liter diberbagai negara didunia? Cukup dengan 
berteriak-teriak “GANYANG Imperialisme AS!” dan berdemo-demo ria saja?  
Kenyataan basis militer AS yg dibangun dibanyak negara untuk menundukkn negara 
tsb dan kangkangi dunia, sedang basis militer yg hendak dibangun RRT adalah 
untuk melawan imperialisme AS yg sampai sekarang mengangkangi dunia! Kalau 
saja, AS dan negara-maju boleh memiliki senjata-senjata modern yg ampuh dan 
mematikan sampai pada rudal dan nuklir, kenapa pula RRT tidak boleh, lalu 
menuding sama dengan imperialisme?    From: Tatiana Lukman 
jetaimemuc...@yahoo.com [GELORA45] Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 12:41 
AMTo: Yahoogroups ; Daeng ; Rachmat Hadi-Soetjipto ; Harry Singgih ; Farida 
Ishaja ; Gol ; Mitri ; Lingkar Sitompul ; Ronggo A. ; in...@ozemail.com.au ; 
Billy Gunadi ; Oman Romana ; Harsono Sutedjo ; da...@telia.com ; Sie Tik Tan ; 
Sahala Silalahi ; Tjoa ; Andreas Sungkono ; GELORA_In ; Nunu Nugroho Subject: 
[GELORA45] Tiongkok akan membangun basis militer di Afganistan   Sayang 
beritanya dalam bahasa Spanyol. Inilah hasil "kejayaan" dan "keunggulan" sistim 
kapitalisme dengan ciri Tkk yang dibanggakan Chan: terus membangun basis 
militer... Kali ini di Afganistan dengan alasan menghadapi terorisme...Di 
mana-mana Tkk dengan sangat agresif membangun pengaruh ekonominya dan 
militernya. Kontradiksi antar imperialis terus meningkat, terutama antara AS 
dan Tiongkok dan antara AS+EU dan Rusia. Semuanya rebutan pasar, ruang untuk 
penanaman modalnya, kekayaan alam/bahan baku dan pengaruh. Masing-masing 
menjaga dan membela kepentingan nasional masing-masing dan kaum pemodal. Kedua 
Perang Dunia pada hakekatnya adalah perang antar imperialis, karena imperialis 
adalah sumber perang yang sebenarnya. Hanya perjuangan rakyat yang bisa 
mencegah perang dunia.
China construirá una base militar en Afganistán para hacer frente a la 
expansión del terrorismo hacia Asia<!--[if !vml]--><!--[endif]-->   Resumen 
Medio Oriente/ 8 de febrero 2018 .- China ha estado en conversaciones con el 
vecino Afganistán para ayudar a construir una base militar allí, en medio de 
preocupaciones de Pekín por la expansión del Daesh al territorio afgano y por 
los militantes uigures que regresan al territorio chino desde Siria e Iraq, 
dijeron funcionarios afganos. La base militar se construirá en el remoto y 
montañoso Corredor Wakhan, en el noreste de Afganistán, donde testigos 
informaron haber visto soldados chinos y afganos realizando patrullas 
conjuntas, informó AFP el viernes. El informe citó al portavoz adjunto del 
Ministerio de Defensa de Afganistán, Mohammad Radmanesh, que dijo que 
responsables chinos y afganos habían discutido el plan durante unas 
conversaciones en diciembre del año pasado en la capital china, pero añadieron 
que “aún están trabajando en los detalles.” “Vamos a construirla (la base) y el 
gobierno chino se ha comprometido a ayudar financieramente al Ejército afgano y 
a proporcionar equipos y entrenar a los soldados afganos”, dijo Radmanesh. En 
respuesta a las preguntas sobre el proyecto, un alto funcionario de la Embajada 
de China en Kabul solo dijo que Pekín estaba involucrado en el “desarrollo de 
las capacidades” de Afganistán. El congelado y árido territorio fronterizo 
situado entre Afganistán y la región de Xinjiang de China es escenario, sin 
embargo, de contactos entre los pueblos de ambos lados de la frontera. La 
participación de China en la construcción de la base militar afgana se produce 
en un tiempo en el que el presidente chino, Xi Jinping, busca expandir la 
influencia económica y geopolítica regional de Pekín. China está invirtiendo en 
la construcción de infraestructuras en el Sur de Asia, en un esfuerzo conocido 
como la Nueva Ruta de la Seda, y busca defender sus intereses y su seguridad a 
través de una presencia militar en Afganistán. Algunos expertos señalan que el 
grupo terrorista Daesh, que ha sufrido graves derrotas en Oriente Medio, está 
emigrando a Afganistán con ayuda de EEUU. Eso podría representar una amenaza 
contra la seguridad de Rusia, China y los países de Asia Central.  


   

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