--On mandag, november 28, 2005 10:49:35 -0500 "Bernie Volz (volz)"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
For DHCPv4, all three forms could be used (once
draft-ietf-dhc-3315id-for-v4-05.txt is an RFC and implementations
support it).
However, the DHCPv4 server knows which format to use as it is using that
same information to associate the client with a lease.
In general, a DHCPv4 server would:
- Use the DUID format if the client and server both support
draft-ietf-dhc-3315id-for-v4-05.txt and the client presents a
client-identifier option formatted as a DUID. (Note that
draft-ietf-dhc-3315id-for-v4-05.txt documents some issues with migrating
to clients/servers that support
draft-ietf-dhc-3315id-for-v4-05.txt.)
- Use the Client Identifier option from the client if the client
included this option in its messages.
- Use the htype/chaddr otherwise.
This is already specified in RFC 2131 and
draft-ietf-dhc-3315id-for-v4-05.txt.
If you include that little list in this document, I'm fine with it - RFC
2131 and 3315id-for-v4 can't specify the DHCID, since that's defined here,
so I don't know what you mean by "already specified"...
WRT the security issue:
So, I would take your option 2: "Abandon the idea that you can hide
information from a determined attacker using the hash" and I thought
that's exactly what we did? Section 2 says "This makes it difficult to
'track' a client as it is associated with various domain names." Also,
section 6 "Security Considerations" also says "make it difficult to
'track'".
The following sentences need editing, in my opinion:
In order to avoid exposing potentially sensitive identifying
information, the data stored is the result of a one-way MD5 [5] hash
computation.
s/avoid exposing potentially sensitive/make it more difficult to get/
The MD5 hash algorithm has been shown to be weaker than the SHA-1
algorithm; it could therefore be argued that SHA-1 is a better
choice. However, SHA-1 is significantly slower than MD5. A
successful attack of MD5's weakness does not reveal the original data
that was used to generate the signature, but rather provides a new
set of input data that will produce the same signature. Because we
are using the MD5 hash to conceal the original data, the fact that an
attacker could produce a different plaintext resulting in the same
MD5 output is not significant concern.
This whole section is not what you say you were aiming for.
Rather say: "The hiding of information in the hash is already weak, and the
weaknesses so far uncovered in MD5 do not make it any weaker".
The DHCID record as such does not introduce any new security problems
into the DNS. In order to avoid exposing private information about
DHCP clients to public scrutiny, a one-way hash is used to obscure
all client information.
s/In order to avoid exposing private information/In order to make it
somewhat more difficult to get at information/
And add some words about how difficult it is to recover the information
(that you need to be a determined attacker in order to do so).
(if you know your victim's domain name, the DNS queries aren't at all
expensive, since the DUID will always be stored under the same domain name
in the DNS...)
Harald
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