I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART)
reviewer for this draft (for background on Gen-ART, please see
http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/art/gen-art-FAQ.html).
Please resolve these (slightly belated - sorry) comments along with any
other Last Call comments you may receive. (I understand this has now
gone forward to the IESG so you will have to consult your AD about what
to do next).
Summary
=======
This document needs further work (it is not ready for publication).
The main concerns which I have are:
- No discussion of ownership of archived data
- No discussion of interactions with legal requirements (data being
subpoenaed, privacy and data protection issues)
- Lack of actual requirements for functions to deal with decay in the
strength of encryption and authentication mechanisms over time. Also not
explicitly pulled out as a security threat.
- Lack of clarity as to whether signatures used by the LTA may or may
not be embedded in the archived data (as opposed to the Evidence Record).
There is also need for editorial clean up as some issues appear to be
mentioned twice in adjacent pieces of text.
Issues
======
Use of RFC 2119 requirements language: This document doesn't and it
certainly could do.
s2: Isn't there a need for an 'Owner' as well as Submitter and
Originator? The Submitter might die (if a person), be taken over (if a
company) or sell the data (either).
s3, para 5:
If the
archived data object itself contains digitally signed data,
authentication of the signer is also possible.
Is this a requirement or function of the LTA? Maybe what is meant is
that if the associated Evidence Record contains a digital signature then
the signer can be authenticated - surely the LTA should not expect to
interpret or authenticate signatures 'contained in' the archived data
object. This is further confused by explicit mention of (separate)
signature files (as archived data objects) in s4.7. I think it is
vitally important that the requirements make it quite clear that the LTA
should not and generally cannot make any assertions about the semantics
of the archived data objects: all they are trying to do is preserve
their integrity as opaque chunks of data, and any interpretable data
needs to be kept separate in the evidence record.
s4.1.1:
Following submission, the service must provide a value that can be
used to retrieve the archived data and/or associated evidence.
s/value/identifier/ maybe.
s4.2: Shouldn't this section contain requirements for methods to
maintain the cryptographic strength of any authentication or encryption
methods used? For very long term storage this will be an essential
management requirement IMO.
s4.2.1, last para: Is the indication of the policy enforced intended to
be the overall policy or the effective per object policy (i.e. the LTA's
policy as modified by the submitter's per object policy)? This
duplicates/interacts with reqs in s4.4 - see below.
s4.2.1 et seq: Some statements about the impact of legal requirements on
an LTA are needed. An LTA may well have to respond to requests from
governments and other state bodies to retrieve data when subpoenaed.
This may have some impact on deletion requests (an LTA may need to
preserve data even if the submitter (or other authorized principal) asks
for deletion - no shredding of evidence!). Also there may be
interactions with data privacy and/or data protection laws (a LTA would
almost certainly need to be a party to certain statements in the EU if
the data is not encrypted).
s4.3.1, para 2:
For example,
authentication of an originator may be possible in all cases, e.g.,
where the object submitted to the archive is not signed or where the
object does not include the necessary information to authenticate the
object's signer.
s/may be possible/may NOT be possible/
As with the point about s3, para 5, I think it needs to be clarified
that an origination signature embedded in the archived data object can't
be the basis of the LTA's authentication of the originator - the LTA
needs to know that a piece of the (meta)data is the originator's
signature before it can offer any view as to the integrity of the signature.
s4.4: Maybe this should come ahead of s4.2 which needs to know about
these reqs.
s4.4.2, last para: This raises some concerns about the 'contract' under
which an object is originally submitted to an LTA. If a submitter
requests certain policies originally, s/he needs to agree either upfront
or on a case by case basis to changes which affect the policies
requested: it implies need to inform the submitter of proposed changes
or be able to specify no policy changes maybe. Things may be a little
fraught if the submitter discovers that the policies have changed under
his feet, and are no longer to her liking. I see this is sort of
mentioned in the security section.
s6: I would have expected to see some discussion of the effective decay
of the strength of cryptographic algorithms here.
s6, para 1:
The principle threat addressed by a long-term archive service is
undetected loss of data integrity.
Addressed?? Maybe 'that has to be addressed'? Or just 'to'.
s6, para 5: Checking compatible policies are used throughout archival
lifetime: Is this a security matter? Surely an operational concern or a
requirement in s4.4.
Editorial
=========
s1, para 1: The term 'cryptanalysis period' is not AFAICS a well-known
term of the art. I *think* I understand what is implied here (something
about how long it might take to break the algorithm???) but this needs
explaining.
s1, para 2: s/non-reputability/non-repudiability/ (I believe this is
about requiring that it should not be possible to *repudiate* the fact
of data existence.)
I think this piece could be better phrased - I had difficulty parsing it:
and the non-reputability of data existence by a particular point in time
It is possible that it is actually saying the same thing as the next
paragraph and the situation could be cleared up by just omitting the
examples in para 2.
s1, para 3: (this is related to the point about para 1 I think): 'beyond
... the validity of algorithms': To the best of my knowledge,
cryptographic algorithms do not 'expire' - they remain valid algorithms
in the sense that they do what they claim for ever. This piece is about
the 'best before date' on the algorithm: improvements in methods and
speed of computation may render crytographic techniques less useful over
time. Suggest something like 'even beyond the time when the algorithms
used ... cease to offer effective protection because of improvements in
computing speeds and methods.'
s2: It would be good to consistently capitalize all the words in defined
terms (some are, some aren't at the moment) and also where they are used
especially in the terminology (e.g., '... associated Evidence Record' in
Archive Package definition).
s2: 'Archivation period': Ugh! Try 'Archival Period'.
s2: 'Crytographic Maintenance Policy': Being 'named' doesn't seem
important. Maybe 'specific' or just omit 'named'. (also applies to
'Long-term Archive Policy')
s2: 'Originator': Would be worth emphasizing '*digitally* (or
cryptographically) signs'.
s2: Expansions of TSA: Both Time Stamping Authority and Time-Stamp
Authority are used: Choose one (RFC3161 uses the unhyphenated version -
Time Stamping Authority - but also uses time-stamp)! Also time-stamps
and time stamps are used: Again choose one.
s3, para 3: s/an other/another/
s3, para 5: s/the existence of archived data object/the existence of an
archived data object/
s4.2.1: The sentence after the bullets ('It should be possible to extend
or shorten the archivation period after the initial submission.')
duplicates the 2nd bullet.
Regards,
Elwyn Davies
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