On 2/20/2008 2:56 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Hi Lakshminath,
> 
> This version seems to address all my earlier comments. Thanks
> for working hard on the update!
> 
> (However, I haven't done a thorough review of -10/-11, which
> included quite significant changes that might have introduced
> some internal inconsistency.)

Thanks.  I looked through it for inconsistencies, but obviously I missed 
the mistake below while doing a substitution.

> 
> One additional editorial nit for version -11:
> 
> 17) Section 8, "The algorithm chosen by the peer for the MAC
> generation is indicated in the EAP-Finish/Re-auth message."
> Should this be "..in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message"?

I will ask Tim to add an RFC Editor note.  I substituted for 
Re-authentication Response (that is also wrong).

Thanks again Pasi.

regards,
Lakshminath
> 
> Best regards,
> Pasi
>  
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: ext Lakshminath Dondeti [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
>> Sent: 20 February, 2008 10:40
>> To: Eronen Pasi (Nokia-NRC/Helsinki)
>> Cc: [email protected]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; 
>> [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>> Subject: Re: Gen-ART review of draft-ietf-hokey-erx-09 (-10)
>>
>> Hi Pasi, all
>>
>> Following up on this, I think ERX-11 addresses all of Pasi's 
>> comments. 
>> I have previously added (in v10) clarifying text to address the 
>> lock-step issue based on Bernard's suggestion in his detailed 
>> review.  I 
>> have now added a section on lower layer considerations.  The channel 
>> binding parameter processing is clarified in v11, primarily 
>> in its own 
>> section and also elsewhere.  I have incorporated Pasi's 
>> suggestions on 
>> IANA considerations.  Pasi's comment 3 is addressed by the 
>> EMSK-hierarchy document.  Anyway, I went over Pasi's list a 
>> few times, 
>> and think that all of them are now addressed :).
>>
>> Based on Dan's comments, I have added some more text to the security 
>> considerations section (talked about implications of key compromise, 
>> implications of hop-by-hop security and compromise of 
>> proxies, etc.).  I 
>> have made the key naming changes in v10 already.
>>
>> I worked with Bernard's detailed comments in preparing v10; 
>> additional 
>> clarifications were added in v11 as well.
>>
>> I have also incorporated Joe's suggestions in v10 and v11.  (Which 
>> implies one of Alan's comments is not addressed.  Joe wants less 
>> repetition between the EMSK and the ERX specs and Alan wants some 
>> duplication so the ERX document is more independent.)  Joe's 
>> suggestions 
>> helped clean up the AAA related stuff and also the multitude 
>> of options 
>> in identifying the rIK used.  The text is much more clear now 
>> and there 
>> is only one way to identify the key.  Earlier options existed for 
>> identity privacy reasons, but the working group consensus was that we 
>> don't care about that requirement at the moment.  It is simpler to 
>> delete those now and add them in a future revision if 
>> identify privacy 
>> is deemed necessary then.
>>
>> Thanks again to all the reviewers.  Thank you for your 
>> patience while I 
>> worked through all the comments and prepared the revised version(s).
>>
>> best regards,
>> Lakshminath
>>
>> On 2/19/2008 4:15 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>>> I have just scanned through version -10 of this draft, posted
>>> couple of hours ago. 
>>>
>>> This version addresses my comments 5 and 6; and comments 4 and 10
>>> are obsolete since the text I commented has been removed. The
>>> remaining comments are still valid.
>>>
>>> One additional comment for version -10:
>>>
>>> 16) Section 5.3.2, "EMSKname is in the username part of the NAI and 
>>> is encoded in hexadecimal values.  The EMSKname is 64-bits 
>> in length 
>>> and so the username portion takes up 128 octets." EMSKname is not 
>>> defined in this document (or any of its references, as far as I 
>>> can tell); and encoding 64 bits as hexadecimal doesn't take
>>> 128 octets anyway.
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>> Pasi
> <snip>
> 
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