I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART)
reviewer for this draft (for background on Gen-ART, please see
http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/art/gen-art-FAQ.html).
Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments
you may receive.
Document: draft-ietf-geopriv-http-location-delivery-07
Reviewer: Ben Campbell
Review Date: 2008-05-06
IETF LC End Date: 2008-05-07
IESG Telechat date: (if known)
Summary:
This document is almost ready for publication as a proposed standard.
I have a few questions and comments that should be considered prior to
publication.
Comments:
-- Substantive comments:
-- I am a little bit confused by the scope of applicability of this
draft. Section 3, paragraph 1 says "This document assumes that the LIS
is present within the same administrative domain as the Device (e.g.,
the access network)." However, section A.3. claims compliance to a
requirement to the effect of "The design of the L7 LCP MUST NOT assume
a business or trust relationship between the Application Service
Provider (ASP) and the Access Network Provider." (It is possibly I am
misunderstanding what ASP means in this context?)
Furthermore, certain aspects of HELD seem to require fairly tight
coupling between the LIS and the access network. For example, the NIS
needs to know about any range of addresses for which it is likely to
have erroneous location info due to VPNs and NATs. The security
considerations indicate that the network needs to be properly
configured to avoid ip spoofing attacks, which would seem to indicate
at least an administrative coupling between the access network
provider. It goes on to make a normative statement that network
configuration SHOULD be considered.
A paragraph or two describing the expected network architecture might
clear this up. Maybe this is covered sufficiently in some of the
referenced documents?
-- I would like to see a little more analysis on the safety of using
the source IP address as the device identifier. My instinct says that
reverse routeability may keep this from being a problem--but the
security considerations do indicate source address spoofing could
cause LI to be compromised, and add a list of approaches, "one or
more" of which is recommended to limit the exposure. If there are in
fact risks of compromise, I think the draft needs some more exhaustive
and explicit statements of what I must do to avoid such attacks.
-- The lbyr requirements draft includes a SHOULD level requirement
that a client should be able to cancel location references. HELD does
not seem to allow for that capability. I know it was only a SHOULD,
but was there a particular reason to leave it out?
-- Section 4.2: I understand that the authz mechanisms for
dereferencing location URLs constitute a bit of an "elephant in the
room". But do we really think it is useful to punt entirely on that?
The referenced doc does not seem all that helpful on the matter. Even
an example of a potentially useful approach might be helpful. (I
realize this is not a HELD problem per se, but without some mechanism
for it, I question the usefulness of location by reference in HELD.)
(If we can point to a location dereference protocol and claim that
spec solves this, then no problem.)
Section 4.3.1: Should there be normative advice in this section?
Section 6.2 and 6.2.1: I don't see an obvious way to say I only want
to get location by value. Is that intentional?
Section 6.3, error code unsupportedMessage:
Wasn't there a normative statement ealier that the LIS MUST ignore
anything in a request that it does not understand? If so, when would
this get used?
6.5.2: Can you give any guidance about useful value ranges for
"expires"? I assume very short expirations would not be useful.
6.6, last paragraph:
"Note that the presence parameter is not explicitly shown in the XML
schema Section 7 for a location response message due to XML schema
constraints."
Is that not a problem, since section 7 is the formal definition of the
protocol syntax?
Section 8:
I'm a little confused by the fact that a HELD URI can show up both in
a HELD response, and in LIS discovery. Does this use of a HELD URI
imply the use of the HELD protocol? If so, how would a HELD URI in a
locationReponse message be used? Since HELD uses the source IP address
for the identifier, it is not useful to transmit the URI to another
device, right?
-- Nits and Editorial Comments:
S1: Expand LIS on first use. (You do so later in paragraph.)
Section 4:
Paragraph 1
I realized at this point I had not yet seen an expansion of "HELD",
nor a statement that HELD is the protocol being defined in this
document outside of the document title. Maybe an official "naming"
sentence in the last paragraph of the intro would help.
Also, this paragraph could use explicit references for pidf-lo and
location URIs.
Section 4.3, paragraph 3: Please expand VPN on first use.
Table 1: Can you add a legend for o and m? I know it seems obvious,
but better to be explicit. Also, listing locationUriSet and presence
both as optional for responses does not quite capture the normative
statement that one or the other MUST exist.
Section 5.2: Should there be normative language around the inclusion
of locationType? (There is for the other parameters)
Section 6.2. "any" value: The normative statement that the LIS SHOULD
return all available forms seems to mildly conflict with some of the
further normative statements in the paragraph.
Section 12.5: URI Scheme Syntax says "See section" with no section
number.
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