I have been selected as the General Area Review Team (Gen-ART)
reviewer for this draft (for background on Gen-ART, please see
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Please wait for direction from your document shepherd
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Document: draft-ietf-sieve-managesieve-05.txt
Reviewer: Miguel Garcia <[email protected]>
Review Date: 29 December 2008
IESG Telechat date: 18 December 2008
IETF LC End Date: 30 December 2008
Summary: The document is ready for publication as a proposed standard RFC.
Major issues: none
Minor issues:
- Section 1.2 could be slightly improved to guide the reader over the
rest of the document by describing, at the very beginning, that "this is
a command-response protocol based on a client/server architecture. The
client emits a command; the server processes the command and replies with
a response" (or something like that). I am also missing a sentence
indicating that "the protocol runs over any connection-oriented transport
protocol, although at the moment, TCP (and TCP over TLS) are the only
defined transport protocols".
- Section 2.1 (towards the end) has a discussion about the STARTTLS
command and the mechanism to protect against a MITM bid-down attack. The
text says:
Once a SASL security layer is established, the server MUST re-issue
the capability results, followed by an OK response. This is
necessary to protect against man-in-the-middle attacks which alter
the capabilities list prior to SASL negotiation. The capability
results MUST include all SASL mechanisms the server was capable of
negotiating with that client. This is done in order to allow the
client to detect active down-negotiation attack.
What I am missing here is some normative text that instructs clients to
do an action (which one would that be?) if such MITM bid-down attack is
detected by the client. Nothing is written so far, and I suspect that
client will not implement any action if it isn't clearly indicated.
Nits/editorial comments:
- idnits reveals that references [DIGEST-MD5] and [IANA-GUIDELINES] are
declared in Section 9.2, but never used. There should be an anchor in the
text or the reference should be deleted.
- idnits reveals that references to RFC 4366 and RFC 3280 are obsolete.
The updated references are RFC 5246 and RFC 5280, respectively.
- there are a couple of "anchors" in the text. Just make sure these are
deleted before publication, in particular anchor8, which describes Chris
Newman's thoughts.
/Miguel
--
Miguel A. Garcia
+34-91-339-3608
Ericsson Spain
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