Hi Suresh,

thank you for the review. Please find my answers below.
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Suresh Krishnan 
  To: [email protected] ; General Area 
Review Team 
  Sent: Thursday, March 13, 2014 4:50 AM
  Subject: Gen-ART Last Call review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-fragmentation-05


  I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for 
draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-fragmentation-05

   

  For background on Gen-ART, please see the FAQ at 
<http://www.alvestrand.no/ietf/gen/art/gen-art-FAQ.html>.

   

  Please resolve these comments along with any other Last Call comments you may 
receive.

   

  Summary: This draft is almost ready for publication as a Proposed Standard 
but I have some suggestions that the authors may like to consider.

   

  * Retransmission and duplication

   

  It is unclear how the receiver of the message deals with lost fragments that 
are retransmitted. If I understand correctly, the sender only knows that all 
the fragments did not get to the receiver, and has no knowledge about which 
fragments were not received. So it ends up retransmitting all the fragments. 

Right.

  This means that the receiver needs to do some form of de-duplication. Are the 
duplicate fragments discarded on the receiver (without verification) or are 
they blindly written into a reassembly buffer (after verification)? The 
difference is pretty significant because there is a authentication step 
involved for each fragment.

Duplicated fragments are discarded without verification. It is described in 
Section 2.6, second bullet:



   o  Check, that this IKE Fragment Message is new for the receiver and
      not a replay.  If IKE Fragment message with the same Message ID,
      same Fragment Number and same Total Fragments fields was already
      received and successfully processed, this message is considered a
      replay and MUST be silently discarded.



Note, that this check takes place before verifying fragment authenticity (next 
bullet).



If you think this text is unclear, could you please suggest how to improve it?

   

  * IPv6 payload length

   

  I find this text to be a bit handwavy 

   

  "   For IPv6 this estimation is difficult as there may be varying IPv6

     Extension headers included."

   

  I think it would be preferable to at least estimate for the case where there 
are no extension headers. Suggest adding some text like this (Feel free to 
modify/ignore)

   

  NEW:

   

     For IPv6 Encrypted Payload content size is less than IP Datagram size

     by the sum of the following values in the case where there are no 

     extension :

   

     o  IPv6 header size (40 bytes)

   

     o  UDP header size (8 bytes)

   

     o  non-ESP marker size (4 bytes if present)

   

     o  IKE Header size (28 bytes)

   

     o  Encrypted Payload header size (4 bytes)

   

     o  IV size (varying)

   

     o  padding and its size (at least 1 byte)

   

     o  ICV size (varying)

   

     The sum may be estimated as 81..85 bytes + IV + ICV + padding.

   

     If extension headers are present, the payload content size is further

     reduced by the sum of the size of the extension headers. The length of

     each extension header can be calculated as 8 * (Hdr Ext Len) bytes

     except for the fragment header which is always 8 bytes in length. 

Thank you, I'll use it.



  * Editorial

   

  Appendix A: 

  s/forgeg/forged/

  s/ reassempling/reassembly/

Thanks,

Valery.

  Thanks

  Suresh
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