Right, it is always up to the authors (subject to wg consensus)... but it certainly helps me understand - so many thanks for that. Cheers,Elwyn
Sent from Samsung tablet. -------- Original message --------From: "Dearlove, Christopher (UK)" <chris.dearl...@baesystems.com> Date: 20/12/2016 14:50 (GMT+00:00) To: Elwyn Davies <elw...@dial.pipex.com>, gen-art@ietf.org Cc: draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats....@ietf.org, ma...@ietf.org, i...@ietf.org Subject: RE: Review of draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats-03 Elwyn I was just commenting as an author of most of the RFCs referred to - but not this one. So that’s down to the authors of this one to accept, adjust or whatever. But in my personal capacity, I think a comment on packet ICVs would not go amiss - but it needs to get its layering right. (It’s not “if OLSRv2 uses packet ICVs” its “if OLSRv2 runs over an implementation of 5444 with packet ICVs enabled”, roughly speaking. And that can be an also or an instead.) (I’m assuming you saw my other email in which I noted I’d forgotten that 7183 does not discuss packet ICVs, only 7182 does. That’s because of that layering issue.) Also, if the authors were to go further into tradeoffs between packet and message ICVs, whether we have a single shared key or per router keys for that latter makes a big difference. 7183 is really about the shared case - but 7182 does allocate at least one code point that must be per router, 7859 - experimental - has a more detailed non-shared case. Roughly, with a shared key, there’s no real advantage in message ICVs over packet ICVs. With individual keys that’s not so, there are pros and cons each way (though message ICVs probably have more pros, but hop count/limit attacks are not one of them). Christopher -- Christopher Dearlove Senior Principal Engineer BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Laboratories __________________________________________________________________________ T: +44 (0)1245 242194 | E: chris.dearl...@baesystems.com BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, Chelmsford Technology Park, Great Baddow, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 8HN. www.baesystems.com/ai BAE Systems Applied Intelligence Limited Registered in England & Wales No: 01337451 Registered Office: Surrey Research Park, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7YP From: Elwyn Davies [mailto:elw...@dial.pipex.com] Sent: 20 December 2016 14:29 To: Dearlove, Christopher (UK); gen-art@ietf.org Cc: draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats....@ietf.org; ma...@ietf.org; i...@ietf.org Subject: RE: Review of draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats-03 *** WARNING *** This message originates from outside our organisation, either from an external partner or the internet. Consider carefully whether you should click on any links, open any attachments or reply. For information regarding Red Flags that you can look out for in emails you receive, click here. If you feel the email is suspicious, please follow this process. Hi. Thanks, Christopher. So, I think the situation can be clarified - and would have provided a clearer answer to my question by 1. adding a couple of sentences to s6.2 to point up the alternative packet and message protections; and 2. explaining in s6.2.1 that that the 'hole' in the mitigation only occurs if message rather than packet ICVs are in use, and then a malicious node can just update the hop-limit/-count fields without actively getting involved in neighbour or topology discovery and then do a fast retransmit, but that it still never gets involved in data transmission or (probably) any other of the threats (see the other question I asked). The 'hole' would then be a one of the entries in the list of things still to be mitigated that I suggested. Cheers - and Merry Christmas, Elwyn Sent from Samsung tablet. -------- Original message -------- From: "Dearlove, Christopher (UK)" <chris.dearl...@baesystems.com> Date: 19/12/2016 10:40 (GMT+00:00) To: Elwyn Davies <elw...@dial.pipex.com>, gen-art@ietf.org Cc: draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats....@ietf.org, ma...@ietf.org, i...@ietf.org Subject: RE: Review of draft-ietf-manet-olsrv2-sec-threats-03 Elwyn Davies > s3.2: I do not know enough about the details of NHDP and OLSRv2 to know if > this is a silly question: Would it be possible for a compromised node to > perform hop-limit or hop-count modification attacks even with RFC 6183 > security in place just by modifying these fields and reforwarding the packet even if it wasn't actually in the network topology? If so, it would be desirable to mention this if it can do any harm. No, not a silly question at all. But there are details that make the answer longer than yes or no. (Typo: RFC 6183 is RFC 7183.) You need to distinguish packets from messages (this is RFC 5444 territory). And NHDP doesn't matter here, as its message (HELLO) is not forwarded and any hop count or limit is either ignored or possibly used as a reason to reject. So OLSRv2 messages (TC) are forwarded, but at each hop they are put into a packet. That packet is assembled from one or more messages, and at each hop it is broken apart and a new packet formed. So the TC message may share a packet with different other messages at each hop. RFC 7183, which forwards to RFC 7182 where the actual work is defined, allows you to protect either messages, or packets (or both). Packet protection protects hop count and hop limit, but has other limitations (it is not end to end). Message protection is applied to each message, and is end to end (or rather, originator to each processing/forwarding router) but does not protect hop count and hop limit. So if using RFC 7183/7182 just to protect messages (it also covers sender addresses) then there is an attack. Attacker receives packet, sends new packet that resets hop count and limit in those messages it includes in a new packet to only one more hop before end of life. Sends quickly (normal forwarding may be delayed, especially if using RFC 5148) and possibly even elsewhere in network (wormhole attack). This "penultimate hop" message poisons the real message, if it arrives later, as it is seen before, and not forwarded, while the penultimate hop message will go one hop and stop. (Can we do this with a "last hop" message to poison even more successfully? That I would need to check some details in RFC 7181 to determine.) Could this be prevented? I can imagine a revision of RFC 7181's forwarding rules that recorded hop count/limit, and if seeing a longer range message decided to forward that even if seen before with a lower range. But that introduces a new attack of creating a sequence of increasing range messages to add to the traffic load. Or you could use both packet and message ICVs, which does prevent this attack but increases overhead. Or (potential future that I know someone is working on, but is not a solution now as far as I know) find a form of aggregating signature that overcomes this problem efficiently. ******************************************************************** This email and any attachments are confidential to the intended recipient and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient please delete it from your system and notify the sender. You should not copy it or use it for any purpose nor disclose or distribute its contents to any other person. ********************************************************************
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