Thanks for the review, Russ. Comments below (nothing major); pull request here for your review:
https://github.com/ietf/perc-wg/pull/163 On Sat, Oct 20, 2018 at 4:24 AM Russ Housley <[email protected]> wrote: > Reviewer: Russ Housley > Review result: Almost Ready > > I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area > Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed > by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just > like any other last call comments. > > For more information, please see the FAQ at > <http://wiki.tools.ietf.org/area/gen/trac/wiki/GenArtfaq>. > > Document: draft-ietf-perc-double-10 > Reviewer: Russ Housley > Review Date: 2018-10-20 > IETF LC End Date: 2018-11-01 > IESG Telechat date: unknown > > Summary: Almost Ready > > > Major Concerns: > > Section 10: Doesn't the IANA registry needs to specify the PRF to be > used with the ciphersuite as well? > I don't think so. I don't see a slot in the relevant registry for that, and the tabular summary in the IANA considerations section is really just a courtesy. https://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml#srtp-protection-1 > > Minor Concerns: > > Section 3: It would be useful to explain the Master Key before the > reader gets to Section 3.1. > Note that the "master key" concept comes from SRTP. I've added a bit of text to clarify. > Section 3.1: It is unclear what assistance is provided by the > additional level of indirection: > > PRF_double_n(k_master,x) = PRF_inner_(n/2)(k_master,x) || > PRF_outer_(n/2)(k_master,x) > > PRF_inner_n(k_master,x) = PRF_n(inner(k_master),x) > PRF_outer_n(k_master,x) = PRF_n(outer(k_master),x) > > It could just say: > > PRF_double_n(k_master,x) = PRF_(n/2)(inner(k_master),x) || > PRF_(n/2)(outer(k_master),x) > 👍 Not sure what I was thinking. > Section 4: I suggest: > > If the marker bit is not present, then B MUST be set to zero. > 👍 > Section 5, 1st paragraph: and endpoint cannot verify confidentiality. > Well, it can verify that the packet was encrypted with a key known only to the endpoints. But OK. > > Nits: > > The document uses "encryption" and "confidentiality" interchanagably. > Encryption is a mechanism or algorithm. Confidentiality is a security > service. While I do not think that the reader will be confused by the > current wording, it would be better to use the terms properly. In > addition, it is misleading to say: > > ... the receiving endpoint that can encrypt and authenticate ... > > because the sending endpoint encrypts, and the recieving endpoints > decrypts. Also, the receiving endpoints check the authentication tag. > That's actually just some bad grammar. Reworded. > Abstract: s/authenticated encryption with associated data/ > /authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD)/ > > Abstract: s/scheme/algorithm/ > > Section 5.2: s/GCM/AES-GCM/ > > Section 7: s/HBH/hop-by-hop/ > > Section 7: s/E2E/end-to-end/ > > Section 7.1: s/HBH/hop-by-hop/ > > Section 7.2: The text is redundant. I suggest "etc" be dropped from > "such as SSRC, SEQ, CSRC, etc" > > Section 7.2: s/non primary/non-primary/ > > Section 7.3: s/HBH/hop-by-hop/ > Implemented all of the above... > Appendix A: s/HBH/hop-by-hop/ > > Appendix A: s/E2E/end-to-end/ > .... but I'm going to leave these last two as-is, for brevity.
_______________________________________________ Gen-art mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/gen-art
