On Sat, Jun 20, 2026 at 11:52 AM Job Snijders <[email protected]> wrote: > On Sat, Jun 20, 2026 at 11:30:18AM -0500, Behcet Sarikaya wrote: > > > > Section 3.4.4 SHA-1 SHA-1 as a cryptographic algorithm is > > > > deprecated and should be phased out by Dec. 31, 2030 > > > > > > In this context, SHA-1 is not used for cryptographic purposes. > > > > > > The CCR embedded integrity checksums and the content address references > > > to objects outside the CCR all use SHA-256. See 'hashAlg' in section > 3.2. > > > > > > This is what I found on my search: > > > > SHA-1 is no longer secure because it is vulnerable to "collision > attacks," > > where two different inputs produce the exact same hash > > > > What would you say? > > Collisions are not relevant in this context. The tuple of (SHA-1 SKI, > Manifest SIA) uniquely identifies the Certification Authority, in > the original context part of a chain of RSA-2048 signatures, this is > sufficient for the analytical purposes for which CCR is intended. > > More importantly, this CCR specification is not the place to redefine > what constitues a Certificate KeyIdentifier in the RPKI context. The > CCR standard merely aligns with the existing body of work around RPKI, > specifically Section 4.8.2 of RFC 6487. > > Please note that the CCR embedded integrity checksums and the content > address references to objects outside the CCR all use SHA-256. See > 'hashAlg' in section 3.2. > > Kind regards, > > Job >
I read all of the above. Given so much concern on SHA-1 (remember the security review also was concerned on this) I suggest that you include some text from above, especially the first paragraph in the most appropriate place in the draft. Best regards, Behcet
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