Hi Mike,
On Tue, Aug 11, 2026 at 10:01 AM Mike Ounsworth <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi Behcet Sarikaya, thank you for the review. > > I have made some fixes to address these comments here: > > https://github.com/lamps-wg/draft-composite-kem/commit/c70e297a2c2458415388e00308e9cf0b8fa59753 > but I will hold pushing to datatracker because I have a few clarifying > questions back to you below. > > > > Section 1 > RSA vs RSA-OAEP is not explained at all > > [MikeO]: This spec references a pile of cryptographic algorithms, > including ML-KEM, RSA-OAEP, ECDH, X25519, X448, and SHA3. We don't really > "explain" any of them, but references to their specifications are included > in Appendix B. > The opining sentence of Section 1 does at least expand the acronym "OAEP" > and mention that this is a mode of RSA: > "traditional cryptographic key establishment algorithms in common use -- > namely the Rivest–Shamir–Adleman cryptosystem in the Optimal Asymmetric > Encryption Padding mode (RSA-OAEP), and elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman > (ECDH) -- will become vulnerable to quantum attacks." > > [MikeO]: If that's not sufficient, then maybe you could explain further > what level of explanation you feel is missing? > > > Fine. > > expand at first use: PQC post quantum cryptography (PQC) > > [MikeO]: Good catch. > > > > in in this > specification; this is discussed further > > Here there were two "in" s. PKIX-related Public Key Infrastructure X.509 > > Fine > [MikeO]: I don't understand these comments. Can you explain further what > change you are looking for here? > > > > Post-Quantum / Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrids > combined > idea seems to be central to this document > this gives stronger algorithms since > an attacker would need to break all of them > simultaneously to compromise the protected data > > [MikeO]: I added a forward link to the Security Considerations that > discuss the properties of PQ/T hybrids in more detail. > > Fine > 1.1 > pramater sets > > [MikeO]: Good catch. > > 2.2 > > KEM Encaps(pk) -> (ss, ct) "." missing? > > [MikeO]: Fixed. > > Added complete test vectors in Version -07 of this document > contributing almost 60 pages > > [MikeO]: This is true, are you asking for some kind of change here? > > No. > > 9. Security Considerations > dual algorithm security > > [MikeO]: I don't understand these comments. Can you explain further what > change you are looking for here? > > Fine > > In Section 10 there is > 10. Operational Considerations > > > calling for an Ops area review? > > [MikeO]: These Operational Considerations are really quite > cryptography-specific, so I'm not sure that an OPS Dir review would add > much, but of course I would welcome more eyes. > > So your fixes above are OK, just add one more and then publish it. Behcet > On Mon, 27 Jul 2026 at 11:43, Behcet Sarikaya via Datatracker < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Document: draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem >> Title: Composite ML-KEM for use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure >> Reviewer: Behcet Sarikaya >> Review result: Almost Ready >> >> I am the assigned Gen-ART reviewer for this draft. The General Area >> Review Team (Gen-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed >> by the IESG for the IETF Chair. Please treat these comments just >> like any other last call comments. >> >> For more information, please see the FAQ at >> >> <https://wiki.ietf.org/en/group/gen/GenArtFAQ>. >> >> Document: draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem-18 >> Reviewer: Behcet Sarikaya >> Review Date: 2026-07-27 >> IETF LC End Date: 2026-07-27 >> IESG Telechat date: Not scheduled for a telechat >> >> Summary: >> This document defines combinations >> of US NIST Module-Lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism i.e. ML-KEM >> in hybrid with >> traditional algorithms RSA-OAEP, ECDH, X25519, and X448 >> Major issues: >> None >> Minor issues: >> >> Nits/editorial comments: >> >> Section 1 >> RSA vs RSA-OAEP is not explained at all >> >> expand at first use: PQC post quantum cryptography (PQC) >> >> in in this >> specification; this is discussed further >> >> PKIX-related Public Key Infrastructure X.509 >> >> >> Post-Quantum / Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrids >> combined >> idea seems to be central to this document >> this gives stronger algorithms since >> an attacker would need to break all of them >> simultaneously to compromise the protected data >> >> 1.1 >> pramater sets >> >> 2.2 >> >> KEM Encaps(pk) -> (ss, ct) "." missing? >> >> Added complete test vectors in Version -07 of this document >> contributing almost 60 pages >> >> >> 9. Security Considerations >> dual algorithm security >> >> In Section 10 there is >> 10. Operational Considerations >> >> >> calling for an Ops area review? >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Spasm mailing list -- [email protected] >> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected] >> >
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