On 22/09/2008, Hiram Chirino <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > The only reason I suggested including the sigs in the source distro is > because a source build like Apache ServiceMix depends on hundreds of > third party dependencies.. so an end user would need to end up > trusting LOTs different signatures to get ServiceMix to build. > > It would be easier if the end user could just trust the Apache source > distro and also transitively trust the signatures that we trust for > our dependencies. >
So effectively you are proposing a secondary indirect signature for each of those artefacts. But instead of signing the checksum list, why not generate signatures for the artefacts themselves and check those? You could then store the Apache sigs in the Maven repo, and they would then be available to all Apache projects - and to any others who decided to trust the Apache key. > The end user would still need to manually validate the source distro > signature. > I can see that it would be an improvement over the existing Maven situation, but for me it does not go far enough. The problem is that the process of generating the checksum list does not scale well, and it forces every project to use fixed versions for each dependency. > Regards, > > Hiram > > > On Sat, Sep 20, 2008 at 1:08 PM, Henning Schmiedehausen > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > On Sat, 2008-09-20 at 10:08 +0100, Robert Burrell Donkin wrote: > >> On Fri, Sep 19, 2008 at 6:11 PM, Justin Erenkrantz > >> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> > On Fri, Sep 19, 2008 at 6:12 AM, Hiram Chirino <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > wrote: > >> >> How about we include the signatures in the source distros? That way > >> >> if you trust your source, then you can trust the dependencies it > >> >> downloads. > >> > > >> > Eww. That'd be a giant gaping security hole. > >> > >> not necessarily, depends how it's done > >> > >> signing works through trusting the people who own the keys. given > >> sufficient signaturees (to prevent small conspiracies), where the > >> signatures are downloaded from shouldn't matter. > > > > Hiram suggested to put the signatures into the source, which in turn is > > also distributed from the repo. If you compromise the repo and change > > the artifact, it is trivial to update the source artifact to contain a > > matching signature. > > > > This is a security hole. And I don't really care for some of the > > proposed "high nineties" security solutions. Either a solution is secure > > or it is not. Everything else is just FUD. > > > > The problem with the central repo is that you need an easy accessible > > web of trust if you want validation. The Apache web of trust is > > distributed and an overlay to the GPG web of trust. But if you live in > > Juneau, Alaska, it is hard for you to access it and get a trust > > relationship to it. > > > > There is a (bit rusty) proposal on how to improve this at > > http://people.apache.org/~henkp/trust/ > > > > Ciao > > Henning > > > > > > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > To unsubscribe, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > For additional commands, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > > > > > > > -- > Regards, > Hiram > > Blog: http://hiramchirino.com > > Open Source SOA > http://open.iona.com > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > > To unsubscribe, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > For additional commands, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] For additional commands, e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
