> From: dennis.hamil...@acm.org
> To: general@incubator.apache.org
> Subject: RE: Code signing and WOT for releases
> Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2016 10:33:13 -0700
> 
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Nick Kew [mailto:n...@apache.org]
> > Sent: Tuesday, July 26, 2016 02:25
> > To: general@incubator.apache.org
> > Subject: Re: Code signing and WOT for releases
> > 
> > On Tue, 2016-07-26 at 09:19 +0200, Thorsten Schöning wrote:
> > > Hi all,
> > >
> > > the docs about release management for incubating projects make clear
> > > that the release needs to be signed[1] and in the end associated with
> > > the project AND the WOT of Apache in general[2].
> > 
> > I don't like that term "the WOT of Apache in general", with its
> > implied suggestion that an Apache WoT might differ from AN Other.
> > Even if a private Apache WoT were a reality, how would that help
> > our users verify our releases?  Surely the WoT we should be
> > concerned with is the Strong Set that unifies Geekdom at large.
> [orcmid] 
> 
> I think that is perhaps relevant to how the WoT is viewed, but it does not 
> necessarily consider the audience of the signed material.  
> 
> For example, Apache OpenOffice distributes binaries on behalf of end-users.  
> They are unlikely to know anyone in the WoT of a signer and, while there may 
> be an effect in numbers, it is not clear how one can be satisfied abut the 
> identity and veracity of the signer.
> 
> Also, there are two aspects that seem to be muddled in discussion of the WoT. 
>  There is how much one trusts that the private key is in the exclusive 
> control of the user identified in the public key certificate and that the 
> identification is accurate, and the not-quite-the-same question of how much 
> one trusts the possessor of that private key to be careful in the 
> counter-signing of the public keys of others.  
> 
> > Yes, also the project's KEYS and id.apache.org, but that's
> > a separate issue to the WoT!
> [orcmid] 
> 
> Right.  Yesterday, I received an email from one of the users who received a 
> security advisory message that I signed.  The user's mail reader reported 
> that the signature was untrusted (no surprise) and that the signature was 
> BAD.  Since the mail reader shows the stripped message, and it looks 
> perfectly fine, there is no way to help analyze that from my end.
> 
> What I did do was (1) verify the message that was sent to me from the list 
> and (2) verify the message in the list archive.  I then (3) advised the 
> recipient what I did and also (4) how to find a public key certificate 
> matching the ID in the signature and how to check that the private key is 
> asserted to be in the possession of the person controlling orc...@apache.org 
> and how the individual having control of that email address is associated 
> with the ASF.

MG>can we assume the key was converted to PKCS8 before asserting the key?
http://stackoverflow.com/questions/5230942/how-to-read-a-private-key-for-use-with-opensaml

MG>and then built new SignatureBuilder().buildObject() Signature with key 
locations before assigning 
assertion.setSignature(___)?http://www.programcreek.com/java-api-examples/index.php?api=org.opensaml.xml.signature.Signature

MG>/thanks dennis/
> 
> (I made another check of the archived message too.  The raw form of the 
> message fails to verify when downloaded and that appears to be on account of 
> some encoding features that have to be processed properly for the original 
> text to be reconstituted properly. That might or might not be relevant to how 
> that recipient's email reader handles PGP
> signatures.)
> 
> > 
> > In terms of instructions I can't improve on Mark's reply.
> > I would add that it's not entirely unprecedented to sign a
> > release with a key that can't be verified in the Strong Set,
> > but you should make all efforts to avoid that.  A key that
> > can't be verified adds no more security than an MD5 checksum.
> > 
> > --
> > Nick Kew
> > 
> > 
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