Andreas K. Huettel dixit (2011-03-25, 09:53):

> > Do you want to reject signed commits if
> > - keys are not publicly available [1]
> 
> Yes, since that defies the purpose of the signature.
> 
> > - signatures are from expired keys [2]
> 
> Yes if the signature was made after expiration. (Dont know if that is even 
> possible.)
> No if the signature was made while the key was valid. (Otherwise our whole 
> portage tree would time out at some point.)
> 
> > - keys are revoked [3]
> 
> Yes.
> 
> > - keys are not listed in userinfo.xml (current or former devs) [4]
> 
> Yes. 
> However, for the former devs we might need an extra list to prevent 
> "expiration on retirement", and treat the keys as if they expired on 
> retirement date (compare above).
> 
> Does that make sense?
> 
> Of course now we can add additional requirements:
> 
> * The key must have an userid that refers to an official Gentoo e-mail 
> address. E.g. dilfri...@gentoo.org
> 
> Very important and easily implemented.
> 
> * The userid should have some specific "default string" in its comment field, 
> like "Gentoo manifest signing key".
> 
> Not so important but also easily implemented.
> 
> * The key should be signed by some central instance for automated validity 
> check.
> 
> Here things get hairy. How about having recruiter/infra team sign a dev's key 
> on completion of the recruitment process? Just a first thought...

I think this is an important requirement however it's quite difficult
to conduct reliably. A normal keysigning process usually requires
knowing one personally (and perhaps verifying fingerprints over a
phone with voice verification), seeing one's ID personally and the
like. This is probably unfeasible in the Gentoo development
environment (I'm not a dev, though, so I'm just guessing).

As a weaker but possibly useful workaround Gentoo Infra could just
publish a signed list of trusted developer keys for any given moment.

> * The central instance should be able to reliably revoke a key.
> 
> Add a revocation list in a portage tree directory? Or is this just shooting 
> yourself into the foot backwards through the eye?

Revoking a signature on a key is possible (unless a key has been
nrsigned) and makes sense (assuming those who verify update all
relevant keys).

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