On 26 January 2018 at 00:21, Robin H. Johnson <robb...@gentoo.org> wrote: > On Thu, Jan 25, 2018 at 11:55:58PM +0200, Alon Bar-Lev wrote: >> I did not looked into the detailed implementation, however, please >> make sure integrity check handles the same cases we have applied to >> emerge-webrsync in the past, including: > Gemato is the implementation of GLEP74/MetaManifest, which DOES > explicitly address both of these concerns.
Good! Thanks. > >> 1. Fast forward only in time, this is required to avoid hacker to >> redirect into older portage to install vulnerabilities that were >> approved at that time. > Replay attacks per #1 are addressed via TIMESTAMP field in MetaManifest. Interesting, I tried again to understand how it is working without performing rsync to a temporary directory, compare the timestamp and reject if unexpected. Are we doing multiple rsync for the metadata? Long since I used this insecure rsync... For me it seems like webrsync and/or squashfs are much easier/faster to apply integrity into than rsync... :) Regards, Alon