On Thursday 17 Apr 2014 15:40:04 Matti Nykyri wrote: > On Apr 17, 2014, at 9:10, Mick <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wednesday 16 Apr 2014 18:56:57 Tanstaafl wrote: > >> On 4/16/2014 7:14 AM, Matti Nykyri <[email protected]> wrote: > >>> On Apr 16, 2014, at 13:52, Tanstaafl <[email protected]> wrote: > >>>> Or will simply replacing my self-signed certs with the new real ones > >>>> be good enough? > >>> > >>> No it will not. Keys are te ones that have been compromised. You need > >>> to create new keys. With those keys you need to create certificate > >>> request. Then you send that request to certificate authority for > >>> signing and publishing in their crl. When you receive the signed > >>> certificate you can start using it with your key. Never send your key > >>> to CA or expect to get a key from them. > >> > >> Ok, thanks... > >> > >> But... if I do this (create a new key-pair and CR), will this > >> immediately invalidate my old ones (ie, will my current production > >> server stop working until I get the new certs installed)? > > > > You have not explained your PKI set up. Creating a new private key and > > CSR is just another private key and CSR. > > > > If you replace either the private CA key on the server, or any of its > > certificates chain, but leave the path in your vhosts pointing to the old > > key/certificate that no longer exist you will of course break the server. > > Apache will refuse to restart and warn you about borked paths. > > > >> I'm guessing not (or else there would be a lot of downtime for lots of > >> sites involved) - but I've only ever done this once (created the > >> key-pair, CR and self-signed keys) a long time ago, so want to make sure > >> I don't shoot myself in the foot... > > > > Yes, better be safe with production machines. However, don't take too > > long because your private key(s) are potentially already compromised. > > > >> I have created new self-=signed certs a couple of times since creating > >> the original key-pair+CR, but never created a new key-pair/CR... > >> > >>> There are also other algorithms the RSA. And also if you wan't to get > >>> PFS you will need to consider your setup, certificate and security > >>> model. > >> > >> What is PFS? > >> > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy > > > > I'm no mathematical genius to understand cryptography at anything more > > than a superficial level, but I thought that ECDS, that PFS for TLS > > depends on, was compromised from inception by the NSA? Perhaps only > > some ECDS were, I am not really sure. > > I don't know anything about ECDS. You probably mean ECDSA?! What i have > understood is that ECDSA is not compromised. Though I can not be certain > about that. > > RSA has been in the market for a long time and the mathematics are for what > i think a bit simpler. But with compromised software there was a bad > algorithm for creating the primes. So it was the keys not RSA it self. But > I think the thing that you are talking about is DHE_RSA... I read from > somewhere that it was quite compromised.. But ECDHE is not. The difference > with DH and DHE (ECDH and ECDHE) is that DH uses static keys and DHE > authenticated ephemeral keys. These temporary keys give you forward > secrecy but decrease performance. > > RSA takes quite heavy computing for the same level of security compared to > ECDSA. RSA key creation is even more costly so using ephemeral temporary > keys with RSA takes quite long to compute. Thats why I prefer ECDHE_ECDSA > suites for reasonable security and fast encryption. > > > I remember reading somewhere (was it Schneier?) that RSA is probably a > > better bet these days. I'd also appreciate some views from the better > > informed members of the list because there's a lot of FUD and tin hats > > flying around in the post Snowden era. > > For high security application I would also use RSA in excess of 16k keys. > Then make sure to use random data and a trustworthy key-generator. > Fighting the agencies is still something I believe is virtually impossible > ;)
Thanks Matti, Can you please share how you create ECDHE_ECDSA with openssl ecparam, or ping a URL if that is more convenient? -- Regards, Mick
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