FYI, the lead author of that paper, Dan Kahan, posted two additional blog posts on culture, values, and geoengineering:
http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/24/geoengineering-the-cultural-plasticity-of-climate-change-ris.html http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/26/geoengineering-the-science-communication-environment-the-cul.html On Thursday, February 27, 2014 2:04:00 AM UTC-6, andrewjlockley wrote: > > Poster's note : This is just brilliant. At last an explanation of why > believing nonsense is rational. Useful to reflect on how this paper replies > to the origin and persistence of other belief systems, as well as climate > change. Leaves me wondering what nonsense I believe. > > > http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2014/2/23/three-models-of-risk-perception-their-significance-for-self.html > > Three models of risk perception & their significance for self-government > > Dan Kahan Posted on Sunday, February 23, 2014 at 7:52AM > > From Geoengineering and Climate Change Polarization: Testing a Two-channel > Model of Science Communication, Ann. Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. (in press). > > Theoretical background > > Three models of risk perception > > The scholarly literature on risk perception and communication is dominated > by two models. The first is the rational-weigher model, which posits that > members of the public, in aggregate and over time, can be expected to > process information about risk in a manner that promotes their expected > utility (Starr 1969). The second is the irrational-weigher model, which > asserts that ordinary members of the pubic lack the ability to reliably > advance their expected utility because their assessment of risk information > is constrained by cognitive biases and other manifestations of bounded > rationality (Kahneman 2003; Sunstein 2005; Marx et al. 2007; Weber > 2006).Neither of these models cogently explains public conflict over > climate change—or a host of other putative societal risks, such as nuclear > power, the vaccination of teenage girls for HPV, and the removal of > restrictions on carrying concealed handguns in public. Such disputes > conspicuously feature partisan divisions over facts that admit of > scientific investigation. Nothing in the rational-weigher model predicts > that people with different values or opposing political commitments will > draw radically different inferences from common information. Likewise, > nothing in the irrational-weigher model suggests that people who subscribe > to one set of values are any more or less bounded in their rationality than > those who subscribe to any other, or that cognitive biases will produce > systematic divisions of opinion of among such groups. > > One explanation for such conflict is the cultural cognition thesis (CCT). > CCT says that cultural values are cognitively prior to facts in public risk > conflicts: as a result of a complex of interrelated psychological > mechanisms, groups of individuals will credit and dismiss evidence of risk > in patterns that reflect and reinforce their distinctive understandings of > how society should be organized (Kahan, Braman, Cohen, Gastil & Slovic > 2010; Jenkins-Smith & Herron 2009). Thus, persons > with individualistic values can be expected to be relatively dismissive of > environmental and technological risks, which if widely accepted would > justify restricting commerce and industry, activities that people with such > values hold in high regard. The same goes for individuals > withhierarchical values, who see assertions of environmental risk as > indictments of social elites. Individuals > with egalitarian and communitarian values, in contrast, see commerce and > industry as sources of unjust disparity and symbols of noxious > self-seeking, and thus readily credit assertions that these activities are > hazardous and therefore worthy of regulation (Douglass & Wildavsky 1982). > Observational and experimental studies have linked these and comparable > sets of outlooks to myriad risk controversies, including the one over > climate change (Kahan 2012).Individuals, on the CCT account, behave not as > expected-utility weighers—rational or irrational—but rather as cultural > evaluators of risk information (Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil 2006). The > beliefs any individual forms on societal risks like climate change—whether > right or wrong—do not meaningfully affect his or her personal exposure to > those risks. However, precisely because positions on those issues are > commonly understood to cohere with allegiance to one or another cultural > style, taking a position at odds with the dominant view in his or her > cultural group is likely to compromise that individual’s relationship with > others on whom that individual depends for emotional and material support. > As individuals, citizens are thus likely to do better in their daily lives > when they adopt toward putative hazards the stances that express their > commitment to values that they share with others, irrespective of the fit > between those beliefs and the actuarial magnitudes and probabilities of > those risks.The cultural evaluator model takes issue with the > irrational-weigher assumption that popular conflict over risk stems from > overreliance on heuristic forms of information processing (Lodge & Taber > 2013; Sunstein 2006). Empirical evidence suggests that culturally diverse > citizens are indeed reliably guided toward opposing stances by unconscious > processing of cues, such as the emotional resonances of arguments and the > apparent values of risk communicators (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith & Braman 2011; > Jenkins-Smith & Herron 2009; Jenkins-Smith 2001).But contrary to the > picture painted by the irrational-weigher model, ordinary citizens who are > equipped and disposed to appraise information in a reflective, analytic > manner are not more likely to form beliefs consistent with the best > available evidence on risk. Instead they often become even more culturally > polarized because of the special capacity they have to search out and > interpret evidence in patterns that sustain the convergence between their > risk perceptions and their group identities (Kahan, Peters, Wittlin, > Slovic, Ouellette, Braman & Mandel 2012; Kahan 2013; Kahan, Peters, Dawson > & Slovic 2013).Two channels of science communication > > The rational- and irrational-weigher models of risk perception generate > competing prescriptions for science communication. The former posits that > individuals can be expected, eventually, to form empirically sound > positions so long as they are furnished with sufficient and sufficiently > accurate information (e.g., Viscusi 1983; Philipson & Posner 1993). The > latter asserts that the attempts to educate the public about risk are at > best futile, since the public lacks the knowledge and capacity to > comprehend; at worst such efforts are self-defeating, since ordinary > individuals are prone to overreact on the basis of fear and other affective > influences on judgment. The better strategy is to steer risk policymaking > away from democratically accountable actors to politically insulated > experts and to “change the subject” when risk issues arise in public debate > (Sunstein 2005, p. 125; see also Breyer 1993). > > The cultural-evaluator model associated with CCT offers a more nuanced > account. It recognizes that when empirical claims about societal risk > become suffused with antagonistic cultural meanings, intensified efforts to > disseminate sound information are unlikely to generate consensus and can > even stimulate conflict. > > But those instances are exceptional—indeed, pathological. There are vastly > more risk issues—from the hazards of power lines to the side-effects of > antibiotics to the tumor-stimulating consequences of cell phones—that avoid > becoming broadly entangled with antagonistic cultural meanings. Using the > same ability that they reliably employ to seek and follow expert medical > treatment when they are ill or expert auto-mechanic service when their car > breaks down, the vast majority of ordinary citizens can be counted on in > these “normal,” non-pathological cases to discern and conform their beliefs > to the best available scientific evidence (Keil 2010). > > The cultural-evaluator model therefore counsels a two-channel strategy of > science communication. Channel 1 is focused on information content and is > informed by the best available understandings of how to convey empirically > sound evidence, the basis and significance of which are readily accessible > to ordinary citizens (e.g., Gigerenzer 2000; Spiegelhalter, Pearson & Short > 2011). Channel 2 focuses on cultural meanings: the myriad cues—from group > affinities and antipathies to positive and negative affective resonances to > congenial or hostile narrative structures—that individuals unconsciously > rely on to determine whether a particular stance toward a putative risk is > consistent with their defining commitments. To be effective, science > communication must successfully negotiate both channels. That is, in > addition to furnishing individuals with valid and pertinent information > about how the world works, it must avail itself of the cues necessary to > assure individuals that assenting to that information will not estrange > them from their communities (Kahan, Slovic, Braman & Gastil 2006; Nisbet > 2009). > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
