I'd take issue with the word "effective', applied to either the Tobacco Institute or the API project. The tobacco industry is still using the US Chamber of Commerce to oppose anti-smoking rules overseas, but that's a rear-guard action. Just remember the days when public places, bars etc. were wreathed in smoke (the young can watch Mad Men and marvel). The API activity described was a few years ago, and even then they knew they had to act covertly. The battle for public opinion isn't over but they're losing it. For those in the actual research fields where this sleaziness went on, and still goes on (I assume) it's personally offensive, but in the end it can be filed under 'a fool and his money are soon parted'.
On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 4:22 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > [email protected] > <https://groups.google.com/forum/?utm_source=digest&utm_medium=email#!forum/geoengineering/topics> > Google > Groups > <https://groups.google.com/forum/?utm_source=digest&utm_medium=email/#!overview> > <https://groups.google.com/forum/?utm_source=digest&utm_medium=email/#!overview> > Topic digest > View all topics > <https://groups.google.com/forum/?utm_source=digest&utm_medium=email#!forum/geoengineering/topics> > > - Day 3 - Are we comparing apples with apples? And who likes "them > apples"? <#14e777caae9dd98f_group_thread_0> - 1 Update > - Merchants of Doubt, the Sequel <#14e777caae9dd98f_group_thread_1> - 1 > Update > > Day 3 - Are we comparing apples with apples? And who likes "them > apples"? > <http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering/t/443f99abd5529b69?utm_source=digest&utm_medium=email> > Motoko <[email protected]>: Jul 10 09:51AM +0200 > > Day 3 - Are we comparing apples with apples? And who likes "them apples"? > > > http://www.spp-climate-engineering.de/symposium-blog-single/items/day-3-are-we-comparing-apples-with-apples-and-who-likes-them-apples.html > > The third and final full day of the symposium again included two > sessions of talks. The first, entitled "A Comparative View of Climate > Engineering Options and Metrics," was aimed at taking a good look at the > concepts and terms we use to evaluate and assess different types of CE > technologies to establish if researchers from different fields, > countries and disciplines are assessing the technologies in a comparable > way. > > In the first talk of the day, Peter Irvine outlined a way to move > towards a comprehensive review and comparison of the impacts and risks > of CE methods. His suggested review process included and empirical > evaluation of given CE method to attempt to project changes for the > system affected, and a normative evaluation to attempt to judge the > projected changes as good/bad, just/unjust, etc. Peter envisioned > assessing all CE methods in this way and then aggregating the results to > put the assessed climate risk of one given CE technology into a broader > perspective by comparing its risks with those of other suggested > technologies. He suggested that this bottom-up approach would be quite > slow and would probably result in a complex picture comprised of patchy > assessments with variation across regions. But the advantage of starting > with the individual evaluation of each technology and slowly building up > the bigger picture one "pixel" at a time would be that the resulting > picture would have very detailed resolution. An alternative to the > bottom-up approach would be a top-down, derivate approach using the > metrics and tools established by the IPCC to assess the key risks of all > CE technologies. Starting from the big picture and working down to the > individual level would have the advantage of being faster and allowing a > more uniform, comprehensive comparison, but would perhaps produce a less > detailed picture of the risks of individual technologies. Peter > suggested that a combination of both approaches would allow the most > comprehensive evaluation. > > Duncan McClaren's talk centered around the concept of justice in CE > assessment. As CE technologies would have an uneven effect around the > world, the "justness" of their deployment is central to the debate. But > as Duncan pointed out, justice is not a universal concept. He called for > a categorization of the global range of justice concepts, claims and > metrics, which could then be used these to compare and contrast the > justice of CE techniques, emphasizing the need for a move towards a > plurality of concepts of justice, suggesting this could be achieved by > means of deliberative and participative approaches to combine > contradictory metrics. > > Harald Stelzer followed in the same tone, calling for an overview of the > normative criteria for the evaluation of CE technologies that would > emphasise distributive impacts and elaborate on ethical aspects of > ongoing projects. This would allow an interdisciplinary exchange on the > ethical, societal and political feasibility of CE technologies. He > pointed out that normative evaluations of CE ask much the same questions > as empirical assessments - including how much technologies "cost" and > who would benefit how much etc. – but such normative approaches simply > provide an added ethical perspective. He concluded that ethical > assessment is an essential part of all questions on CE and emphasized > that interdisciplinary dialogue is imperative to understanding and > evaluating the social, political, economic, ethical and moral dimensions > of CE feasibility. > > The next talk, given by Hermann Held, focused in on one of the many > aspects of CE evaluation listed by the previous speakers: Cost > effectiveness. Using economic modelling he showed that if you ignore the > risks of SRM deployment, it would completely "crowd out" mitigation in > economic climate policy. By comparing economic effects of mitigation > with and without added SRM deployment, he showed that about one third of > the costs of maintaining a 2 degree target could be saved by using SRM. > However, he then went on to show that two thirds of the economic gains > of SRM are lost after regional climate risk is taken into account. > > Andreas Oschlies took a very long-range view in his talk about modelling > the millennial effects of CE deployment. His model runs looked at the > state of the climate system in 3000 after multiple centuries of > large-scale deployment of a range of CE techniques, including > stratospheric aerosol injection, iron fertilization, alkalinity > enhancement and artificial upwelling in the ocean, and afforestation on > land. The simulations showed that the only two technologies which had a > high impact in a high emission world over a long period of time were > stratospheric aerosols and ocean upwelling, but there was no future > "mission accomplished moment" in which the climate returned to a stable > state and CE could safely be terminated. The models showed that > termination problem persists even after several hundred years of CE > deployment because the CDR technologies included in the simulations did > not have a significant effect on the atmospheric CO_2 concentration. > Andreas emphasized that, due to its incredibly long life-time in the > climate system, managing carbon is key in the long term. > > Sebastian Sonntag continued the theme of comparing the effectiveness of > land, ocean and atmosphere-based CE methods in his presentation on the > modeling of stratospheric aerosol injection, alkalinity enhancement and > afforestation. In contrast to the previous speaker, Sebastian's > simulations indicated that afforestation could have a substantially > larger CDR potential, as the model includes terrestrial feedback effects > of increased CO_2 . The models indicated that there was cooling due to > CO_2 reduction, but as forests are darker than cropland, there was some > local warming, and increasing evaporation additionally had a cooling > effect. The end effect of large-scale afforestation on the climate was a > minor net effect cooling with large regional variations. > > Staying with the topic of the effects of land-based, or terrestrial CDR > methods, Vera Heck then told us about her investigations into the > potential climatic side effects of biomass plantations. Her results > challenged the assumption that terrestrial CDR (tCDR) is a "safe and > green" CE method by comparing the impacts of tCDR to the biochemical > effects human alterations to land use have historically had. Vera's > models included biochemical metrics to measure changes in water flux, > plant production, land carbon storage and vegetation carbon resistance > time. Her simulations showed that tCDR could be expected to cause larger > future biochemical changes than humans have caused so far historically > by altering natural environments for agriculture, meaning the impacts of > large scale biomass plantations would be even larger than past land use > changes and would move the climate system into a completely new state. > Additionally, Vera showed that plantations could have large effects on > biodiversity and food production, that fertilization required for the > plantations would be 420 % of current nitrogen demand, and that 30–50 % > more water would be required than current land use requires. She > therefore summarized that her models indicate that tCDR is not a "green" > option. > > Jessica Strefler then went on to present her work on the integrated > assessment of mitigation and CDR. She looked at four types of CDR: > Bio-energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), afforestation, > direct air capture and terrestrial enhanced weathering and compared them > based on price, energy and land use requirements. Comparing the land use > of the different CDR methods, Jessica showed that as unrestricted > afforestation and BECCS are expected to reduce the amount of land > available for food crops, both these methods are expected to cause food > prices to increase dramatically. Despite these problems, Jessica's work > showed that CDR could play a key role in achieving low stabilization of > carbon in the climate system, and that its strategic value lies in > compensating the emissions that are most expensive to reduce. > > Before we broke for lunch the audience and a panel of the session's > speakers were given the chance to discuss any open questions raised > during the day. Points made during the panel discussion included a > reiteration that concepts of justice are always contested, and obtaining > an overview over the range of these concepts essential to communicate on > CE. However the open question remained as to whether these multitude of > justice concepts would be useful for comparing types of CE responses. > With regard to questions of the justice of CE deployment, it became > clear that the intentionality would play a huge role, and that thus far > there has not been much consideration of the topic. > > Another issue discussed is that it is essential to make explicit what > models of the effects of CE deployment are being compared to. When > making empirical and normative evaluations of CE, It makes a big > difference if the reference climate being referred to is today's climate > or pre-industrial climate or runaway climate change in the future. > > Additionally, there was lively discussion about the tension between the > need for simplification and the desire for complexity when evaluating > CE. While some were of the opinion that it is dangerous to draw general > conclusions from general observations, and emphasized that detailed > assessment is needed before statements about the effectiveness of > specific CE technologies can be made, others pointed out that at the > same time we need to reduce complexity to a point that we can make > decisions on CE. Additionally, it was suggested that we, as researchers, > need to generalize a little to be able to communicate about issues in an > interdisciplinary way, as there is not a way to wait until we have a > final answer before discussing these topics. > > And finally, summarizing the overall take-home message of the session on > comparing the concepts and terms we use to evaluate and assess different > types of CE technologies, it was empathized that the difficult task of > identifying and deciding upon meaningful metrics can only be achieved as > part of an interdisciplinary community effort. > > After a restorative lunch, we started the afternoon's session on the > perceptions of and perspectives on CE research and deployment with new > energy. We jumped right into the issue as to what "people" think about > CE technologies and why with a presentation by Jack Stilgoe on how the > framing of CE affects not only the perception of the field in civil > society, but also how members of the research community see their role. > Jack described research and experiments as "ways of making and remaking > the world" and called on researchers to be aware of their role as frame > shapers. He then went on take a closer look at the composition of the > field. As CE research is recent, the field is expectedly quite small. It > is very interdisciplinary, but some disciplines are more strongly > represented than others - what is especially evident is that there is a > relative absence of engineers in the field of climate /engineering./ > Jack then addressed the way in which researchers in the field perceive > the way scientific enquiry should proceed. Using streetscapes as an > analogy, he asked if should we rather delineate a "safe space" by draw > red lines around what we consider to be acceptable/unacceptable research > and imposing strict entrance criteria, or if we should rather see the > field as a "shared space" in which there is no clear delineation between > disciplines, blurring lines and removing barriers to participation. > Continuing the street analogy, he suggested that, as having shared > streets slows traffic, so a shared research space may result in slower > science, but the end result has the potential be much more complex and > inclusive. > > Wil Burns then provided us with an overview of the concept of > intergenerational justice and how some CE technologies have the > potential to violate principle of intergenerational equity. He took up > the topic of the termination effect, suggesting that even if our > generation did not stop using it, we would still be transferring a > "Damocles sword" to hang over the heads of future generations who will > then need to keep using CE to avoid the termination effect, saying this > too is a potential violation of principle of intergenerational equity. > Other CE related issues which may contravene the principle of > intergenerational equity suggested by Wil included that if CE affects > the replenishment of the ozone layer, future generations may face > increased skin cancer related problems, and if ecosystems are altered, > future generations may be denied access to recourses. To reduce the > likelihood of this happening, Wil indicated that we should restrict the > scope of CE to keep options open for future generations and reduce > emissions to reduce the amount of time that CE would need to be used. He > went on to argue for a strong legal coupling of any permission to deploy > CE to aggressive mitigation. > > An overview of the African perspective on CE was provided by Mary > Mutiso, who emphasised that the peoples of different regions have > potentially very different perceptions about the utility and morality of > CE. She pointed out that knowledge about and research on CE is limited > in African nations, and expressed the concern that decisions about CE > would be imposed upon Africa by the global north. She stressed the need > for transparency of research, knowledge transfer and consensus on CE > governance to ensure participation by scientists, politicians and the > public in as many nations as possible. > > Gert Pönitzsch briefly presented the results of an online survey of CE > experts and laypeople which asked how much of the total budget should be > spent on mitigation, CDR, adaption and SRM. The results indicated > respondents thought mitigation should receive the most funding, and the > median amount of budget respondents allocated to CE was 15 %, with CDR > receiving the most of that funding. Further questions on what sort of > solar aerosol injection (SAI) research should be funded showed that > while most respondents supported research, support for limited field > research and global field research was much lower among both experts and > laypeople. The results Gert presented indicated that there was no bias > among CE researchers towards deployment, and that experts were slightly > more cautious regarding risks and benefits of SAI than lay people. > > Christine Merk went on to show us the results of an experiment to assess > whether individuals reduce mitigation efforts when they are informed > about SAI. The experiment was organized as an online survey in which > each participant was given 10 Euro and told they could use this to buy > voluntary carbon offsets (1 Euro per offset) or keep it and do what they > liked with it. Participants included a baseline group and group who had > been informed about SAI. This information was provided in a way that > tried to avoid all framing by keeping the information neutral and > included details about potential benefits, negative effects and high > uncertainty. The results Christine presented showed that people who were > informed about SAI bought more carbon offsets, indicating that knowledge > about aerosol injection increases individual mitigation, although she > emphasized that it is unclear if this > Back to top <#14e777caae9dd98f_digest_top> > Merchants of Doubt, the Sequel > <http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering/t/e552a39df8307d1?utm_source=digest&utm_medium=email> > Greg Rau <[email protected]>: Jul 09 09:42PM -0700 > > Tangential to climate intervention, or the main reason for it? > > While I had assumed that Oreskes and Conway's book Merchant of Doubt was > the last word on the culpability of the fossil fuel industry in obfuscating > the AGW "debate", this recent report by the Union of Concerned Scientist > puts to bed any doubt about the role this industry played in sowing > uncertainty and derailing efforts to address the AGW problem: > http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/The-Climate-Deception-Dossiers.pdf > > The report is based on 85 internal company and trade association documents > that have come to light, containing such revelations as the following: > "Identifying, Recruiting, and Training Undercover Scientists > Given that scientists are a trusted source of information for policy > makers and the public, it is not surprising that the API roadmap memo calls > for cultivating and deploying them. Importantly, the API’s communication > team realized that scientists seen as spokespeople for the fossil fuel > industry would lack credibility. They aimed to “identify, recruit and train > a team of five independent scientists to participate in media outreach,” > and their deception depended on ensuring that these scientists’ financial > ties to the fossil fuel industry remained hidden from the public—precisely > the arrangement they ultimately made with Dr. Wei-Hock Soon (Dossier #1, p. > 6). According to the leaked memo, “These will be indi- viduals who do not > have a long history of visibility and/or participation in the climate > change debate. Rather, this team will consist of new faces who will add > their voices to those recognized scientists who are already vocal” (Walker > 1998). > While the funding of the hand-selected scientists was to remain secret, > their intended mission was clear: Exxon, Chevron, and the other fossil fuel > industry representatives needed these scientists to produce “peer-reviewed > papers that undercut the ‘conventional wisdom’ on climate science.” They > intended to fund and train the scientists to get their crafted message of > uncertainty out to print, radio, and TV journalists (Walker 1998)." > > "Targeting Teachers and Students > Another section of the API roadmap memo outlines a plan to target the > National Science Teachers Association. Exxon, Chevron, and the other Global > Climate Science Communi- cations Team members recognized that the tide > might turn against fossil fuels unless they could reach the next genera- > tion. So, under the guise of “present[ing] a credible, balanced picture of > climate science,” they opted to push out materials for teachers and their > students that directly countered the scientific evidence. As the memo > explains, their assumption was that emphasizing “uncertainties in climate > science will begin to erect a barrier against further efforts to impose > Kyo- to-like measures in the future” (Walker 1998). > The leaked memo also outlines a tactic of working through grassroots > organizations to promote debate about climate science on campuses and in > communities during the period mid-August through October 1998 (Walker > 1998). In the years since this memo, many of the activities outlined in the > memo have been carried out, as evidenced by the API’s online curriculum for > elementary schools that presents non- renewable energy sources such as oil, > natural gas, and coal, as “more reliable, affordable, and convenient to use > than most renewable energy resources” (see, for example, API 2002). > Fossil Fuel Company Involvement: Direct and Indirect Fossil fuel companies > contributed to the campaign indirectly, through their membership in and > funding of the API, and directly, through the participation of their own > employees. > Joseph Walker of the API facilitated the process, and the largest fossil > fuel companies were implicated in this memo. BP, ConocoPhillips, and Shell > were members of the API at the time. Along with ExxonMobil and Chevron, all > these firms remain API members today. Exxon and Chevron contributed > directly to the development of the plan through their rep- resentatives > Randy Randol and Sharon Kneiss, respectively. Exxon, Chevron, and > Occidental Petroleum also exerted influence through a team member, Steve > Milloy, who was the executive director of a front group, called The > Advancement of Sound Science Coalition, funded by these companies. (Milloy > had previously aided tobacco firms with their decep- tion campaign (Walker > 1998).) > BP and Shell, among other fossil fuel companies, indirectly supported this > deception campaign via their API memberships. It is noteworthy that these > companies began to publicly acknowledge the threat of climate change around > this time. Shell, for example, publicly acknowledged in its 1998 corporate > sustainability report that rising global temperatures were “possibly due in > part to greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activity.” The report also > noted that “human activities, especially the use of fossil fuels, may be > influencing the climate, according to many scientists, including those who > make up the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” (Royal Dutch Shell > 1998). Despite such comments, however, fossil fuel companies’ broader > campaign to sow confusion continued." > > "Funding the Campaign > The fossil fuel companies knew that a disinformation cam- paign of the > scope they intended would not be cheap. The Global Climate Science > Communications Team estimated the budget for the program at $5,900,000, > which included a national media program and national outreach as well as a > data center (Walker 1998). The roadmap identified an array of fossil fuel > industry trade associations and front groups, fossil fuel companies, and > free-market think tanks to underwrite and execute the plan, including: > • The American Petroleum Institute and its members > • The Business Round Table and its members > • The Edison Electric Institute and its members > • The Independent Petroleum Association of America and its members > • The National Mining Association and its members > • The American Legislative Exchange Council > • Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow > • The Competitive Enterprise Institute > • Frontiers of Freedom > • The Marshall Institute" > > More recently: > "In 2009, the API attempted to under- mine the American Clean Energy and > Security Act of 2009— often known as the Waxman-Markey climate bill and a > key federal attempt to regulate carbon emissions—by mobilizing front groups > to hold staged “energy citizens” rallies in roughly 20 states, rallies > designed to suggest that there was significant public opposition to > regulating carbon emissions where little actually existed (Gerard 2009; > Talley 2009). An API memo leaked to Greenpeace reveals that API urged > fossil fuel company executives, including from BP, Chevron, Exxon- Mobil, > and Shell, to send their employees to the staged rallies (Center for Media > and Democracy 2012; Gerard 2009)." > > > GR - what I find breathtaking here is that a modestly funded but highly > focussed and disciplined disinformation campaign was and is being used to > effectively neutralize the entire weight and knowledge of the science > community in the formulation of effective GHG policy. While built on the > similarly successful playbook used in the past by the tobacco industry, > this time the fate of an entire planet was and is in play. Also unlike the > tobacco issue, where are the lawsuits for present and future climate > damages, given these latest revelations? Are these corporate crimes against > the planet really going to go unpunished? > Back to top <#14e777caae9dd98f_digest_top> > You received this digest because you're subscribed to updates for this > group. You can change your settings on the group membership page > <https://groups.google.com/forum/?utm_source=digest&utm_medium=email#!forum/geoengineering/join> > . > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it send an > email to [email protected]. > -- Thanks, Bill Stahl -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
