http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/sjoe.12120/abstract
Keywords: Climate change;international public goods;supermajority rule;F51;H41;Q54 Abstract Abating climate change is an enormous international public-goods problem with a classical “free-rider” structure. However, it is also a global “free-driver” problem because geoengineering the stratosphere with reflective particles to block incoming solar radiation is so cheap that it could essentially be undertaken unilaterally by one state perceiving itself to be in peril. This exploratory paper develops the main features of a free-driver externality in a simple model motivated by the asymmetric consequences of type-I and type-II errors. I propose a social-choice decision architecture, embodying the solution concept of a supermajority voting rule, and derive its basic properties. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
