https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069618305035
Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering: Clash or cooperation?☆ <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069618305035#aep-article-footnote-id9> Author links open overlay panelDanielHeyena <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069618305035#!> JuanMoreno-Cruzc <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0095069618305035#!> Show more https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.03.005Get rights and content <https://s100.copyright.com/AppDispatchServlet?publisherName=ELS&contentID=S0095069618305035&orderBeanReset=true> Abstract *Solar geoengineering* has received increasing attention as an option to temporarily stabilize global temperatures. A key concern is that heterogeneous preferences over the optimal amount of cooling combined with low deployment costs may allow the country with the strongest incentive for cooling, the so-called free-driver, to impose a substantial externality on the rest of the world. We analyze whether the threat of *counter-geoengineering* technologies capable of negating the climatic effects of solar geoengineering can overcome the free-driver problem and tilt the game in favor of international cooperation. Our game-theoretical model of countries with asymmetric preferences allows for a rigorous analysis of the strategic interaction surrounding solar geoengineering and counter-geoengineering. We find that counter-geoengineering prevents the free-driver outcome, but not always with benign effects. The presence of counter-geoengineering leads to either a climate clash where countries engage in a non-cooperative escalation of opposing climate interventions (negative welfare effect), a moratorium treaty where countries commit to abstain from either type of climate intervention (indeterminate welfare effect), or cooperative deployment of solar geoengineering (positive welfare effect). We show that the outcome depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry in temperature preferences between countries. Keywords Climate intervention Solar geoengineering Counter-geoengineering Free-driver Strategic conflicts Game theory Cooperation Externality Global warming International environmental agreements JEL codes Q54 H41 D62 D02 D74 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
