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https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-023-03612-2 *Authors* - Todd L. Cherry <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-023-03612-2#auth-Todd_L_-Cherry-Aff1-Aff2> , - Stephan Kroll <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-023-03612-2#auth-Stephan-Kroll-Aff3> & - David M. McEvoy <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584-023-03612-2#auth-David_M_-McEvoy-Aff4> 02 October 2023 Citations: Cherry, T.L., Kroll, S. & McEvoy, D.M. Climate cooperation with risky solar geoengineering. *Climatic Change* 176, 138 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-023-03612-2 Abstract Given the lack of progress on climate change mitigation, some scientists have proposed solar geoengineering as a means to manage climate change at least temporarily. One main concern with such a risky technological solution, however, is that it may create a “moral hazard” problem by crowding out efforts to reduce emissions. We investigate the potential for a risky technological solution to crowd out mitigation with theory and experiments. In a collective-risk social dilemma, players strategically act to cooperate when there is an opportunity to deploy a risky technology to help protect themselves from impending damages. In contrast to the moral hazard conjecture, the empirical results suggest that the threat of solar geoengineering can lead to an *increase* in cooperative behavior. *Source: Springer Link* -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/geoengineering/CAHJsh982ggDKFnAo0h8Z1-%3Dj5wsJSN%2Be1jpyRsHB3dtzsNi%2BXA%40mail.gmail.com.
