https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2024.2333811

*Authors*
Jonathan Symons, Courtney Fung, Dhanasree Jayaram, Sofia Kabbej &Matt
McDonald

*Published online: 07 Apr 2024*

https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2024.2333811

With climate change now a reality and its impacts being felt,
geoengineering is emerging as a major (if controversial) point of
discussion and debate regarding international responses to climate change.

In 2013, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change defined
‘geoengineering’ as ‘methods that aim to deliberately alter the climate
system to counter climate change’ (IPCC Citation2013, 29). By most
accounts, technological interventions that fit within this broad label of
geoengineering take one of two forms: carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and
solar radiation management (SRM) (or more simply solar geoengineering). The
former describes ‘anthropogenic activities removing CO2 from the atmosphere
and durably storing it in geological, terrestrial or ocean reservoirs or in
products’ (IPCC Citation2018) and includes activities such as
afforestation, soil carbon sequestration, ocean fertilisation and direct
air capture. Solar geoengineering, on the other hand, involves reducing
impacts of climate change by reflecting some of the sun’s energy into
space. Here, stratospheric aerosol injection (using aircraft to disperse
sulphur, for example) is the most likely technique envisaged to achieve
this.

Not only is CDR widely used (primarily afforestation, see Smith
Citation2023) but it is increasingly recognised as crucial for reaching net
zero targets and addressing climate change (Maher and Symons Citation2022).
Australian CDR policies are currently less developed than those in the
United States, but Australia has pioneered soil carbon methodologies and in
2022 the CSIRO published a major report on other CDR opportunities (CSIRO
Citation2022). While understanding of and even support for CDR is growing,
however, solar geoengineering remains acutely controversial, and Australia
has paid little attention to issues around its use, impact or governance.

Critics have raised a series of concerns about solar geoengineering. For
some, it involves playing God with nature (see Hamilton Citation2014). Some
see a significant risk of it deterring mitigation action (McLaren and Corry
Citation2023) or empowering the actors who control the technology (Biermann
et al. Citation2022). Others note the potential for dangerous ‘termination
shock’ from stopping use of global solar geoengineering once deployed
(Parker and Irvine Citation2018). Still others caution that not enough is
known about solar geoengineering’s consequences for ecosystems and
planetary functions (Biermann et al. Citation2022), or that regulating its
use will be difficult if not impossible (Brent Citation2023; Reynolds
Citation2019). However, as global warming creeps past 1.5°C above
pre-industrial levels (Ripple et al. Citation2023) and the impact of
changing rainfall patterns, warmer temperatures and disasters is being
felt, a range of interventions that might potentially minimise harms are
arriving on global policy agendas. This includes solar geoengineering.

*Solar geoengineering on the international agenda*
At the 2024 session of the UN Environment Assembly in Nairobi, Switzerland
proposed that a United Nations expert group be asked to ‘examine risks and
opportunities’ associated with solar geoengineering. Amid deep
international disagreement the resolution was first revised and then
rejected (McLaren and Corry Citation2024). Yet, whereas a previous Swiss
proposal in 2019 was wholly opposed by the Trump Administration, it was
noteworthy that the Biden Administration worked to ensure the 2024
resolution was presented in a form it could support.

The debate in Nairobi saw an increasing number of states contributing to
debate and outlining their positions on the issue (McLaren and Corry
Citation2024). Australia was not among them. Indeed to date, Australia has
played virtually no role in global discussion of solar geoengineering.
Australia also stands out among comparable nations for its limited
examination of potential national impacts. One explanation attributes this
inattention to Australia’s ‘role conception’. By this account, Australian
policy-makers identify as faithful US allies and so commonly defer to US
leadership on global issues (Horton Citation2023). Yet, Australia’s climate
and geography are quite dissimilar to North America’s. If global solar
geoengineering were implemented it would have highly distinct impacts on
Australian agriculture, biodiversity, costal protection, rainfall patterns
and fire risks. Australian and US interests therefore appear quite distinct.

While we have not seen global agreement on the governance of solar
geoengineering, around the world nationally focused research is proceeding
rapidly. Since 2023 alone, the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy has commenced a congressionally mandated ‘five-year plan’ for a
‘scientific assessment of solar and other rapid climate interventions in
the context of near-term climate risks and hazards’ (OSTP Citation2023);
the United Kingdom has asked its Natural Environment Research Council
(NERC) to conduct a five-year ‘Modelling Environmental Responses to Solar
Radiation Management’ programme and allocated £10.5 million ($20 million
AUD) to the work; and Canada has incorporated study of solar geoengineering
into its 2024–2029 science strategy (E&CC Citation2024).

These initiatives build on a longer history of national research. In the
US, the National Academies of Sciences (Citation2021), the National
Research Council (Citation2015) and the Government Accountability Office
(US GAO Citation2011) have all delivered landmark reports. Outside of the
US research has been conducted by the Office for Technology Assessment at
the German Bundestag and the German Research Foundation (Klepper
Citation2016; Maher and Symons Citation2022), the UK’s Royal Society (Royal
Society Citation2009), successive EU-funded research projects (Schäfer
Citation2015; European Research Council) and a major study funded by the
Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology (see Horton Citation2023).
Meanwhile, Degrees Modelling Fund grants have supported over 150
researchers to conduct solar geoengineering research in 21 developing
countries.

*A role for Australia?*
Although Australia has taken no steps to investigate the national impacts
of global solar geoengineering, Australia is a world leader in trialling
local climate interventions. Australian governments have supported the
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority as it conducted small-scale trials
of ‘cloud-brightening’ above the reef (in 2020 and 2021) with the goal of
testing equipment that might be used to prevent coral bleaching during
ocean heatwaves (see Butcherine Citation2023; Horton Citation2023). These
trials are arguably the world’s first significant outdoor trial of a solar
geoengineering technique (McDonald et al. Citation2019). The trials were
opposed by environmental organisations such as Friends of the Earth and the
German Greens (Böll-Stiftung Citation2020; Sales Citation2019), but for the
most part attracted surprisingly limited public attention.

Cloud brightening is a relatively localised intervention, but at some point
in the coming decades it seems increasingly likely that larger-scale
climate interventions will be considered or indeed implemented by some
actors in the international system. If the 2024 negotiations are
indicative, not only is the issue likely to prove divisive, but Australia’s
Pacific neighbours are likely to take quite a different position from the
United States. When negotiations over the governance of these forms of
climate interventions eventually do begin, it is important that Australia
should have an informed understanding of likely regional impacts. There are
at least two major elements of this work: scientific and social/political.

In the absence of any field trials, most scientific research into solar
geoengineering utilises scenarios developed within the Geoengineering Model
Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP). These scenarios include intervention
involving stratospheric sulphur-injection, marine cloud brightening and
cirrus cloud thinning (a proposed technique that would cool the earth by
allowing more infrared radiation to be reflected into space) (Visioni et
al. Citation2023; Kravitz et al. Citation2021). A basic understanding of
regional impacts from these techniques could be gained by funding climate
scientists to take existing GeoMIP scenarios and specify their anticipated
regional impacts on temperature and rainfall patterns for Australia and the
Asia-Pacific. Translation of these data to more localised contexts would
allow scholars to identify the range of possible material impacts on
ecology, agricultural productivity and fire risk, for example. Ideally,
Australia would work with neighbouring countries (e.g. Timor-Leste,
Indonesia and the Pacific Island Forum) to develop a detailed understanding
of regional impacts.

A second body of work could explore social and political impacts at local
and international levels. In the social context, while public awareness is
limited, deeper understanding of perspectives on and likely responses to
solar geoengineering within Australian society is needed. In political
terms, consideration of potential international governance arrangements and
Australia’s role in contributing to these is clearly required. This is
necessary not least because in the absence of such arrangements, solar
geoengineering use may have important security implications (McDonald
Citation2023). With no global agreement in place and climate change effects
worsening, there is growing concern that an actor might seek to deploy
solar geoengineering unilaterally (Horton Citation2023). While states
facing significant climate harms are often viewed as potential early users,
this option might also be attractive to actors that view a possible
technological ‘silver bullet’ as preferable to the end of a global fossil
fuel economy. Opponents of solar geoengineering worry that its use –
although intended to reduce climate harms – might potentially create
significant harms, including for other states, through affecting monsoon
patterns or rainfall, for example (Ricke et al. Citation2012). Unilateral
deployment could also fuel perceptions that adversaries have caused harmful
weather events, or that the dual-use potential of SG equipment (e.g.
patrols by stratospheric aircraft) represent a threat to sovereignty.
Opposing states might also seek to sabotage or counter deployment that
lacked multilateral support (see Surprise Citation2020).

These scenarios are at the heart of concerns that SG might contribute to
international tensions, instability and even violent conflict. Perhaps the
greatest risk for Australia would be if the United States and China took
opposing positions on deployment of solar geoengineering, and deployment
became another flash-point in great-power rivalry (Lockyer and Symons
Citation2019). Here, Australia’s interest in minimising the risk of
conflict between its primary security guarantor and largest trading partner
gives it a clear independent interest.

*Conclusion*
Solar geoengineering is a deeply controversial idea. It is now well
understood that growing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases have
placed the global climate in a perilous and unprecedented situation. Solar
geoengineering is either a dangerous distraction from the urgent work of
decarbonising economic process, or possibly a flawed, imperfect and partial
response that might limit climate harms while the international community
gets serious about urgent mitigation action.

While Australia and its neighbours are among the most climate-vulnerable
countries, they are currently among the least informed about the possible
consequences of solar geoengineering. Australian climate scientists are
well represented among scholars modelling solar geoengineering scenarios.
However, to date there has been no effort to detail implications for
Australia. Regardless of whether Australia and its Pacific neighbours
ultimately support or oppose climate interventions, Australian
policy-makers and researchers need to start taking the potential
implications and governance of solar geoengineering seriously.

*Source: Taylor & Francis Online*

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