https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2026/02/05/climate-intervention-at-high-latitudes-a-2030-security-scenario/

An exploration of the security dynamics of a fictional but plausible
proposed SAI deployment in 2030.

*Authors: *Erin Sikorsky, Julia Greensfelder, and Hannah Lyons

Storymap by Tom Ellison

*February 2026*

Overview

The effects of climate change are already posing significant security
challenges worldwide. Extreme weather regularly destroys lives,
livelihoods, and critical infrastructure; warming temperatures affect food
and water security, amplifying fragility and cross-border tensions.
Governments are increasingly attuned to the risks of instability, tensions,
or even conflict in climate-changed geographies, including in the Arctic.
Against this backdrop, scientists also warn
<https://global-tipping-points.org/> that key climate tipping points, or
systems-level irreversible changes, are fast-approaching, including the
melting of the Greenland ice sheet, the reversal of the Atlantic Meridional
Overturning Circulation (AMOC), and faster-than-expected permafrost thaw.

This graphic from Climate Action Tracker shows the gap between current and
policies and actions (which would result in 2.5 – 2.9 degrees warming by
2100), and what is needed to meet the Paris Agreement’s goal of 1.5 degrees
average warming.

While the world has made progress in cutting carbon emissions and the clean
energy transition is progressing, it is not happening fast enough. In
October 2025, UN Secretary General Antonio Guiterrez acknowledged
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2025/oct/28/change-course-now-humanity-has-missed-15c-climate-target-says-un-head>that
the Paris Agreement goal of keeping global warming “well below” 1.5 degrees
above pre-industrial temperatures is likely out of reach, and the 2025 UN
Emissions Gap Report warns
<https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2025> that if
countries maintain current policies, average warming will reach 2.8 degrees
Celsius by the end of the century. This level of warming means more extreme
heat, less predictable extreme weather events, mass displacements, greater
risks of food and water security crises, and growing instability in
multiple regions of the world.

This diagram from NOAA illustrates the concept of “peak shaving.” The blue
lines represent the impact SAI could have on temperature under an
aggressive emissions mitigation scenario.

In response to this alarming trajectory, there is growing interest
<https://www.ametsoc.org/ams/about-ams/ams-statements/statements-of-the-ams-in-force/climate-intervention/>
in
the research, development, and possible deployment of climate interventions
aimed at minimizing the worst impacts of our current path and allowing more
time for decarbonization. Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI), a
type of Solar
Radiation Modification
<https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/solar-radiation-modification-noaa-state-science-factsheet>,
is one such intervention. SAI would reduce the amount of planet-warming
sunlight reaching the Earth by introducing reflective particles into the
stratosphere, similar to the cooling effect observed from large volcanic
eruptions or increases in air pollution. Such action comes with its own set
of security dynamics and governance challenges, however.

This storymap aims to explore the security dynamics associated with a
fictional but plausible proposed SAI deployment in 2030. It discusses the
potential reactions and priorities of different countries and regions. It
identifies key issues that the scientific research community and relevant
policymakers need to consider as they prepare for increased attention to
climate intervention as part of the toolkit to manage climate change.
Methodology Note

This storymap presents an overview of potential security and foreign policy
dynamics associated with a fictional yet plausible scenario of a proposed
high-latitude climate intervention. The storymap does not discuss
scientific or governance issues related to SAI in depth. The findings are
based on desk research, results from a tabletop exercise, and expert
interviews. The tabletop exercise involved more than 25 foreign and
security policy experts from multiple countries.

In the tabletop exercise on which this storymap is based, the United States
was not played by a team and is therefore not included in the analysis
below. For purposes of the exercise, the United States was envisioned as a
country in flux, going from the prominent climate action of the Biden
Administration to the step backs on climate policy from the Trump
Administration. In the below 2030 scenario, the United States was presented
as governed by a newly-elected moderate leader whose platform included
restoring multilateralism, tackling shared problems, and reimagining U.S.
institutions, including a strong civil service.

The tabletop exercise and this storymap leverage a simulator created by
Reflective to visualize the potential local effects of different SAI
interventions compared to continued warming. Read more about the simulator
here
<https://simulator.reflective.org/?var=tas&spatial_agg=WGI+Reference&decade_visualization=2091-2100&ssp_scenario=SSP2-4.5&temp_target=1.5&start_year=2035&ramp_up=10>
.

Participants receive a briefing ahead of an interactive exercise on SAI and
geopolitics during New York Climate Week, September 2025.
The 2030 Scenario

Arctic sea ice extent for November 2025, compared to the median extent from
1981 to 2010 (pink).

The year is 2030. Extreme climate-driven weather events are intensifying
worldwide. Scientists are warning that within the next five years, the
Arctic Ocean is projected to be seasonally ice-free. There is also
increasing concern among the climate science community, though less
certainty, about faster-than-expected permafrost thaw, Greenland ice sheet
melting, and the fate of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation
(AMOC).

These concerns drive a new, more intense set of climate security
discussions at global security and economic forums, such as the Munich
Security Conference and the World Economic Forum. Security leaders warn
that the fallout from such changes, including major disruptions to global
food, water, and energy systems, could lead to instability and potentially
even conflict.

Against this backdrop, a public–private consortium led by Canada and the
United Kingdom has proposed an urgent deployment of stratospheric aerosol
injection (SAI) over the Arctic, designed specifically to preserve sea ice
and slow Greenland melt. The consortium aims to move quickly, but is also
seeking buy-in and legitimacy from other countries and the broader
international community. They have proactively convened key stakeholders on
the sidelines of the annual UN General Assembly meeting in New York to make
their case and recruit additional consortium members.

The Canada-UK proposal has prompted significant debate. Countries at low
latitudes have expressed concerns that Arctic deployment may not cool them
sufficiently, but could disrupt the hydrological cycle and affect
precipitation patterns. Meanwhile, other Arctic nations are concerned about
the geopolitical implications (never mind the practicalities) of such a
deployment in their backyard.
Technical Details

The fictional consortium’s proposed deployment is as follows: 3Tg of sulfur
dioxide (SO2) will be injected annually over the Arctic at 60°N between
2035 and 2040, with the amount of material injected increasing over
subsequent decades to a peak of 14Tg globally by 2100 (this scenario has
been pre-loaded into the Simulator). The program aims to stabilize global
temperatures at 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels, under a world following
SSP2-4.5 (“modest emissions reductions”). The proposed deployment at peak
is comparable to the 10.4-15.5Tg of SO2 released during the 1991 Mt.
Pinatubo eruption
<https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2022JD038446>, which
ejected significant amounts of ash and gas into the atmosphere, cooling the
planet on average about 1° F (0.6° C).

A comparison of projected 2091-2100 Arctic sea ice extent used for the
exercise, without SAI deployment (left) and with SAI deployment (right),
illustrating the possible benefits of SAI (graphic from Reflective simulator
<https://simulator.reflective.org/?var=tas&spatial_agg=WGI+Reference&decade_visualization=2091-2100&ssp_scenario=SSP2-4.5&temp_target=1.5&start_year=2035&ramp_up=10>
).
The Players

How might key actors react to such a proposal? What are some important
questions they might need answered? The analysis here is rooted in a
combination of desk research, findings from a tabletop exercise, and expert
interviews. This is a selection of potential stakeholders, but it is not
comprehensive. It does not reflect the perspectives of all key players,
including multilateral institutions, private sector actors, and other
relevant countries.

Projections from Reflective’s simulator show the hypothetical SAI
deployment could mitigate global temperature rise. But geopolitics,
mistrust, and potential harms and inequitable impacts challenge unified
global decisionmaking (graphic from Reflective simulator
<https://simulator.reflective.org/?var=tas&spatial_agg=WGI+Reference&decade_visualization=2091-2100&ssp_scenario=SSP2-4.5&temp_target=1.5&start_year=2035&ramp_up=10>
).
African UnionArctic and Geopolitical Interests

The African Union is neither a member nor an observer of the Arctic Council
and lacks direct policies related to the Arctic. However, changes in Arctic
shipping routes would have implications for African trade, particularly in
relation
<https://www.middlebury.edu/institute/sites/default/files/2024-07/cold-calculations-arctic-shipping-routes_miis_ited-working-paper_june2024.pdf?fv=vMZXNi3A#:~:text=As%20one%20of%20the%20world%27s,just%20lost%20revenue%20in%20tolls.>
to
the Suez Canal and emerging West African ports. The African Union
recognizes that Arctic resource competition and shifting global alliances
could have an indirect impact on African economies and diplomacy. Some
analysts argue that African states should consider pursuing observer status
to protect trade and geopolitical interests.
Potential Response to the Consortium Proposal

   - The African Union would likely be concerned about the impact of a
   high-latitude intervention on temperatures and precipitation in Africa, as
   well as the potential differential effects across the continent. As a
   regional body, it would be unlikely to support an intervention that was
   perceived as harming some countries on the continent, even if it appeared
   to help others.
   - The African Union would likely also raise questions regarding equity,
   specifically regarding the representation of developing countries in the
   scientific research that led to the consortium proposal, as well as in the
   initial composition of consortium countries.

West Africa could face more diminished water availability under an SAI
deployment than without one (graphic from Reflective simulator
<https://simulator.reflective.org/?var=tas&spatial_agg=WGI+Reference&decade_visualization=2091-2100&ssp_scenario=SSP2-4.5&temp_target=1.5&start_year=2035&ramp_up=10>
).
ChinaArctic and Geopolitical Interests

China is an observer in the Arctic Council and has declared itself a
“near-Arctic state.” Its Polar Silk Road
<https://www.economist.com/china/2024/06/19/china-and-russia-have-chilling-plans-for-the-arctic?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=17210591673&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gclsrc=aw.ds&gad_source=1&gad_campaignid=17210596221&gbraid=0AAAAADBuq3JSyfijNafEMUwCyRYrJ74gw&gclid=CjwKCAiA3L_JBhAlEiwAlcWO55qZ3nU_uvmT2kHH5LiWkvoBmZ1lFxwPFDNXX6BavhQ648dGl0lGERoCgN0QAvD_BwE>
strategy
integrates Arctic shipping routes into its Belt and Road Initiative, though
progress has been uneven. China invests heavily in Arctic energy projects,
particularly in Russia, and operates advanced research capabilities,
including polar icebreakers and Arctic research stations. While ambitions
are expansive, many projects face political and financial hurdles.
Sino-Russian cooperation has deepened, however, with joint coast guard
agreements and military exercises in Arctic waters.
Potential Response to the Consortium Proposal

   - China may take a mildly oppositional public stance on such a proposal
   while privately supporting other countries taking the lead on an SRM
   deployment. Beijing may see an opportunity to be a free rider – its own
   science would likely indicate it would benefit, yet it would not bear the
   responsibility of conducting the diplomatic outreach for the project.
   - China could also view the proposal as a geopolitical opportunity to
   strengthen its relationships in the developing world, claiming to act as
   their champion in the face of Western climate imperialism.

Chinese Premier Li Qiang meets with European Commission President Ursula
von der Leyen in 2023. (Dati Bendo / European Union)
European Union (EU)Arctic and Geopolitical Interests

The EU is an observer in the Arctic Council and has strengthened its Arctic
policy <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-arctic_en> since 2021. Its
priorities are preserving peace, slowing Arctic climate change, and
supporting the sustainable development of Arctic communities. While lacking
territorial claims, the EU seeks influence as a regulatory power and
trading partner. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also affects many elements of
the European Union’s multifaceted Arctic policy.
Potential Response to the Consortium Proposal

   - The EU may advocate for a multilateral scientific assessment to
   understand the risks, costs, and regional impacts before any decision on
   joining the consortium.
   - Brussels may also be concerned about NATO cohesion in the face of a
   proposed Arctic SAI deployment and how Russia might respond.

An SAI deployment could mitigate European temperature rise amid concern
over climate impacts (graphic from Reflective simulator
<https://simulator.reflective.org/?var=tas&spatial_agg=WGI+Reference&decade_visualization=2091-2100&ssp_scenario=SSP2-4.5&temp_target=1.5&start_year=2035&ramp_up=10>,
above). However, the EU and NATO are most immediately concerned with
threats from Russia (below).

(European Union)
MexicoArctic and Geopolitical Interests

Mexico is neither a member nor an observer of the Arctic Council and does
not have a formal Arctic policy. Its engagement with Arctic issues comes
indirectly, largely through global climate diplomacy, where Arctic change
is discussed in broader governance contexts. There is no evidence of Mexico
seeking observer status or articulating Arctic geopolitical ambitions.
Potential Response to the Consortium Proposal

   - Mexico is likely to have concerns about the impact of such a
   deployment on temperature and precipitation in its backyard, and will
   likely be strongly aligned with the African Union and other developing
   countries on issues of equity, representation, and shared governance.

Mexico’s Undersecretary for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights, Enrique
Ochoa (right), represented Mexico at the COP30 climate summit in Brazil in
November 2025. (Government of Mexico)
NorwayArctic and Geopolitical Interests

As a member of the Arctic Council, Norway considers the Arctic its top
strategic theater. Its 2024 Arctic strategy, Norway in the High North –
Arctic Policy for a New Reality
<https://www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/norway-in-the-high-north-arctic-policy-for-a-new-reality/id3116990/>,
reflects heightened geopolitical risks due to Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Priorities include defense, infrastructure, sustainable development, and
cooperation with NATO allies. Norway emphasizes knowledge leadership on
Russian and Chinese activities and regards northern presence as vital to
national security.
Potential Response to the Consortium Proposal

   - Norway would likely share the EU’s interest in a consensus
   multilateral scientific assessment to underpin any further action by the
   consortium.
   - Oslo would also be particularly attuned to the Russian response to the
   proposal and would be concerned about Moscow’s military build-up.

Paratroopers train for Arctic operations during a joint Norwegian-US
exercise in 2024 in Norway. (Sgt. Avery Cunningham / U.S. Army)
RussiaArctic and Geopolitical Interests

Russia views the Arctic as a core national security domain. As a founding
member of the Arctic Council, it has long sought to leverage the region’s
economic resources and control over the Northern Sea Route (NSR). In recent
years, its Arctic policy has shifted toward militarization
<https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2021/01/27/release-new-report-by-security-experts-warns-of-gray-zone-warfare-and-great-power-conflict-potential-in-arctic-if-climate-change-goes-uncurbed/>,
with expanded bases, infrastructure, and surveillance. The Arctic contains
vast oil and gas reserves central to Russia’s energy strategy, and Moscow
treats the NSR as internal waters, in conflict with international views.
Growing cooperation
<https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/2023/10/05/new-journal-article-climate-change-has-awakened-the-polar-dragon/>
with
China—both commercially and militarily—has further reshaped Russia’s Arctic
calculus.
Potential Response to Consortium Proposal

   - Russia may perceive a world with global warming above 1.5 degrees
   Celsius as offering strategic advantages in the Arctic.
   - Moscow could engage in oppositional behavior in response to the
   consortium proposal, including disinformation campaigns aimed at exploiting
   public scientific skepticism and portraying the consortium as neo-colonial
   or imperialist.
   - It could also use such a proposal as an excuse for deploying military
   assets “preventively” in the Arctic, or develop plans to disrupt or delay
   any potential deployment.

A Russian nuclear-powered icebreaker. (Kiselev d / CC BY-SA 3.0)

Exercise participants roleplaying as policymakers consider positions on a
hypothetical SAI proposal.
Key ConclusionsGeopolitics, Not Science, Will Drive Initial Reactions

Countries are likely to default to their geopolitical instincts when
confronted with an Arctic SAI proposal. Scientific arguments alone will not
shape early responses; instead, states will interpret the deployment
through the lens of strategic advantage, regional influence, and existing
rivalries.
Russia Represents the Central Security Risk in Any Arctic SAI Scenario

Given its geographic proximity, military footprint, and history of
suspicion toward Western-led climate interventions, Russia is the pivotal
security challenge. Moscow could interpret an Arctic SAI effort as a
strategic threat, either environmental or geopolitical, and respond by
further militarizing the Arctic, interfering with operations, or attempting
to sabotage the effort.
A Trusted Multilateral Assessment is Essential for Stability

A credible, multilateral scientific assessment, recognized by key Arctic
stakeholders, is crucial to reducing misperceptions. It must provide a
shared baseline of evidence on projected impacts not only in the Arctic but
also in non-Arctic regions that may experience secondary climate effects.
Such an assessment could help reduce security anxieties.
Without Early Trust-Building, Risks of Miscalculation Rise

If states enter the decision-making process without a shared scientific
understanding or established diplomatic channels, geopolitical fears will
prevail. This increases the risk of misinterpretation, escalation, and
hardening of security postures. Once a deployment proposal is on the table,
states will become more defensive and less open to persuasion.
Trust-building, quiet diplomacy, and scientific collaboration need to be
established early and well before any government is asked to take a
position.
*Source: The Council on Strategic Risks*

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