Hi Graeme, The threat is that countries will increase production of HCFC 22 to generate more HFC-23 waste gases, which can then be captured and sold via the CDM; this perverse incentive occurs because the value of the waste gases via the CDM is greater than the value of the refrigerants. There's two threats here really, first the threat of more ozone depleting substance production, and second, as Michael Wara has pointed out, the inefficiency of this system, since it only costs about $100 million to install this equipment, yet over $6 billion could be earned on the CDM market. And, of course, such projects do very little to contribute to fostering sustainable development in developing countries, one of the ostensible objectives of the CDM. The UNFCCC parties have struggled with this issue over the years, at one point limiting credits to existing HCFC-22 facilities, then reversing course under some circumstances. It's a quintessential example of the gaming of the flexible mechanisms, but by no means the only one! wil
Dr. Wil Burns, Editor in Chief Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 1702 Arlington Blvd. El Cerrito, CA 94530 USA Ph: 650.281.9126 Fax: 510.779.5361 <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] <http://www.jiwlp.com/> http://www.jiwlp.com SSRN site (selected publications): <http://ssrn.com/author=240348> http://ssrn.com/author=240348 Skype ID: Wil.Burns
