Dear colleagues, With respect to the view below on India and China as the main hindrances to a deal with quantified targets, I would encourage perhaps a little bit more effort to look at the arguments from all perspectives.
Most of us on this list will likely be familiar with the argument put forward by India and China: quantified targets in the absence of explicit burden sharing risks locking these countries (or at least India) into relatively low per capita emission levels. The argument cannot be dismissed entirely out of hand. The idea, of course, is that without explicit burden sharing, the risk is that the global target will be taken seriously, Annex 1 targets will continue to be dictated by national politics and will, therefore, be weak, and the residual burden will be placed on the developing world. The perception, at least in India, is that countries such as India are being asked to pick up the slack for the decade and more of minimal change in Annex 1 countries post 1992. The fear here is that in 2020, we will see more of the "we are all in this together so let's not talk about the past but look forward" rhetoric. I can see how this fear may seem overblown sitting in Western Europe. We certainly seem to be moving to a world where the notion that China would accept any form of residual target-setting seems unlikely. But it may help to also understand the sense in much of non-Annex 1 (and certainly in India) that the 1992-2010 period seems to have been about displacing a burden, and what we saw at Copenhagen was an attempt by the large industrializing countries to draw a line in the sand. I would welcome any thoughts on whether this burden sharing argument for resisting global quantitative targets is seen as at all legitimate or respectable in other parts of the world. TO take the discussion further, many of us here are wondering aloud about the wisdom of India allying tightly with China. China is not India, in either its absolute emission levels, per capita levels, or energy intensity of its economy. Given CHina's levels, it is unlikely to be substantially constrained by any sort of carbon target, and based on Copenhaged pledges, will exceed Europe's per capita levels by 2020. By contrast, Indian emissions are growing fast, but starting from a very very low base. And the intensity performance has actually been pretty good -- 30% decrease between 1994- 2007. I certainly agree that, at the end of the day, we have to be thinking about absolute emissions, and not intensity. But, the numbers suggest that the challenge of any sort of absolute carbon constraint will be much harder for INdia to manage than certainly any other major economy, given its very low starting point, at least given current technology. If anyone is interested, I can share the numbers. India's story is really quite different from China's and the lumping together of India and China in the western media and academic discourse has not helped, nor has the failure of the Indian government to draw the distinction between the two countries over the last decade. What do others feel about the "Chindianisation" of at least a part of climate politics? I want to be clear that this is not about being an India apologist. LIke many others here, I am pretty critical of INdian policies within our own domestic debate, including of the tendencies of INdia's elite to reinforce their hold on privilege by invoking the poor as justification for our climate politics. But the sort of blanket pronouncement that India and China were the main hindrance at Copenhagen, when reported in media here, really tend to shut down internal debate, and reinforce long-seated tendencies toward suspicion and conspiracy theories. I am not sure it is positive, either for the politics or for our collective understanding. To my mind, the Copenhagen story was really about incommensurate frames. Given the muscle flexing by CHina backed by BASIC, I am not sure a long term target can be won in subsequent rounds (nor am I sure of its value given weak short term targets, and the lack of any sort of robust compliance regime). On the other hand, explicit burden sharing based on one of the many formulae out there purporting to balance responsibility and capacity, is also likely to be outside the range of political possibilities. The interesting questions, to me, are about the re-imagining of the global climate regime that appear to be going on behind the scenes in the months since Copenhagen. I would love to have some discussion on this list serv on these re-imaginings. And if we do have more leaked tapes, it would be helpful to get a round of somewhat more open-ended perspectives so that we can collectively piece together what this particular elephant looks like. With apologies for an unduly long email, Regards, Navroz Dubash On Tue, May 11, 2010 at 11:45 PM, Arild Angelsen <[email protected]>wrote: > Colleagues, > > Well, I was not in the room, but nothing of what was said is surprising > (except perhaps Sarkozy wording); it was just a reconfirmation of the > country’s official positions. The conclusion that comes out of from this > meeting and COP15 generally was that China and India were (and still are) > the main hindrances for a deal with quantified targets. Most NGOs have yet > to realize that, and being in Copenhagen I was surprised to see how gently > the two countries were treated. For someone who has realized their role, see > this nice and provocative presentation by DeLong (particularly point 2: *Beg > the Rulers of China and India): * > http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2010/04/2010-peder-sather-symposium-after-copenhagen-what-can-be-done-to-meet-the-economic-and-environmental-challenges.html > > *Arild Angelsen* > > Professor, Dept. of Economics & Resource Management, > > Norwegian Univ. of Life Sciences (UMB), Ås, Norway > > & Senior Associate, Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), > > Bogor, Indonesia. > > > > *From:* [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] *On > Behalf Of *Greg White > *Sent:* Tuesday, May 11, 2010 6:11 PM > *To:* [email protected] > *Subject:* [gep-ed] Copenhagen "secret recording" > > > > Dear Colleagues: > > > > Perhaps people have already seen this: * > http://www.spiegel.de/video/video-1063770.html*<http://www.spiegel.de/video/video-1063770.html> > > > > The Guardian covered it as well. * > http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/07/secret-copenhagen-talks-climate-recording > *<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/may/07/secret-copenhagen-talks-climate-recording> > > > > Apart from the ominous music cues - and the gentle treatment of Merkel - I > wonder if it's a fair distillation of the "secret recording." For students, > it might be useful heuristically - especially when Sarokozy raises > "organized hypocrisy" as an issue. (Wonder if he's read Krasner...) > > > > Does anyone have any thoughts/insights on the video's treatment of the > "secret recording"? > > > > Thanks, > > > > Greg > -- Navroz K. Dubash Senior Fellow Centre for Policy Research Dharma Marg Chanakyapuri New Delhi 110 021 India Tel: +91-11-2611-5273/74/75/76 Fax: +91-11-2687-2746 Email: [email protected] www.cprindia.org
