Dear GEP-Ed Colleagues, 

 

I just wished to share my latest journal article on Moral Duties, Compliance and Polycentric Climate Governance (which just came out in International Environmental Agreements). In this paper, I develop a normative cartography to address the problem of non-compliance with duties of climate change mitigation in a context of polycentric governance. 

 

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10784-020-09494-4?wt_mc=Internal.Event.1.SEM.ArticleAuthorOnlineFirst&utm_source=ArticleAuthorOnlineFirst&utm_medium=email&utm_content=AA_en_06082018&ArticleAuthorOnlineFirst_20200710

 

I hope it will be of interest to you! For those without institutional access, please email me. 

 

All the very best, 

 

Alex

 

 

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Abstract

Contributions to the climate governance literature have highlighted the importance of recognizing its new polycentric nature, which includes roles for non-state and subnational actors in climate change mitigation and in leadership for climate action. Yet, the literature is missing a normative cartography—that is, a mapping of the distribution of moral duties in the real world—which is tailored to a context of polycentric governance. This paper answers the question: how can moral duties be distributed in a context of polycentric climate governance such as to diminish the problem of non-compliance? This implies the following question: do duties change in situations of non-compliance in a context of polycentric governance, and if so how? Acknowledging polycentric governance is the key to an effective distribution of moral duties, as it allows for a more accurate mapping of non-state and subnational actors’ duties in leading the charge against climate change. Correspondingly, a normative cartography fitted to this context will be instrumental in showing how morally informed climate governance can diminish the problem of non-compliance. This paper focusses on the distribution of moral duties in a context of polycentric governance as a contributing factor to inducing agents to act according to the collective goal. It argues that a more fine-grained distribution of climate duties, tailored to polycentric climate governance, contributes to addressing the problem of non-compliance.

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Alexandre Gajevic Sayegh, Ph.D.
Professeur adjoint
Département de science politique
Université Laval
www.alexgajevic.com

T  418 656-2131, poste 408841
Pavillon Charles-De Koninck, local 4409
Québec (Québec) G1V 0A6

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