Dear colleagues,

Thank you for your responses. Let me clarify that what I previously included is NOT the official ENB analysis but a rough draft containing my own personal observations and unpublished thoughts on the process. The officially published ENB analysis, edited by Pam Chasek, can be found at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb1960e.pdf It contains additional information, including on non-HCFC issues such as illegal trade of ODS. Sincere apologies for any possible misunderstanding.

Allison, it would indeed be interesting to hear from you what Steve Anderson says. Please let us know. The more perspectives we hear the better.

Cheers,

Rado


Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Western Ontario
Social Science Centre
London, Ontario
Canada N6A 5C2
Tel. +1(519) 661-2111 ext. 85023
Fax +1(519) 661-3904
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

On 25-Sep-07, at 2:14 PM, phaas wrote:

Thanks Rado for sharing this. What is the coy reference to to "another important G8 player"? In the past ENB has excelled at citing actors by names, and not hiding behind UN social conventions.

----- Original Message ----- From: "Radoslav Dimitrov" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Wil Burns" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; "Global Environmental Education" <gep-ed@listserve1.allegheny.edu>
Cc: "Samuel Barkin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Tuesday, September 25, 2007 1:54 PM
Subject: correction


Oops, I just realized that the draft commentary I included in my previous message contained one paragraph written by someone else (another ENB writer who was also in Montreal). Below is the corrected, original version of my draft. I hope this information is useful.

Cheers,

Rado


The nineteenth meeting of the parties to the Montreal Protocol opened to much fanfare. The meeting marked the twentieth anniversary of the Montreal Protocol, a treaty that pundits regard as a spectacular success in global environmental politics. In the keynote address, former Canadian Prime Minster of Canada Brian Mulroney portrayed the Montreal Protocol as “the single most successful international agreement to date.” This sentiment appears to be widely in the policy world, as various speakers from government delegations, international organizations and environmental NGOs showered the process with superlatives throughout the six-day meeting in Montreal. Newspapers around the world ran articles that lavished the event with attention.

EXCEEDING EXPECTATIONS

The ozone process could easily have afforded to lie on its laurels and bask in the approbation of the world. Instead, delegates moved swiftly to forge out yet another key agreement, on accelerating the HCFCs phase-out. Thus, instead of merely receiving the accolades, the process produced a new substantive proof that it deserves them well. The remainder of this analysis reflects on the dynamics and achievements of the meeting, the considerable strengths of the ozone process and the challenges that lie ahead.

The celebration provided the context of the meeting and infused it with an upbeat and festive atmosphere. The well-organized and productive meeting in Montreal demonstrated that the process is a smooth and effective mechanism for decisionmaking. Delegates maintained a positive and cordial tone during the negotiations, displayed a constructive spirit of cooperation, and made mutual compromises. None of the tectonic rifts and acrimonious debates that characterize some other international policy processes were evident here.

ANOTHER NEW HORIZON: HCFCs
Switching gears to move faster on eliminating these substances has widely been regarded as the next logical step in the evolution of the Montreal Protocol process. What took everyone by surprise is how quickly events unfolded. Many said that the issue came to the fore very quickly, perhaps too quickly. Even veteran observers of the process said they had not expected a decision before MOP21, and were astonished at the rapid pace of progress in the discussions. When the idea of accelerated phaseout was first raised six years ago, it had met strong opposition by key players, and until earlier this year no one had expected a decision was possible at this stage. Some delegations even admitted that they were not fully prepared to engage in in-depth negotiations at this meeting, and may have some explaining to do back home.

Various conducive factors converged to facilitate rapid progress. China, the biggest country producer of HCFCs and main opponent of accelerating the phase-out showed far more flexibility than anyone expected. Another important player, while not supporting acceleration, decided not to oppose it actively either and discretely withdrew from the discussion in the middle of the week. Rumour had it that their president’s signature on a recent G-8 declaration had tied the delegation’s hands on the issue.

Among the remaining players, various country interests converged to work favourably in the same direction. Industrialized countries stressed the high global warming potential of HCFCs and the climate benefits of their elimination. Developing countries saw new stronger commitments as a mechanism for increasing financial resources available through the multilateral fund. They insisted on a “total package” involving agreements on HCFCs, increased Fund contributions and access to alternatives. They stuck to their guns on linking these issues, and succeeded in securing a commitment to stable and sufficient funding. For everyone involved, accelerating the phase-out was also necessary for maintaining stable levels of funding in the multilateral fund. Insiders openly discussed the financial reasons to seek acceleration: with 95 percent of other ODSs successfully eliminated, the Fund had been drying up, and new policy commitments were seen as a way to ensure continued funding. More fundamentally, the successful implementation of the treaty had created a paradoxical problem: with most of the goals achieved, the process faced the prospect of having nothing left to do, and in need of a reason to live. These diverse factors thrust a powerful tail wind in the sails that propelled the negotiations forward.


TILLING NEW FIELDS: CLIMATE CHANGE

One major country displayed particular enthusiasm about taking climate-related action outside of the climate process. Reportedly, their delegation had “marching orders” to bring climate into the ozone process before an upcoming high-level meeting on climate change next week, and thus draw attention away from the UNFCCC.

TAKING STOCK: SUCCESSES AND FUTURE CHALLENGES
The outcome was what delegates referred to as a “historic agreement” to accelerate the HCFC phaseout. This agreement opens a new chapter in the life of the Montreal Protocol. The new policy commitments strengthen the fight to protect the ozone layer, give the Montreal Protocol process a new raison d’etre, and ensure “the sustainability of funding” by providing new justification for fund replenishment. Politically, the new agreement may take attention away from the ongoing issues of methyl bromide use and illegal trade problems, and reduce the pressure on key offenders in those regards. It also provides an easy way to take action on climate change and shift the focus away from the Kyoto Protocol. The new HCFC agreement is yet another gem in a crown that is already resplendent. Clearly, the Montreal Protocol process has much to boast. It enjoys broad active participation, with most of the countries in the world being parties to the treaty. The Protocol and its amendments are ambitious policy instruments and stipulate stringent regulations of many substances. The implementation of these policies has been strong, and as many pointed out, ninety-five percent of ODSs have been eliminated. The new agreement helps the process remain on the pedestal of global environmental politics.

Still, problems remain and further challenges lie ahead. Illegal trade of ODSs remains the weak spot of ozone policy, and curbing the black markets will continue to be a struggle. One NGO speaker publicly accused his government for supplying the black markets. Methyl bromide also remains a contentious issue. In Montreal, much energy was spent debating how to measure stocks. A regional group kept challenging partners to match its own achievements in phasing out MB, and succeeded in gaining additional ground. The fact that a heavy-handed player yielded to the pressure and accepted to reduce its methyl bromide quantities for critical use exemptions could be taken as an indication that a complete phaseout is a matter of time. The eventual phaseout of HCFCs may have unexpected and undesirable consequences, given that the negative impacts of HCFC alternatives are of concern. Environmental NGOs stressed that one alternative in particular, HFCs, have a global warming potential far greater than HCFCs and reliance on them may create more problems than it solves. Developing countries appeared to be most concerned with possible negative impacts of alternatives and persistently called for studies on the matter. After all, HCFCs that are now headed to the guillotine were introduced as a solution to the CFCs problem. The logical question is whether the next solution will also become the next problem? Accelerating the phaseout at MOP19 is undoubtedly a notable achievement. Yet, the choice of particular substitutes and policy instruments used to implement it will be of equal importance.

The ultimate weakness of the process is that, despite all political successes in international cooperation, the ecological problem of ozone depletion has not been solved. As the scientific presentations during the meeting revealed, current stratospheric ozone levels remain low, the Antarctic hole is at its worst, and skin cancer cases are expected to multiply several times in the next decade. The international policy process established to restore the ecological balance remains accountable for the end results and those are ultimately measured in ecosystem and public health.



On 24-Sep-07, at 11:10 AM, Wil Burns wrote:

You're quite right, Sam. However, what the faster phaseout does do is, potentially, buy us some time in terms of when atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases would reach the point where forcings would push us past the 2C threshold that everyone acknowledges as particularly foreboding, and at which point some of the non-linear forcings may occur. Such is our lot in life where that's the extent of the good news, but perhaps in the interim technological change, peak oil and political impetus can transform climate policy before the worse potential impacts of climate change are visited on us, and perhaps more importantly, the world's most vulnerable populations.
wil

-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Samuel Barkin
Sent: Monday, September 24, 2007 7:30 AM
To: gep-ed@listserve1.allegheny.edu
Subject: HCFCs and Kyoto

A thought on the new Montreal Protocol/HCFC agreement and climate
change, following up on the several emails on GEPED on the topic
yesterday. Various commentators have argued that this agreement does
anywhere from twice to five times as much for climate change as does
Kyoto. And this may well be the case for some periods of time in between
the new baseline year and the old phase-out date of 2040. But in the
long term, it strikes me that the new HCFC agreement does not do all
that much for climate change. The parties to the agreement had all
already agreed to a phaseout - this agreement moves the dates forward by
a decade. But a decade in climatological terms isn't all that much.
After 2040, this agreement makes no difference at all to climate change. Kyoto, on the other hand, was about setting new emissions levels, not changing the schedule for emissions levels already agreed to. As such, its achievements (however modest) could be expected to alter long- term behavior by setting new baselines for expectations. As such, it strikes me that comparisons of the climate-change effects of the two agreements are misplaced, in that the HCFC agreement does not have new long- term
ameliorative effects on climate change. Thoughts?

Sam Barkin

Samuel Barkin
Associate Professor of Political Science
University of Florida





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