Jeff King <[email protected]> writes: > Actually, there are only two callers left these days. One of them leaks, > and the other immediately closes the zstream. So something like: > > diff --git a/sha1_file.c b/sha1_file.c > index 09ad64ce55..cea003d182 100644 > --- a/sha1_file.c > +++ b/sha1_file.c > @@ -978,10 +978,10 @@ static void *unpack_sha1_rest(git_zstream *stream, void > *buffer, unsigned long s > while (status == Z_OK) > status = git_inflate(stream, Z_FINISH); > } > - if (status == Z_STREAM_END && !stream->avail_in) { > - git_inflate_end(stream); > + git_inflate_end(stream); > + > + if (status == Z_STREAM_END && !stream->avail_in) > return buf; > - } > > if (status < 0) > error("corrupt loose object '%s'", sha1_to_hex(sha1)); > @@ -2107,7 +2107,6 @@ int read_loose_object(const char *path, > *contents = unpack_sha1_rest(&stream, hdr, *size, > expected_sha1); > if (!*contents) { > error("unable to unpack contents of %s", path); > - git_inflate_end(&stream); > goto out; > } > if (check_sha1_signature(expected_sha1, *contents, > > seems reasonable. Doing it that (with my other patch on top) splits the > leak-fix and the not-yet-a-bug-but-confusing-error-return problems into > two separate patches. > > I dunno. There aren't that many callers of unpack_sha1_rest(), so it may > not matter that much, but while we're here...
Yeah, I agree that it is a reasonable thing to do.
